

About Author



Dr. Anala Andini is a distinguished academician and orator having presented more than 100 invited lectures, workshops and seminars. She has an outstanding career with a wide range of experience in teaching and research. Having received her formal schooling in Kannada medium, she holds degree in law from Mangalore University. Dr. Anala received Ph.D. in Women and Law from Kuvempu University. In the backdrop of long years of experience in legal literacy, She has more than 26 years of teaching experience. Her teaching and research interests include Jurisprudence, Constitutional Law, Human Rights, Teaching and Research Methodology, Women and Law, Environmental Law, besides guiding Masters and Ph.D students. Dr. Anala has more than 20 articles and book chapters to her credit.

978-81-985864-3-8



CRDEEP Publications

Rajendramagar, Dehradun, Uttarakhand India

Premier Publishers of Journals and Books

E-mail: editor@crdeepjournal.org

Call us at: 7895844394

Visit our store at: www.crdeepjournal.org

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

IN THE ABSENCE OF

DATA PROTECTION REGIME IN INDIA

1st Edition 2021



ISBN: 978-81-985864-3-8

Dr. ANALA A

CRDEEP PUBLICATIONS

ISBN: 978-81-985864-3-8

RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE ABSENCE OF DATA PROTECTION REGIME IN INDIA

By:

Dr. ANALA A

Associate Professor

C.B.R College of Law and Centre for Post Graduate Studies, Shivamogga

CRDEEP PUBLICATIONS

2021

FOREWORD

Privacy and Data Protection are essential concepts in modern digital communication and information-sharing. The book looks into how with the increasing use of technology in our daily lives, we generate vast amount of data that can be collected, stored, analysed, and shared by various entities, as happened in the Facebook and CA scandals. What India has done so far to protect an individual's privacy, both Parliament and Supreme Court. The book also discusses the limits that can be imposed on the right to privacy and how this right is developed and protected in U.K. and U.S.A. How international covenants and conventions are protecting the right to privacy. Understanding what privacy and data protection entail and why the matter is essential. First of all, I would like to warmly congratulate the Publishers and the Editors, CRDEEP Publishers on their initiative in bringing together – for the first time – between the covers of this Book a wealth of information and expertise across the nation on the creation and legal protection of the right to privacy. Privacy and Data Protection delves into the evolving importance of privacy in today's interconnected world. As the digital age expands, the book emphasizes the need to safeguard personal data, aligning with the growing significance of privacy as a fundamental human right. It explores key legal frameworks like India's Digital Personal Data Protection Bill (2023), which enhances individual control over personal information, ensuring transparency and accountability. This volume is a valuable resource for students, researchers, and legal professionals, offering an in-depth analysis of the challenges and legal frameworks shaping data privacy in the modern world. Privacy is an important human right enshrined in many international treaties. It is essential for the protection of human dignity and is one of the solid pillars of a democratic country. The right to life within Article 21 is freely interpreted and therefore, it includes all aspects that makes a person's life more meaningful. The concerned State authorities have passed numerous laws to protect the privacy of their subjects. However, these measures are not impenetrable and are restricted in some circumstances by the government. As more information is digitized and shared online, the need for data protection and privacy is growing. Data must be managed based on its perceived relevance since people care deeply about the privacy of their personal information. Along with that, technology is a sector which is growing every single minute and hence extensive discussion on this topic is the need of the hour. The book delves into all these significant aspects.


PRINCIPAL
CBR National College of Law
SHIMOGA-577 201

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

With immense pleasure and gratitude, I duly acknowledge the assistance and support received from various people who paved way for the completion of this research work.

Words cannot express my gratitude to my teachers and mentors for their invaluable patience and feedback. I also could not have undertaken this journey without my Guru, who generously provided knowledge and time. Additionally, this endeavour would not have been possible without the generous support from the primary data sources.

I am also grateful to my fellow teachers especially my college team, for their editing help, late-night feedback sessions, and moral support. Thanks should also go to the librarians, research assistants and study participants from the university, who impacted and inspired me.

Lastly, I would be remiss in not mentioning my family, especially my parents, spouse, and children. Their belief in me has kept my spirits and motivation high during this process. I would also like to thank my pet for all the entertainment and emotional support.

SAMPLE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	4
1.1 India and the Need for Data Protection.....	4
1.2 Locating the Meaning of Data Protection.....	6
1.3 The Right to Data Protection and Rule of Law.....	8
1.4 Right to Privacy and Its Relation with Data Protection.....	9
1.5 Principles of Data Protection.....	15
1.6 The Foundation of Data Protection Regime in India.....	17
CHAPTER 2: GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR DATA PROTECTION PRINCIPLES	22
2.1 Introduction.....	22
2.2 United Nation's Data Protection Principles.....	23
2.3 The Underpinnings of Right to Privacy within the ICCPR.....	25
2.4 Decoding the Unlawfulness of the Interferences with the Right to Informational Privacy.....	28
2.4.1 The need for sufficient safeguards.....	33
2.5 African Union's Data Protection Framework.....	35
2.5.1 Personal Data Protection Aspect of the Convention.....	37
2.6 OECD Principles on Data Protection.....	40
2.6.1 Collection Limitation Principle.....	42
2.6.2 Data Quality Principle.....	44
2.6.3 Purpose Specification Principle.....	44
2.6.4 Use Limitation Principle.....	45
2.6.5 Security Safeguards Principle.....	45
2.6.6 Openness Principle.....	45
2.6.7 Individual Participation Principle.....	46
2.6.8 Accountability Principle.....	47
2.7 Dissertation.....	48
CHAPTER 3: DATA PROTECTION IN EU, US AND UK	49
3.1 Introduction.....	49
3.2 Role of ECHR in Developing Data Protection Jurisprudence in EU.....	51
3.3 Important Definitions under GDPR.....	58
3.4 Principles of EU Data Protection Regime.....	59
3.4.1 Data Accountability Principle.....	59
3.4.2 Data security principle.....	59
3.4.3 The Storage Limitation Principle.....	60
3.4.4 Data Minimization Principle.....	61
3.4.5 Purpose Limitation Principle.....	62
3.4.6 Fairness Principle.....	63
3.4.7 Transparency Principle.....	64
3.5 Rights of Data Subjects under GDPR.....	64
3.5.1 Right to Rectification.....	65
3.5.2 Right to Data Portability.....	66
3.5.3 Right to Be Informed.....	66
3.5.4 Right to Erasure.....	70
3.6 International Data Transfer.....	71
3.7 The Link between Data Protection Laws and Privacy in the Legal System of European Union.....	72
3.7.1 Right to Privacy and Data Protection are Separate Yet Complimentary Rights.....	73
3.7.2 Data Protection Laws as a Subset of Right to Privacy.....	74
3.7.3 Right to Privacy and Data Protection Rights are Independent Rights.....	74
3.8 Reading the Right to Data Protection under the Article 8 of the ECHR.....	75
3.9 The New Data Protection Law Regime.....	77

3.10	Better Protection of the Data and New Opportunities for the Businesses	79
3.11	Rights and Obligations of Individuals under GDPR	81
3.11.1	Right to be forgotten	81
3.11.2	Right to portability of Data	81
3.11.3	Right to Information	82
3.11.4	Right to Seek Remedy	82
3.12	Data Protection in the United States	83
3.12.1	The Right to Privacy in United States	84
3.12.2	The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)	86
3.12.2	Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)	89
3.12.3	Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)	90
3.12.4	Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)	91
3.12.5	Video Privacy Protection Act, 1998	94
3.12.6	Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 1974	96
3.12.7	Gramm Leach Bliley Act, 1999	98
3.12.8	Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act, 2003	99
3.12.9	Federal Trade Commission Act, 1914	100
3.13	Data Protection in the United Kingdom	100
3.13.1	Features of the Data Protection Act of 2018	101
3.13.2	Brexit and GDPR	103
3.14	Dissertation	104
CHAPTER 4: DATA PROTECTION REGIME IN INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM		107
4.1	Introduction	107
4.2	The Information Technology Act, 2000	111
4.3	Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Person Data or Information) Rules, 2011	115
4.4	Privacy in the Health Sector	117
4.5	Existing Surveillance Regime in India	118
4.5.1	Privacy and Surveillance	119
4.6	How will the Doctrine of Proportionality be applied in India?	125
4.7	Right to Privacy and the Constitution of India	133
4.7.1	Privacy as a Natural Right	134
4.8	The Approach of Supreme Court on Right to Privacy	136
4.8.1	Clashes between spatial, institutional and decisional privacy	139
4.9	Puttaswamy and the Aftermath	141
4.10	Dissertation	143
CHAPTER 5: COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE DATA PROTECTION REGIME IN INDIA WITH REFERENCE TO EU, US & UK		147
5.1	Introduction	147
5.2	Scope of The Indian Data Protection Laws in India and Elsewhere	148
5.3	Application of Act to Processing of Personal Data	151
5.3.1	Personal Data, Non-Personal Data and Sensitive Data	153
5.4	Data Anonymisation	158
5.4.1	Points of Concern	160
5.5	Rights of Data Principals	162
5.5.1	Principles for Protection of Individual's Data	163
5.6	Obligations of Data Fiduciary	167
5.6.1	The lawfulness, fairness and transparency of processing principle	167
5.7	Element of Consent and Processing of Data Without Consent	169
5.7.1	Grounds for Processing of Personal Data Without Consent	171
5.7.2	Importance of Informational Self Determination	173

5.8 A Critique of Provisions of the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 Enabling Processing of Personal Data Without Consent	174
5.9 Sandbox Clauses	178
5.10 Data Protection Authority	180
5.10.1 Powers, Functions and Independence of Data Protection Authority	181
5.11 Baron Seeking Remedy: Curtailment of the Right of Data Principal	188
5.12 Data Localization	194
5.12.1 Understanding Data Localization	197
5.12.2 Data Localization in China	201
5.13 Brazil	202
5.14 Conclusion	207
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS	209
6.1 Introduction	209
6.2 Need for a Broader Scope of Data Protection	210
6.3 A Feeble Data Protection Authority	212
6.3.1 Composition of the Data Protection Authority	214
6.3.2 Terms and Conditions of Appointment	215
6.3.3 Powers of Data Protection Authority	217
6.4 Materializing the Principle of Informed Consent	218
6.4.1 Surveillance Reforms	219
6.4.2 The need to foster a Privacy Conscious Regime in India	220
6.5 Baron Seeking Remedies for Breach of Rights Guaranteed under the Bill	221
6.6 Need for Expansion of Rights of the Data Fiduciaries	221
6.7 The Need for a Transitional Period	222
6.8 Conclusion	224
BIBLIOGRAPHY	229

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 India and the Need for Data Protection

It is often said that Data is the new oil¹. With an intensely digitalized world and an increasingly digitalized India, the significance assumed by the data has reached unprecedented heights in the last couple of decades. The motive behind most of the cybersecurity attacks in India in the recent past has been aimed at stealing data. There have been numerous instances of health data², financial data³ and other important personal⁴ and sensitive data⁵ being compromised by the cyber attackers. Numerous instances of data breaches including the hacking of social media accounts⁶, theft of credit and debit card details and other privacy breaches go unreported due to the lack of stringent data protection laws in India that could afford adequate protection to the sensitive and personal data of the citizens in the recent past.

In an investigative report published by The Tribune Newspaper in the year 2018, made a sensational claim that entire Aadhar Database (containing personally identifiable information of over 1.3 billion Indians) could be accessed by paying a meagre sum of 500 INR⁷. The Aadhar breach was rightly described as the world's biggest data breach so far by think-tanks and the global media. Further, a report published by digital security firm Gemalto claimed that India accounts for over 37%

¹NANDAN KAMATH, LAW RELATING TO COMPUTERS, INTERNET, AND E-COMMERCE: A GUIDE TO CYBERLAWS AND THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000 121 (1ST ED. 2020)

²*Id.*

³*Id.*

⁴PAVAN DUGGAL, CYBERSECURITY LAW 42-103 (1ST ED. 2019)

⁵Jason Asbury, Maria McClelland, Kris Torgerson, India Vincent & Jennifer Boling, *Law and Business Technology: Cyber Security & Data Privacy Update*, 20 Transactions: TENN. J. BUS. L. 1065, 1067-71 (2019).

⁶*Id.*

⁷R. Khaira, *Rs 500, 10 Minutes, And You Have Access To Billion Aadhaar Details*. TRIBUNE INDIA NEWS SERVICE, (Nov, 2018.): <<https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/archive/nation/rs-500-10-minutes-and-you-have-access-to-billion-aadhaar-details-523361>

of the global data breaches⁸ and is second only to the United States in terms of the data breach⁹. The frequent breach of data in an increasingly data-driven economy has highlighted the void created by the non-existence of a robust data protection framework in India.

This Study has been taken up with the specific objective of studying the existing and upcoming data protection law in India while comparing it with the laws in advanced data protection regimes in order to highlight the lacunas in our data protection framework. The law of data protection is of particular concern to India due to innumerable factors, the most prominent of them being the extensively vast population of India¹⁰. India has over 500 million Internet users and the count growing at a rate of over 8% per annum; it is by far the biggest market in the digital economy as of today. With the digital economy in India headed towards an unprecedented boom¹¹, it may soon become a very impending challenge to address the issues arising out of voluminous transactions in the form of the digital medium.

In the recent past, India has also witnessed a fillip in the use of digital space in the sector of finance and with an influx of more advanced technologies and an aggressive posture from the government to promote digital transactions after the demonetization, has made the use of data even more significant and prone to misuse at the same time¹². The growth in usage of online platforms like Google Pay, BHIM, Paytm and numerous other start-ups facilitating digital transactions¹³ are testimony to the fact that the Indians have entered into an age where these digital mediums have become

⁸Dhiraj R. Doraiswamy, *Privacy and Data Protection in India*, 6 J.L. & CYBERWARFARE 166, 169-172 (2017).

⁹*Id.*

¹⁰S Singh, *Privacy and Data Protection in India: A Critical Assessment*, 53 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE, 104-111 (2012).

¹¹N Mathur, *India Now Has Over 500 Million Active Internet Users: IAMAI*. LIVENINT (Jan 2020) <<https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-now-has-over-500-million-active-internet-users-iamai-11588679804774.html>>

¹²*Id.*

¹³*Id.*

an indispensable aspect of our lives and thus there needs to be a strong and effective mechanism in place in order to provide adequate security to these transactions¹⁴.

With the penetration of high-speed Internet within the nooks and corners of the country, the threat to the informational privacy looms larger than ever now.¹⁵ While the digitalization of the economy has opened the way for a plethora of job opportunities in these sectors pertaining to Health, Education and Governance, the need to have a strong law in place in order to ensure maximum protection to these personally sensitive data of the individuals becomes more important than ever.

1.2 Locating the Meaning of Data Protection

Data Protection has been defined as one of the most abstract concepts in the law that is bereft of being ascribed a one-lined definition. Jurists have opined that the term “data protection” is a catch-all terminology that is used to denote everything that is associated with the processing of personal data¹⁶. The first ever data protection law – Sweden’s Data Act – was passed nearly 50 years ago, in 1973, and came into effect the following year. The Swedish Data Protection Authority made it illegal for any person or company to use information systems of any kind to handle personal data without a license. In the late 60s, citizens of the progressive Scandinavian nation had become concerned about the growing use and storage of personal data, and the Data Act was conceived to allay their fears.

Data protection refers to the practices, safeguards, and binding rules put in place to protect your personal information and ensure that you remain in control of it.

In short, you should be able to decide whether or not you want to share some

¹⁴Dhiraj R. Duraiswami, *Privacy and Data Protection in India*, J.L.&CYBERWARFARE 166, 169-72 (2017).

¹⁵SC notice on privacy concerns to Google, WhatsApp, Amazon, HINDUSTANTIMES, UPIs <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/sc-notice-on-privacy-concerns-to-google-whatsapp-amazon-upis-101612192948826.html>.

¹⁶David Wallace & Mark Visger, *Responding to the Call for a Digital Geneva Convention: An Open Letter to Brad Smith and the Technology Community*, 6 J.L.&CYBERWARFARE 3, 12- 13 (2018).

information, who has access to it, for how long, for what reason, and be able to modify some of this information, and more.

Two prongs of the data protection laws, that go on to build the lion's share of the meaning of data protection laws are "personal data" and "processing"¹⁷. These two concepts are focal to the analysis of the underlying rationale behind the data protection laws and hence require a considerable degree of attention¹⁸. The term processing is as wide as the entire law of data protection itself and thus it ought to be construed liberally in order to broaden the ambit of the protection conferred by it¹⁹. The term processing refers to any material activity that has a direct bearing on the data and this would go on to include, collection of data, its storage, its erasure, its usage, its dissemination²⁰.

Most of the advanced data protection regimes favour giving the widest possible meaning to the term. It has to be accepted that a loosely defined meaning of the term "processing" would go on to vitiate the very purpose behind having a data protection law²¹. The second aspect of the Data Protection Laws is of course the concept of "Personal Data."²² The term refers to anything that can be used to identify a person or any information that can be linked to the individual identity of a person²³. Following this very line of reasoning, the courts in the European Union have applied

¹⁷*Id.*

¹⁸*Id.*

¹⁹Umang Joshi, *Online Privacy and Data Protection in India: A Legal Perspective*, 7 NUALS L.J. 95, 101-103 (2013).

²⁰*Id.*

²¹Alibeigi, Ali, "Towards Standard Information Privacy, Innovations of the new General Data Protection Regulation" LIBRARY PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE (E-JOURNAL), 2840, (2019)..

<https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/libphilprac/2840> where in the author asserts that the personal data protection law is about individual's right to control his/her information while highlighting the approach of the European Jurisdictions in treating the right to privacy as a concomitant of right to life.

²²See D Bruschi, *Information privacy: Not just GDPR*, PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (CEPE) PROCEEDINGS, (9 pp.).

²³Latha R. Nair, *Data Protection Efforts in India: Blind Leading the Blind*, 4 INDIAN J. L. & TECH. 19, 21-22 (2008).

the test of “personally identifiable” information for determining whether a class of data can be classified as personal or not²⁴.

With these prongs mystified, one gets into position to have a clearer picture of the concept of data protection laws. That being noted, one can formulate the definition of data protection laws as, a set of rules that protect the dissemination, collection, using, erasure, storage and destruction of all the information that can be used to identify a person. Here protection implies a reasonable degree of fairness in the processing of personal data that conform to the established principles²⁵. However, the laws of data protection have come a long way from mere fair processing of personal data and now refer to a more jurisprudentially evolved concept of informational self-determination and informational autonomy²⁶. The term informational self-determination refers to the right of the individual to decide the terms on which the personal data can be disclosed in the first place²⁷.

1.3 The Right to Data Protection and Rule of Law

The right to informational self-determination has come to be considered as an inherent aspect of the rule of law. It has been opined that the lack of adequate autonomy in exercising informational self-determination “*would also impair the common good because self-determination is an elementary functional condition of a free democratic community*”²⁸. This assertion springs from the fact that Data Protection is at times considered as an offshoot of the right to privacy²⁹. However, a major portion of this

²⁴Vinita Bali, *Data Privacy, Data Piracy: Can India Provide Adequate Protection for Electronically Transferred Data*, 21 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 103, 109-10 (2007).

²⁵Sougata Talukdar, *Privacy and Its Protection in Informative Technological Compass in India*, 12 NUJS L. Rev. 1 (2019).

²⁶Henry Pearce, *Systems Thinking, Big Data, and Data Protection Law*, 18 Eur. J.L. Reform 478 (2016).

²⁷*Id.*

²⁸*Id.*

²⁹*Id.*

debate is confined to the European Constitutional Courts and hence will be dealt with in detail at the appropriate stage.

As already noted, the concept of data protection has evolved from the state of being a tool to protect the unwarranted inferences with the sensitive and personally identifiable information of the citizens, to be a central aspect of the social order that considers the right to informational self-determination as indispensable character of every society governed by rule of law³⁰.

1.4 Right to Privacy and Its Relation with Data Protection

There can be no denial of the normative fact that there exists an unfettered correlation between right to privacy and the data protection law. However different these two nebulous concepts may be from each other theoretically, the relation between Right to Privacy and the Right to Data Protection is a concrete one³¹. The very argument that data protection laws have come such a long way to be considered as a fundamental right stem from the fact that the right to privacy has been recognized as one³². The Supreme Court of India, upon same lines, had directed the Central government to come up with a data protection code, only after it had identified the right to privacy as an inherent part of the right to life and liberty as guaranteed by the Article 21 of the Constitution of India³³. That doesn't leave any doubt that the data protection legislations do have the intent to protect the right to privacy of the individuals at their helm³⁴. However, in a country like India where the jurisprudence of right to privacy is still in its infancy, there needs to be a cut and dried definition of the right to privacy for the purpose of the Data Protection legislation.

³⁰Orla Lynskey, *Deconstructing Data Protection: The Added-Value of a Right to Data Protection in the EU Legal Order*, 63 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 569, 577-81 (2014).

³¹Silvia Lucia Cristea & Viorel Banulescu, *The Right to Personal Data Protection. The Right to Privacy. A Comparative Law Approach*, 64 ANALELE STIINTEI UNIVERSITATII ALEXANDRU IOAN CUZADINIA SIIINTEI JURIDICE 1, 03-05 (2018).

³²*Id.*

³³KSPuttaswamy v. Union of India, 2017 SCC Online SC 996

³⁴Supra Note 30 at 04

However, just as the Data Protection Law, the right to privacy is quite a nebulous concept and there exists a great degree of confusion amongst the legislatures all over the world in giving out a concrete definition of the right to privacy³⁵. However, in order to effectuate the very purpose of the data protection laws, there needs to be a concrete and rational definition of the right to privacy. The limited number of judicial precedents makes it imperative to rely upon some of the well-settled principles relating to it and more importantly, the data protection laws should themselves be broad enough to lay out in the clearest of terms, the meaning and scope of the right to privacy.

The failure to chalk out a precise definition of the right to privacy has its own costs and benefits. It may be an advantage in as much as the lack of a definition provides ample room for flexibility for the judiciary to interpret it in the widest sense³⁶. The changing world of technology seems to reinvent itself each passing day and thus it may be in the best interests of the citizens, the democratic framework and the rule of law to keep the understanding of the right to privacy as open-ended as possible³⁷. There has been a great deal of debate as to what should be considered as the most precise definition of the right to privacy³⁸.

The voluminous literature pertaining to the relationship between the right to privacy and data protection laws purport to establish the link between the right to informational self-determination and information control³⁹. One of the most quoted understandings of the right to privacy in the realm of data protection is that "*Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when,*

³⁵Supra Note 30 at 05

³⁶Edward J. Eberle, *The Right to Information Self-Determination*, UTAHL.REV.965, 969-971 (2001).

³⁷*Id.*

³⁸*Id.*

³⁹Eva Fialova, *Data Portability and Informational Self-Determination*, 8 MASARYK U. J.L. & TECH.45, 456-51 (2014).

*how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others*⁴⁰.” The sole reason behind the popularity and the acceptance of this approach can be traced to the enormous appeal that the “right to self-determination” has over the people in any democratic set-up⁴¹. However, there’s a need to reconcile with the fact that the *stricto sensu* no data protection law can guarantee complete informational self-determination however, what a robust law can ensure is a regulated determination⁴².

A more old and yet popular understanding of the Right to Privacy has been associated with the right to be let alone. This approach treats the non-interference as an inherent part of the right to privacy. As per this version, three prongs of the right to privacy include, “secrecy, anonymity and solitude⁴³.” No discussion on the Right to Privacy can ever become complete without referring to the seminal work of Samuel D Warren and Louis D. Brandeis that laid the foundations of recognition of the right to privacy as a distinct right.

“These considerations lead to the conclusion that the protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it consists in preventing publication, is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general right of the individual to be let alone. It is like the right not to be assaulted or beaten, the right not to be imprisoned, the right not to be maliciously prosecuted, the right not to be defamed. In each of these rights, as indeed in all other rights recognized by the law, there inheres the quality of being owned or possessed- and (as that is the distinguishing attribute of property) there may be some propriety in speaking of those rights as property. But obviously, they bear little resemblance to what is ordinarily comprehended under that term. The

⁴⁰Jakub Mísek, *Consent to Personal Data Processing- The Panacea or the Dead End*, 8 MASARYK U. J.L. & TECH. 69, 71-72 (2014).

⁴¹*Id.*

⁴²*Id.*

⁴³*Id.*

principle which protects personal writings and all other personal productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication in any form, is in reality not the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate personality⁴⁴.”

Numerous data protection principles do take into account these features to ensure that the greatest possible protection is granted to the individuals. The genesis of principles of data protection such as the principle of fairness of processing, the principle of purpose limitation and the right to erasure⁴⁵ can be traced to the conception of the right to be let alone. The yet another approach to connect right to privacy with Data protection is the disclosure of sensitive material⁴⁶. Sensitive materials are usually those data which have the tendency to expose the identity of the individuals such as name, sexual preferences, residential address etc. There is a great deal of disagreement among the scholars with regard to the effectiveness of this approach as it is highly likely that through the technological advancements in this era of Big data, information that is not otherwise sensitive may be collected and processed in a way that would make them of sensitive character⁴⁷. Keeping these aspects of these separate approaches about the nature of the right to privacy, the Supreme Court of India chose to adopt the informational self-determination approach:

“Above all, the privacy of the individual recognises an inviolable right to determine how freedom shall be exercised. An individual may perceive that the best form of expression is to remain silent. Silence

⁴⁴Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, *Right to Privacy*, 4 Harv.L.Rev.193 (1890-1891). Louis was a professor at the Harvard Law School and a staunch advocate of the fundamental character of the Right to Privacy. This paper is considered to be the most authoritative literature on the developing contours of Data Protection.

⁴⁵Alina Savoiu & Catalin Capatina Basarabescu, *The Right to Privacy*, 2013 Annals Constantin Brancusi U. TARGU JIU JURIDICAL SCI. SERIES 89, 92-98 (2013).

⁴⁶Silvia Lucia Cristea & Viorel Banulescu, *The Right to Personal Data Protection. The Right to Privacy. A Comparative Law Approach*, 64 ANALELE STIINTIFICE ALE UNIVERSITATII ALEXANDRU IOAN CUZA DINIASI TIINTE JURIDICE 1, 03-09 (2018).

⁴⁷*Id.*

postulates a realm of privacy. An artist finds reflection of the soul in a creative endeavor. A writer expresses the outcome of a process of thought. A musician contemplates upon notes which musically lead to silence. The silence, which lies within, reflects on the ability to choose how to convey thoughts and ideas or interact with others. These are crucial aspects of personhood. The freedoms under Article 19 can be fulfilled where the individual is entitled to decide upon his or her preferences. Read in conjunction with Article 21, liberty enables the individual to have a choice of preferences on various facets of life including what and how one will eat, the way one will dress, the faith one will espouse and a myriad other matters on which autonomy and self-determination require a choice to be made within the privacy of the mind. The constitutional right to the freedom of religion under Article 25 has implicit within it the ability to choose a faith and the freedom to express or not express those choices to the world. These are some illustrations of the manner in which privacy facilitates freedom and is intrinsic to the exercise of liberty⁴⁸.

The excerpt represents the importance that has been accorded to right to privacy by the Supreme Court of India. Come what may, the future of interpretation of the data protection laws in India will be influenced by this landmark judgment for years to come. The sensitive personal data may only be transferred outside India for the purpose of processing...” the Bill notes, while adding that this doesn’t apply to ‘critical personal data’. The interpretation of right to privacy in the spatial, functional and institutional forms has long been seen as an inhibitor of gender equality and thus has been subject to a lot of criticism from the feminist school of jurisprudence. The feminist school treats the right to privacy at home as an instrument to facilitate the subordination of women in their homes. This interpretation has been repeatedly attacked as an instrument for immunizing the power imbalances within the families

⁴⁸Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., (2017) 10 SCC 1

by the exclusion of the constitutional scheme in the guise of privacy. The spatial and functional understanding of the right to privacy has been regarded as an instrument to “defend the exemption of marital rape from sexual assault laws, and to discourage state interference with domestic violence or child abuse.

The new Personal Data Protection Bill also contains three key clauses that were not previously included in the Srikrishna draft version and have raised some concern amongst technology companies and privacy experts. These include sections that will allow the Centre to ask any “data fiduciary or data processor” to hand over anonymised personal data or “other non-personal data” that will allow better governance or targeting of citizen welfare services.

On the surface, the proposed Indian Data Protection Act of 2019 appears to emulate new global standards, such as the right to be forgotten. Other requirements, like having to store sensitive data in systems that are located within the subcontinent, may put constraints on certain business practices and are considered more controversial by some. The draft bill also states that the central government can frame policy for the digital economy with respect to non-personal data. In particular, it can direct any data processor to “provide any personal data anonymized or other non-personal data to enable better targeting of delivery of services or formulation of evidence-based policies by the Central Government”. The final Bill slightly reverses India’s stand, noting that “sensitive personal data may be transferred outside India”, but should continue to be stored within the country. However, what remains to be seen is the legislative intent in enacting a strong data protection law.

India could exceedingly benefit from the experiences of the countries that are known to have strong data protection regimes in place by avoiding the usual pitfalls. Given the fact that India, along with the world, is moving towards an increasingly digitalized and globalized world, it becomes all the more important to address the issues of data protection that may have trans-national aspects attached to them. In order to put forth a strong case for a Data Protection regime that is compatible with the entities situated

abroad, and particularly in the developed world, the finder would deem it conducive to discuss the accepted principles of Data Protection in the developed world, particularly in the EU as well as the legislations in these jurisdictions.

1.5 Principles of Data Protection

Right to Privacy, as mentioned earlier is quite an abstract and amorphous concept and hence it is nor possible to chalk out a definite one-line guide that would lead the courts to determine whether there has been an intrusion in the private domain of an individual⁴⁹. Hence, numerous principles governing the right to privacy have been developed by the legislatures and courts all over the world to serve as the guide to effective adjudication against the claims of breach of the right to privacy. Some of the notable principles are the OECD Principles⁵⁰, the US Consumer Bill of Rights and the GDPR⁵¹. However, a one size fits all strategy can not serve the purpose of effective legislation and hence India, instead of adopting any of these principles had to develop its own national privacy principles that would be suited to the Indian Constitutional values while borrowing the best practices from all over the world.

These principles must be aimed at securing the safety of the entire process of collection, storage, processing, access, retention and disclosure of information that can be used to identify a particular individual. In pursuance of the objective to develop National Privacy Principles, the Planning Commission appointed a committee led by the Justice A.P. Shah to formulate the principles that would go on to form the crux of the upcoming data protection legislation in India⁵². In 2012, a Group of Experts on Privacy was constituted by the erstwhile Planning Commission under the

⁴⁹ DAVID BENDER, COMPUTER LAW: A GUIDE TO CYBER LAW AND DATA PRIVACY LAW, 388-389 (1ST ED. 1978).

⁵⁰ OECD, 'OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data' (2013), available at: <http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesonthe protectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata>.

⁵¹ A Gupta, *Summary Of The Report On Privacy Law By The Group Of Experts Headed By Justice A.P. Shah*. MEDIUM. (July, 2019) ; <<https://iltb.net/summary-of-the-report-on-privacy-law-by-the-group-of-experts-headed-by-justice-a-p-shah-6e5917ea9c18>> [Accessed 28 May 2020]

⁵² *Supra* Note 48 at 402.

Chairmanship of Justice AP Shah (Justice AP Shah Committee). The report of the Justice AP Shah Committee recommended a detailed framework that serves as the conceptual foundation for a privacy law in India, considering multiple dimensions of privacy. After a detailed deliberative and consultative exercise, it proposed a set of nine National Privacy Principles to be followed, broadly derived from the OECD Guidelines.⁵³ The finder would discuss these principles in an nutshell to locate the Indianized jurisprudence of the data protection law through the principles identified by AP Shah Committee.

Notice: The first and perhaps the most important of the principles identified by the committee is the requirement of the notice to the data owner⁵⁴. The principle highlights the concept of the data ownership and mandates that every processor of the personal data of the individual shall give sufficient notice to the owner of the data. The notice must be couched in language that is easily understandable and sufficient to inform the data principal about the processing. The notice should further disclose the facts relating to the type of data which is being collected, the purpose for which such collection is being made, these security measures that the collector has in place to ensure the security of the collected data⁵⁵. The principle also mandates that the data principal shall be from time to time be informed about the changes made in the privacy policy of the process and in case of any breach, immediate notice must be sent⁵⁶.

Consent: The second principle provides that the obtaining of the consent is a necessary pre-condition to the processing of the personal data of the individuals. The processor may deny these services in case the consent is refused. However, when the

⁵³WHITE PAPER OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON A DATA PROTECTION FRAMEWORK FOR INDIA
https://www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/white_paper_on_data_protection_in_india_171127_final_v2.pdf

⁵⁴Report of the Justice AP Shah Committee, 5 (October 16, 2012).

⁵⁵Supra Note 48 at 403.

⁵⁶Supra Note 48 at 405.

processing is sanctioned by law and is in conformity with the other data protection principles, then the information collected by the agencies shall be anonymized⁵⁷.

Collection Limitation Principle: The data shall be collected only to the extent which is absolutely necessary for the fulfilment of the objective for which the data had been collected⁵⁸.

Purpose Limitation Principle: Data can be processed only for the purposes that had been notified to the data principal at the time of obtaining his consent. For processing data for any other purposes, a fresh consent has to be taken through notice⁵⁹.

1.6 The Foundations of Data Protection Regime in India

The B.N. Srikrishna Committee had laid the foundation of the beginning of an era of the establishment of a comprehensive code on the data protection regime in India⁶⁰. The Narendra Modi government 2020 appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Justice (Retd.) B.N. Srikrishna, which has been tasked with the mandate of proposing measures to effectively address issues around data protection and privacy. This committee has also been playing with the idea of a regulator, possibly modelled on existing regulatory bodies like the Securities and Exchange Board of India or the Reserve Bank of India. The lacunas in the existing laws relating to the absence of incorporation of the key data protection principles and the need to have a more extensive and data principal centric law had led to the formation of the committee to suggest the roadmap for a new and comprehensive data protection

⁵⁷Supra Note 48 at 406.

⁵⁸*Id.*

⁵⁹*Id.*

⁶⁰Justice Srikrishna Committee Submits Report On Data Protection. Here're Its Top 10 Suggestions, The Economic Times. <<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/justice-bn-srikrishna-committee-submits-report-on-data-protection-here-re-the-highlights/articleshow/65164663.cms?from=mdr>>

legislation. The 10-member committee led by Honorable Justice B N Sri Krishna; a former judge of the Supreme Court of India submitted its report containing the recommendations for a comprehensive data protection regime in India along with a draft data protection bill⁶¹. The recommendations mirrored the provisions of the GDPR(General data protection regime) to a great extent and provided for the adoption of the key data protection principles in the Indian legal arena⁶². At the time of its release, the draft bill had been hailed as the foundation of the core principles of the upcoming data protection regime in India⁶³. A brief analysis of the key aspects and recommendations of the committee report shall be handy in paving the way for the analysis of the proposed data protection law in India.

The draft bill had defined the key aspects of data protection regime including the meaning of data⁶⁴, processing⁶⁵, the personal data⁶⁶, sensitive data⁶⁷ etc. much on the lines of the GDPR (General Data Protection Regime). Then it provided restricted grounds on which the personal data of the individuals may be processed by the state and the corporations⁶⁸. The bill had also pitched for stringent data localization norms while providing that at least one copy of the data sought to be transferred across the borders has to be stored in India. The draft bill had also pitched for a broad meaning of the rights of the data principal and recognized, the right to data portability, the right to be forgotten⁶⁹, the right to accessibility⁷⁰ and the right to correction⁷¹. Further, the draft bill had laid a great deal

⁶¹*Id.*

⁶²Meity.gov.in.2020.WHITEPAPEROFTHCOMMITTEEOFEXPERTSONADATA PROTECTION FRAMEWORK FOR INDIA.
<http://meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/white_paper_on_data_protection_in_india_171127_final_v2.pdf>

⁶³*Id.*

⁶⁴Sec.12 Personal Draft Data Protection Bill 2019.

⁶⁵Sec.29 Personal Draft Data Protection Bill 2019.

⁶⁶Sec.32 Personal Draft Data Protection Bill 2019.

⁶⁷Sec.35 Personal Draft Data Protection Bill 2019.

⁶⁸Sec.40 Personal Draft Data Protection Bill 2019.

⁶⁹Sec.27 Personal Draft Data Protection Bill 2019.

⁷⁰Sec.24 Personal Draft Data Protection Bill 2019.

⁷¹Sec.25 Personal Draft Data Protection Bill 2019.

of emphasis on the importance of informed consent⁷². However, one of the substantial omissions of the draft bill was the non-inclusion of the right to erasure and no mention of the need to reform the surveillance regime in the country.

However, one of the most laudable aspects of the bill was the conception of an independent data protection authority that would be selected by a committee comprising of the Chief Justice of India⁷³. Even then, while the Srikrishna committee suggested inclusion of the Chief Justice of India or his nominee and one expert of repute in the Selection Committee, the PDP Bill introduced in parliament provides for a committee comprising entirely of members from the executive, i.e. secretaries from departments of the Central government, without a judicial member and an expert. The power and discretion to remove any member of the DPA are vested with the Central government without a method or procedure for such removal being explicitly prescribed.⁷⁴ The protection of the salary of the members has also been diluted and it shall now be prescribed by the Central government. The Data Protection of India, as envisaged by the draft bill would have a wider range of powers including that of search and seizure and imposing heavy penalties.

The Committee's report was subjected to a lot of criticisms, ranging from having pushed the need to protect the informational privacy of the citizens at a back seat while giving primacy to the economic aspects of the personal data.⁷⁵ It also drew ire from the academicians and right to information activists for its flawed composition. The members of the committee consisted of the personalities that had been vocal in support of the Aadhar Act and had even at various points of time, opposed the recognition of the right to privacy as a fundamental right.⁷⁶ The report, while having

⁷²Sec.02 Personal Draft Data Protection Bill 2019.

⁷³Sec.02 Personal Draft Data Protection Bill, 2019.

⁷⁴Why India's Proposed Data Protection Authority Needs Constitutional Entrenchment, The Wire (2021), <https://thewire.in/tech/india-data-protection-authority-needs-constitutional-entrenchment> (last visited Feb 24, 2021).

⁷⁵Id.

⁷⁶The Data Protection Bill only weakens user rights, The Hindu (2021), <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/the-data-protection-bill-only-weakens-user-rights/article30405339>.

mirrored a lot of provisions on the lines of GDPR promised the dawn of a healthy and robust data protection regime in the country, failed to answer some of the pressing questions related to the safeguards against the intrusions of the state in the realm of the private affairs of the citizens.

The most significant deviation of the report can be traced in the philosophical overtones of the report that seek to emphasize more on the need of a robust economy instead of safeguards against the breach of the fundamental right to privacy. The report also, to a great degree misinterprets the landmark decision in the case of *K S Puttaswamy v. Union of India*⁷⁷ of India while ignoring the importance of the doctrine of proportionality and hence pushes the fundamental right to the backseat. Some of the other counts on which the draft bill came under severe criticism include the failure to recognize the ownership of data, the lack of provisions regarding notice of the breach, non-mentioning of the reforms in Aadhar etc.

India has come a long way from the days when the concept of data protection as confined to the narrow walls of the Information Technology Industries. As noted, the use of data has become an indispensable aspect of the Indian economy and hence there is need of a comprehensive framework that would cater the needs of data protection in India. In the following chapter, the finder would discuss some of the globally accepted principles of data protection in order to get a better understanding of the normative aspects of data protection legislation.

⁷⁷(2017)10SCC 01

CHAPTER 2: GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR DATA PROTECTION PRINCIPLES

2.1 Introduction

In the previous Chapter the finder has dealt with some of the most notable aspects of the era of digitalization that have led to the privacy concerns all over the world. The discussion has provided a theoretical insight into the Principles of Data Protection but as the famous proverb goes, “*the taste of pudding lies in the eating*” it would be optimum to take up a detailed study of the manner in which the provisions related to the concept of Data Protection in order to have a firm grasp on the practical aspects of a Comprehensive Data Protection Code. The study also becomes important in order to formulate a code that would be in synergy with the International Best Practices with regards to data protection.

It has been rightly opined by the academicians and the jurists all over the world that data protection cannot be achieved by a country in isolation⁷⁸. Given the fact that the source, storage and medium of transmission of the major chunk of data all over the world is the Internet, the numerous challenges faced by the regulators in affording a robust data protection regime cannot be met adequately at the national level⁷⁹. The data knows no boundaries and hence there needs to be a trans-national framework aimed at securing adequate safeguards to the personal data of the citizens while ensuring an unrestricted cross-border transmission of data.

In order to effectuate the policy of free flow of data across the borders and guarantee a prescribed threshold of security measures, there needs to be a mutually agreed

⁷⁸Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Jonathan Gray & Mireille Van Eechoud, *Open Data, Privacy, and Fair Information Principles: Towards a Balancing Framework*, 30 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 2073 (2015).

⁷⁹GUTWIRTH, S. AND DEHERT, P., REGULATING PROFILING IN A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL STATE. IN PROFILING THE EUROPEAN CITIZEN 271 (2008).

framework on which the nations ought to base their data protection legislations⁸⁰. Universally accepted principles of data protections can be instrumental in bringing uniformity and consistency in the data protection laws all over the world⁸¹. As we have witnessed in the previous chapter, the whole subject of data protection is quite abstract in nature and there cannot be one size fits all formula that would serve the purpose of data protection.

This gives rise to the need for having a set of principles at the international level that would serve as a guide for the nations in framing their own data protection laws. Keeping this view in mind, numerous International and regional organizations have agreed upon some of the core principles that should be incorporated in the data protection laws of the countries.⁸² The first would primarily focus upon two of the most important organizations that hold a great deal of influence over the data protection regimes all over the world.

2.2 United Nations' Data Protection Principles

The United Nations Personal Data Protection principles lay down the blueprint for a healthy data protection regime all over the world. While, most of the data protection enactments in the world do vouch to adhere to these principles, minor deviations from these principles are also common. Importantly, there is the persuasive value of the principles recognized by the United Nations that act as a guiding principle for the states that genuinely look forward to creating a robust data protection regime in their country⁸³. While these principles are supposed to guide the United Nations System Organizations in carrying out their mandated work, the persuasive value of these principles in the global realm remains to be enormous⁸⁴. The GDPR (General data protection regime) and Personal Data Protection Bill 2019

⁸⁰Supra Note 73 at 274.

⁸¹Supra Note 73 at 277.

⁸²Al Lutz, Discussion Paper: Data Protection, Privacy and Security for Humanitarian and Development Programs

⁸³*Id.*

⁸⁴Will Thomas DeVries, *Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age*, 18 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 283, 311 (2003)

and numerous data protection legislations across the globe have these principles as the cornerstone of their data protection regime⁸⁵. These principles (the “Principles”) set out a basic framework for the processing of “personal data”, which is defined as information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (“data subject”), by, or on behalf of, the United Nations System Organizations in carrying out their mandated activities.

FAIR AND LEGITIMATE PROCESSING PRINCIPLE

The United Nations System Organizations should process personal data in a fair manner, in accordance with their mandates and governing instruments and on the basis of any of the following:

- (i) the consent of the data subject;
- (ii) the best interests of the data subject, consistent with the mandates of the United Nations System Organization concerned;
- (iii) the mandates and governing instruments of the United Nations System Organization concerned; or
- (iv) any other legal basis specifically identified by the United Nations System Organization concerned.

PURPOSE SPECIFICATION

Personal data should be processed for specified purposes, which are consistent with the mandates of the United Nations System Organization concerned and take into account the balancing of relevant rights, freedoms and interests. Personal data should not be processed in ways that are incompatible with such purposes.

PROPORTIONALITY AND NECESSITY

The processing of personal data should be relevant, limited and adequate to what is necessary in relation to the specified purposes of personal data processing.

⁸⁵*Id.*

TRANSPARENCY

Processing of personal data should be carried out with transparency to the data subjects, as appropriate and whenever possible. This should include, for example, provision of information about the processing of their personal data as well as information on how to request access, verification, rectification, and/or deletion of that personal data, insofar as the specified purpose for which personal data is processed is not frustrated.

Among other prominent principles include the Accountability Principle which prescribes that United Nations System Organizations should have adequate policies and mechanisms in place to adhere to these Principles. Further the Data Protection Principles are hinged around a notion that in carrying out its mandated activities, a United Nations System Organization may transfer personal data to a third party, provided that, under the circumstances, the United Nations System Organization satisfies itself that the third party affords appropriate protection for the personal data.

⁸⁶ROSEMARY JAY, ANGUSH HAMILTON, DATA PROTECTION LAW AND PRACTICE 445 (1995).

International cooperation of civil and political rights from here on words referred as ICCPR

forbidden, unless it is done in accordance with the lawful procedure. An Individual has the right to know the reason for which their data is being used, the location where it is kept, the period for which it was gathered, the ability to get it rectified, and so on. This has also been highlighted throughout the comment.

The Human Rights Committee has time and again emphasized on the importance of lawful collection and processing of personal records. It has stated that “gathering and holding of personal information on servers, databases, and other devices, whether by public institutions or private persons or entities, should be controlled by law.” Although the comment’s simplifications seem to encompass the digital realm of the right to privacy, there is a significant gap that must be filled. Comment 16 should take into account a larger perspective of the Right to informational privacy, as well as include an individual-centric concept of privacy. The ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights) precedents will be very useful to countries in upgrading comment 16 to specifically hold the routine procedure of collecting public data, a ground for the breach of the right to privacy. This will provide the basis for addressing the threat of mass surveillance and also broadening the reach of the provision to include the digital sphere in order to acknowledge all the possible threats faced by technical advancements.

Getting Rid of the 4th Amendment’s based-Right to Privacy

The language of Article 17 of the ICCPR specifically references the expression “home,” giving the impression that the concept of privacy in the convention is limited to “spatial privacy,” that is, the privacy of personal spaces only. This means that the covenant’s security will be limited to “protection from encroachment of man’s own castle.” However, in this age, where the possibility of invasion of private property has switched to online mediums, such as succinct reading of the word “Home” would have disastrous consequences.⁸⁷ Hence, the new clause should include “online private spaces” which encompasses Twitter & Facebook pages, emails, and other social media accounts of an individual.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

In the online realm as of today, the social media pages and mobile phones are the sole means by which an individual designates their identity in the public community. Electronic gadgets and social media profiles have largely displaced the century old definition of private space.⁸⁸ Article 17 should explicitly acknowledge this change. For a long time, the courts of the member countries have interpreted the word “home” broadly, holding it to include “place in which private life can evolve freely.” In order to respect the advancement of private life in the modern age, the convention must grant the word “private domain” the broadest possible sense, including any means by which one can enter the online sphere.

Incorporation of Meta data in to the Definition of Correspondence

The meaning of the expression “Correspondence” is another necessary aspect of Article 17 of the convention that has been constricted. Although correspondences relating to telephone calls, letters, online communications, and other forms of communication have already been included in comment 16, the latest risks posed to personal data by “metadata” must be included in the framework of Article 17. The metadata are essentially separate collections of information about people, and may be combined for statistical analysis and information collection. The degree to which the metadata can be used for identification and mass monitoring has been questioned by courts all around the world. The Supreme Court of India struck down a portion of Section 57 of the Aadhar Act for violating the rules of storage and putting intentional restriction, but the court failed to consider the disadvantages of metadata storage. Consequently, this would enable the Indian government to store and process personal data of individuals through Aadhar, which is a legitimate portal.⁸⁹ The incorporation of metadata in the concept of “correspondence” has arisen as a requirement to prevent such irresponsible ignorance of the risks that metadata can pose to the right to privacy.

It must be remembered that metadata has immense potential for being exploited by the government for security purposes. With the aid of metadata, other information

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

regarding one's food patterns, places, and behavioral patterns can be readily accessed, and it is thus important to put metadata into the framework of Article 17 of the convention.⁹⁰ This will undoubtedly extend the reach of the provision, making it crucial in combating the problem of mass metadata monitoring.

“When collected and examined, communications metadata can build a profile of an individual's life, including medical issues, political and religious views, alliances, relationships, and interests, revealing as much information as, or even greater detail that may not be distinguishable from the content of communications,” wrote the United Nations Special Rapporteur on freedom of speech.

It is worth noting that European courts and the judiciaries of other countries with advanced data protection regimes have also taken steps to hold that data related to internet use falls under the definition of “correspondence” as under Article 8 of the ECHR. Meanwhile, since metadata is not explicitly included in the analysis of communications, states have a large window to conduct mass surveillance and profiling. The accumulation of metadata over time will have significant ramifications on individuals' right to privacy all over the world.

2.3 Decoding the Unlawfulness of the Interferences with the Right to Informational Privacy

Threats to the informational privacy of the citizens due to increased digitalization has emerged as a global issue. The core business model of many tech firms is monetizing the data they collect from users—not only for themselves but also for selling to others. Not everyone is a privacy hawk, and millennials less so than earlier generations. However, after the infamous Cambridge Analytica data leaks, the awareness relating to informational privacy has grown considerably. In 2014, Cambridge Analytica, along with Nix and SCLElections, became cognizant of research work at the

⁹⁰Jordan J. Paust, *Can You Hear Me Now? Private Communications, National Security and the Human Rights Disconnect*, 15(2) *Chicago Journal of International Law* 612, 625 (2015).

Psychometrics Centre at Cambridge University. The research revealed that Facebook users' account data which is publicly available can be utilized to precisely estimate a user's personality traits according to the "OCEAN" scale, a psychometric model. Finders created an algorithm that could predict an individual's personality based on the individual's 'likes' of public Facebook pages.

The algorithm and the consequent data harvesting to train the company's model eventually led to Cambridge Analytica helping political campaigns like 2016 US elections, Brexit and led the way to a worldwide scandal. After the data harvesting was exposed, it tarnished Facebook's image along with multiple penalties for data mismanagement.

After the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal it became apparent with time that despite all the government hearings, it requires special efforts and initiatives from the public to make technology companies realize it's high time they made genuine amends. When the European Union passed the GDPR, it was more about regulating the way personal data could be used these companies. It would still not allow users to entirely stop how someone could collect their personal data.

WhatsApp - Facebook Privacy Policy Update

With the growth of social media users all across the world, the threat of infringement of informational privacy has become more apparent. India which is a hot bed of social media users does lack a comprehensive Data Protection legislation and thus the risk of unlawful interference in the privacy of the social media users becomes all the more real. One of such threats have materialized in the form of the stark opposition to the newly changes Privacy Policy of WhatsApp. In a move that has garnered a lot of media attention as well as the backlash from the users, the social media platform changes its privacy policy. As per the new terms, the platform will share the data of their users with its parent company, Facebook. The government is examining and evaluating the recent privacy policy update announced by WhatsApp, amid an outcry over the controversial changes linking data of WhatsApp users to Facebook's other products and services according to sources. It is apparent that on account of the

regulatory vacuum in India, the Indian users of WhatsApp are being treated as second class citizens and their personal data/information is being commercialized by WhatsApp without providing a clear, specific and unambiguous notice to the users before obtaining their consent.

On the other hand, on account of the existence of a robust regulatory regime in Europe, WhatsApp is unable to do the same for WhatsApp users in the European region, whose privacy rights continue to remain protected. This aspect of the practice of the company amply reflects the need of having a strict regulatory mechanism for ensuring Data Protection. In a move that goes blatantly against the principles of informational self-determination, the update in the policy has mandated the users to accept the new policy, failing which they'd lose the access to their chats.

Moreover, the concerns of the breach of privacy are not related only to the chats. Atmanirbhar Digital India Foundation (ADIF) a newly formed industry association of Indian startups, has alleged that WhatsApp's recent privacy policy update is a looming threat to the payments and financial data of users and has sought greater oversight from the authorities. The policy could also lead to increased data sharing between WhatsApp Payments and parent entity Facebook despite the instant messaging platform's position that the update applies only to WhatsApp Chat.

The public backlash has forced the company to postpone the implementation of the new policy for few months, however, absent any regulation there is nothing in law that would invalidate this action of the company. One of the positive takeaways from the incident is the fact that the Indian public, in general has become more conscious about their Informational privacy. This may be evidenced by the shift of the users from the platform to other platforms and a steep decline in the user growth of the platform since the announcement of the new policy.

GDPR and Informational Privacy

The Article 17 of GDPR that postulates, “*No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation*”⁹¹ seek to protect the individuals from the arbitrary and unlawful interference in their private life. While the General comment 16 expressly states that even the lawful interferences from the state that are not in consonance with the principles laid down in the covenant shall be deemed to be unlawful. The fact that “lawful” interferences with the right to privacy is allowed under the convention, it becomes pertinent to afford adequate emphasis to the parameter to adjudge the lawfulness of the act through which the privacy of an individual is sought to be infringed⁹².

In strict sense, lawfulness is a pseudonym for the domestic law and every law that has been validly enacted by the competent authorities of a state would fall within the scope of lawful interference⁹³. However, the General Comment 16 expressly provides that such interference shouldn't be arbitrary and should be consistent with the provisions of the convention⁹⁴. While, this observation of the committee is commendable, one must note that these provisions are applicable only to the aspects of human life that have been identified to form a part of the right to privacy. Given the fact that the current definition of the right to privacy within the convention is quite restricted and outdated, the provisions that seek to protect “unlawful” infringements serve little purpose. The Committee has endorsed the fact that just because there is a law providing for the infringement of the right to privacy, it doesn't become lawful. In a way, the committee proposes the inclusion of the due process clause for warranting the breach of privacy of the individuals.

⁹¹See Supra Note 110 at 704.

⁹²Supra note 240.

⁹³*Id.*

⁹⁴PETER MARGULIES, *THE NSA IN THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: SURVEILLANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL COUNTER TERRORISM*, 82 *FORDHAM LAW REVIEW* 2137 (2014).

The Inter-Parliamentary Union and the United Nations (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) Committee has taken considerable efforts to outline the parameters to assess the lawfulness of the law through which the privacy is sought to be infringed.⁹⁵ The committee has laid down four-pronged test in order to determine the legality of the means through which the privacy of the individual is sought to be curbed⁹⁶:

1. The law must be publicly accessible, meaning thereby that there must not be any element of secrecy attached with the provisions that seek to infringe in the private domain of the individuals. This test would ensure that the individuals are aware of the law under which their privacy is being infringed.
2. The second test incorporates the purpose limitation principle along with the fairness principle and lays that the data can be processed only for the legitimate aims.
3. The third test provides that the underlying principle of certainty meaning whereby that the law should amply describe the nuances of interference. The law ought to lay down an objective criterion to determine the group of people whose privacy can be infringed, the objective that is sought to be achieved by such infringement, the detailed procedure for authorization of such infringement of privacy. The law should also put in clear terms the time limit for which such processing of data must be allowed and the procedure for storage and erasure of such information.
4. There must be sufficient safeguards in place to protect against the abuse of the process.

It may be inferred that the lawfulness of the processing is not just limited to the fact that the law of the land must sanction the law providing for the infringement of the

⁹⁵Ohchr.org (2021),

<https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/handbookparliamentarians.pdf>

⁹⁶Lee A. Bygrave, *Data Protection Pursuant to the Right to Privacy in Human Rights Treaties*, 6 Int'l J. L. & Info. Tech. 247, 253-259 (1998).

privacy⁹⁷. At the same time, it must be pointed out that the personal data protection bill does in no way come even close to satisfying any of these tests⁹⁸.

One of the most vital aspects of the rule of law is the certainty of the law. The regulations providing for the infringement of the right to privacy can't be tangled into a web of secrecy. As per the principles enshrined in the ICCPR, the citizens must have knowledge about the regulations that provide for the data surveillance. In case of absence of publicized law providing for the collection and storage of acts of surveillance, the law would fail the test of legality. One of the other important aspects of the surveillance is the requirement of specificity and precision in the law. The law providing for surveillance must be precise and purpose specific. As per the Human Rights Committee, General Comment 16, (Twenty-third session, 1988), the law providing for surveillance must not be vague and the "*relevant legislation must specify in detail the precise circumstances in which such interferences may be permitted*"⁹⁹.

2.3.1 The need for sufficient safeguards

The rationale behind such assertion is that adequate publicity of the law shall make the citizen aware of the likely consequences of their act. The law, "*must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly and it must be accessible to the public*"¹⁰⁰. The lack of specificity and precision of the manner in which the surveillance is done and the purposes for which it is being done can be detrimental to its legality in the international law¹⁰¹. There ought to be sufficient judicial oversight within the regulatory framework to ensure the transparency and non-arbitrariness of the entire process. It is submitted that the lack

⁹⁷ Brian Gorlick, *Human Rights and Refugees: Enhancing Protection through International Human Rights Law*, 69 *Nordic J. Int'l L.* 117 (2000).

⁹⁸ *Id.*

⁹⁹ Rangushamilton, *data protection law and practice* 445 (1995).

¹⁰⁰ *Id.*

¹⁰¹ *Supra* Note 115 at 2442.

of such safeguards would eventually pave the way for unlawful intrusions within the private realm of the citizens.

The subsequent resolutions of the United Nations have repeatedly emphasized on the need of establish a mechanism providing for the effective mechanisms that would lead to a greater degree of transparency and promote accountability within the surveillance system of the state.

While, the sufficient safeguards are necessary to reduce and eliminate the possibilities of arbitrary interference in the right to privacy, it is equally important to have effective redressal mechanisms in place. The modes of filing the complaint against the breaches of the rights guaranteed under Article 17 must be adequately publicized. There are few parameters that have been identified by the OHCHR in order to ensure that the mechanism has the essential features to redress the infringements in informational privacy¹⁰². The first requirement is that of the notice which is based on the premise that it is the duty of the state to ensure that the citizens sought to be informed about the nuances of the interference and the legal claim that the citizens have against the infringement¹⁰³. This is followed by the need of a prompt, effective and impartial investigation into the alleged breaches by the state.

One of the most essential tests of every law that seeks to infringe the privacy of the individual, is the need for it being non-arbitrary and reasonable. The Human Rights Committee has time and again has advocated for that the need for the non-arbitrariness of the law stems from the requirement of having laws that are strictly in consonance with the aims and objectives of the covenant. The requirement of non-arbitrariness adopts within its fold the elements of necessity, proportionality and legitimacy as well. In order to justify the intrusion into the right to privacy of the citizens, the state must in simple terms, “*demonstrate in specific and individualized*

¹⁰²Jordan J. Paust, Can You Hear Me Now? Private Communications, National Security and the Human Rights Disconnect, 15(2) Chicago Journal of International Law 612, 625 (2015).

¹⁰³*Id.*

*fashion the precise nature of the threat and the necessity and proportionality of the specific action taken, in particular by establishing a direct and immediate connection between the [restricted right] and the threat*¹⁰⁴.” The signatory states have usually chosen to construe the text of Article 17 in the most liberal terms and inferred it to be flexible enough to contain inherent limitations when it comes to the matters of national security and combating terrorism. It is a matter of common knowledge that the states do tend to use the aspects of national security and public interest as the most common justification of infringing the right to privacy. While, there is a genuine concern regarding protection of the national security and combating terrorism, there is a necessity to set forth the limitations concerning these issues to prevent them from becoming an instrument for enabling mass surveillance.

2.4 African Union’s Data Protection Framework

The African Union (AU) was formed in 2002 to replace the Organisation of African Unity, consists of 55 African states, and its broad objectives include establishing peace and security, and fostering development and socio-economic integration on the African continent. Cyber security, and especially cybercrime, is viewed as a growing concern in Africa. An African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection was drafted in 2011 to establish a ‘credible framework for cyber security in Africa through organization of electronic transactions, protection of personal data, promotion of cyber security, e-governance and combating cybercrime.’ The AU postponed the adoption of the Convention several times before finally adopting it in June 2014. It addresses three main areas:

- (1) electronic transactions,
- (2) personal data protection,
- (3) cyber security and cybercrime.

The treaty will enter into force 30 days after the 15th instrument of ratification or accession is deposited. AU member states also have obligations relating to

¹⁰⁴Supra note at 250.

fundamental freedoms and human rights, asset out in declarations and conventions of the AU and the United Nations. This includes the commitment to respect, protect and promote the right to privacy, and personal data protection. In a number of instances, the right to privacy is already established in member states' constitutions (for example, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe recognize the right to individual privacy in their national constitutions as a fundamental human right). All these policies and obligations have implications in terms of the safe, transparent, robust and privacy-respecting exchange of personal data across borders and between jurisdictions. This, in turn, imposes a burden on AU member states to ensure that progress towards regional integration, free trade and development is not hindered or made more risky, by an inability to exchange personal data securely, reliably and with appropriate respect for individuals' rights. In parallel, safe, robust and privacy-respecting use of personal data is an essential enabler of AU member states' ability to do the following:

- Maintain their own self-determination in the information society, and keep abreast of rapid change
- Capitalize on technological innovation.
- Create and sustain trust in a data-driven economy

To sustain trust in the data-driven economy, AU members must acknowledge the role personal data plays, and the economic forces it generates. When successful, the data-driven economy can create economic growth, deliver compelling and innovative services, and improve the quality of life. However, the data-driven economy can also have a dark side, where personal data is handled in exploitative or abusive ways, and where the interests of the data subject are damaged. The cost and risk inherent in these cases sometimes only becomes apparent when things go wrong—when there is a data breach, or fraud is exposed. This can have a profound effect on trust and confidence in online services, and a corresponding impact on the data-driven economy. The Guidelines recommend steps to reduce the risk of these latter, unwelcome outcomes.

2.4.1 Personal Data Protection Aspects of the Convention

While, the convention deals extensively with the aspects relating to cybercrime and cyber security, the contours of data protection principles merit our attention for several reasons. The principles laid down in the convention will herald the beginning of a uniform cross border transaction of data amongst the member states while providing adequate protection to the rights of the citizens. The objective of the convention provides that “*Each State Party shall commit itself to establishing a legal framework aimed at strengthening fundamental rights and public freedoms, particularly the protection of physical data, and punish any violation of privacy without prejudice to the principle of free flow of personal data*”¹⁰⁵. Further, the objective adds that such frameworks established by the states will afford adequate protection to the rights of the concerned citizens with respect to processing of personal data. The convention is quite wide in its scope and it provides that the provisions shall be applicable to¹⁰⁶

“Any collection, processing, transmission, storage or use of personal data by a natural person, the State, local communities, and public or private corporate bodies; b) Any automated or non-automated processing of data contained in or meant to be part of a file, with the exception of the processing defined in Article 9.2 of this Convention; c) Any processing of data undertaken in the territory of a State Party of the African Union; d) Any processing of data relating to public security, defense, research, criminal prosecution or State security, subject to the exceptions defined by specific provisions of other extant laws”.

The right to privacy encompasses, according to Harms J, “*the competence to determine the destiny of private facts.*”¹⁰⁷ It also means that “*the individual concerned*

¹⁰⁵ African Union (AU) Convention on Cyber-security and Personal Data Protection (AU CCPDP), Article 8(1).

¹⁰⁶ African Union (AU) Convention on Cyber-security and Personal Data Protection (AU CCPDP), Article 9(1).

¹⁰⁷ NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2007(5) SA 250 (CC).

*is entitled to dictate the ambit of disclosure, for example a circle of friends, a professional adviser or the public.*¹⁰⁸” The individual may also prescribe the purpose and method of the disclosure, and may decide when and under what conditions private facts may be made public.

In *NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae)* the court further went on to hold that the assumption that others are allowed access to private medical information once it has left the hands of authorized physicians and other personnel involved in the facilitation of medical care is fundamentally flawed. It fails to take into account an individual’s desire to control information about him or herself and to keep it confidential from others. In terms of the constitutional right to privacy, a person also has the ability to decide what information he or she wishes to disclose to the public.¹⁰⁹

The second notable principle identified under the convention is the fairness principle which requires that the data ought to be processed for lawful purpose in a fair and a transparent manner.¹¹⁰ The other principles expressly identified under the convention are the principle of purpose limitation and the principle of storage limitation. It provides that the data shall be processed only up to the extent for which such processing is absolutely necessary and only for the purposes for which the data is collected. The principle of storage limitation warrants that the data shall be deleted after which the purpose for which they have been collected is fulfilled.

One aspect in which the convention has a broader scope than its counterpart legislations in India are the requirement of confidentiality in data processing where the sensitive data of the individuals are involved¹¹¹. The convention lays down a wide

¹⁰⁸Id.

¹⁰⁹Id.

¹¹⁰ African Union (AU) Convention on Cyber-security and Personal Data Protection (AU CCPDP), Principle 5.

¹¹¹ African Union (AU) Convention on Cyber-security and Personal Data Protection (AU CCPDP), Article 14.

range of security measures to ensure that the data is processed with adequate transparency and security. Whereas, the definition of sensitive data is concerned, the convention adopts a very wholesome definition and unlike India, the processing of personal data is completely barred. The convention provides in express terms that the, “*State Parties shall undertake to prohibit any data collection and processing revealing racial, ethnic and regional origin, parental filiation, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, sex life and genetic information or, more generally, data on the state of health of the data subject*”¹¹². Note that the convention was adopted way back in 2014 when the courts in India were yet to recognize the core traits of the individuals to be inherent part of the right to privacy. The rulings in *Navtej Singh Jauhar v. Union of India*¹¹³ and *Joseph Shine v Union of India*¹¹⁴ that recognized the right to sexual privacy and interpreted the right to privacy to be centered around the individual rather than the places or the society had already found a place in the provisions of the convention around half a decade ago. However, there are few exceptional cases wherein such sensitive data can be processed but they have clearly been identified and the inclusions of such exemptions are based by far on the doctrine of proportionality. The data which has already been made public by the data owner can be processed for the purpose for which such disclosure was made¹¹⁵. The other cases wherein such data can be processed are for journalistic and artistic purposes¹¹⁶, for public welfare¹¹⁷, for performance of contractual obligations.¹¹⁸

¹¹² African Union (AU) Convention on Cyber-security and Personal Data Protection (AU CCPDP), Article 14.

¹¹³ *Navtej Singh Jauhar v. Union of India*, (2014) 5 SCC 438

¹¹⁴ *Joseph Shine v Union of India*, (2019) 3 SCC 39

¹¹⁵ African Union (AU) Convention on Cyber-security and Personal Data Protection (AU CCPDP), Article 13.

¹¹⁶ African Union (AU) Convention on Cyber-security and Personal Data Protection (AU CCPDP), Article 14(3).

¹¹⁷ *Id.*

¹¹⁸ *Id.*

2.5 OECD(Organization of European Corporation and development)Principles on Data Protection

The OECD, Organization for Economic Co-operation is a global organization with over 36 countries. Basic ideas about privacy protection emerged in the 1970's, dating back to the advent of the "Information Society" and the introduction of computers into various areas of economic and social activity.¹¹⁹ During this time period, there was a growing public perception that the greater need for information, and the proliferation of computerized systems, would result in a reduction in the power of individuals to control the personal information collected and stored about them. Computers were seen as a technology for processing large amounts of data quickly and cheaply and as a technology which concentrated enormous power in the hands of computer specialists and data processing managers. The combination of computer technology and telecommunications was already holding out the prospect of complex information and communications networks at the national and international level.¹²⁰

In the 1970's the Member Countries of the OECD reached a consensus on issues related to the protection of privacy to promote the free flow of information across their borders and to prevent legal issues related to the protection of privacy from creating obstacles to the development of their economic and social relations. To this end, the OECD Council on September 23, 1980, adopted the Privacy Guidelines. The Guidelines were intended to form the basis of legislation in the organization's Member States. At the core of the Guidelines is a set of eight principles to be applied to both the public and private sectors

Most of them have a comprehensive data protection code aimed at securing the greatest protection to the right to privacy of the individuals. It is to be noted that most of these legislations are based upon the principles laid down in the Guidelines on the

¹¹⁹Core Privacy Principles - The OECD Guidelines, Marcomm.mccarthy.ca (2021), <https://marcomm.mccarthy.ca/pubs/share2.htm>

¹²⁰Core Privacy Principles - The OECD Guidelines, Marcomm.mccarthy.ca (2021), <https://marcomm.mccarthy.ca/pubs/share2.htm>

Protection of Privacy and Trans-boundary flow of data¹²¹. The guidelines framed by the members countries as back as in 1980 are considered to be the first step of the worldcommunityinchalkingoutcomprehensivedataprotectionprinciples¹²². These earliest formulations of the right to privacy, to this day continue to be the backbone of every robust and effective data protection regime in the world.

The guidelines, as the name suggests are not binding on the member countries but have wielded great influence over the countries in the Asia-pacific region. However, with the adoption of the European Union Directive 108 the influence of the OCED guidelines started waning and in order to optimize the guidelines to suit the needs of the 21st century privacy challenges, the OCED Guidelines 2013 were adopted¹²³. The guidelines seek to achieve two-fold objective, the first of them being the need to ensure the free flow of data across the countries and the second being the need to provide necessary safeguards to the data. However, the regulations do provide that there can be legitimate restrictions on the free flow of the data.¹²⁴

Following are some of the most pertinent objectives that were sought to be achieved by the member states through these guidelines.

- a) the need for generally continuous and uninterrupted flows of information between countries,
- b) the legitimate interests of countries in preventing transfers of data which are dangerous to their security or contrary to their laws on public order and decency or which violate the rights of their citizens,
- c) the economic value of information and the importance of protecting "data trade" by accepted rules of fair competition,

¹²¹ Oecd.org. 2020.G20/OECD Principles Of Corporate Governance- OECD,; <<https://www.oecd.org/corporate/principles-corporate-governance/>>

¹²²Id.

¹²³Id.

¹²⁴Id.

- d) the needs for security safeguards to minimize violations of proprietary data and misuse of personal information, and
- e) the significance of a commitment of countries to a set of core principles for the protection of personal information¹²⁵.”

Prima facie analysis of the objects reflect that the initial efforts to lay down the principles of data protection were aimed at obtaining economic viability through cross border transfer of data. The other objectives sought to be achieved by the guidelines felicitating the mutual understanding amongst the member countries to adopt the minimum standards of protection of data and bringing a greater degree of uniformity between the laws concerning data transfers among the countries¹²⁶ to make sure that undue interferences in the free flow of the data¹²⁷ while ensuring that the risks associated with such transfers are reduced to a bare minimum¹²⁸.

The guidelines are mere directional in nature and are not binding on the member states. These principles lay down the bare minimum standards that the member states should adopt to felicitate the free flow of data and requisite safeguards. In pursuance of this objective, the states have also mutually agreed to supplement these guidelines by adopting new measures to strengthen the data protection framework in their states and beyond the boundaries.

2.5.1 Collection Limitation Principle

The finder thinks it pertinent to discuss the principles emancipated in the OECD guidelines to trace the founding pillars of the modern data protection regime in the world. It ought to be highlighted at this very juncture that these principles not to be

¹²⁵Oecd.org.2020.*OECD Guidelines on The Protection Of Privacy And Transborder Flows Of Personal Data* - OECD. [online] Available at: <<https://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesonthe protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal data.htm>> [Accessed 29 May 2020].

¹²⁶Id.

¹²⁷Id.

¹²⁸Id.

read as discreet principles independent of each other as the data protection is an interconnected subject and hence its principles can't be construed in isolation to each other¹²⁹ and in a manner that gives widest amplitude to their interpretation.

The first principle laid down in the guidelines is the collection limitation principle that prescribes that the data collected should be limited. The principle is intended to inhibit the indiscriminate collection of data of the individuals and thus without spelling out the particulars, it merely lays down that there should be a limitation on the collection of data. It lays down that "There should be limits to the collection of personal data and any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject¹³⁰."

The principle has continued to act as a guiding lighthouse for the member states and the countries all over the world to prescribe a cap on the collection of the personal data and further lay down the restrictions on which the data should be collected and thereafter processed. As may be noticed, the principle is couched in very general terms and the limitation prescribed in the principle is understood to be applicable to the amount of data collected, this implies that the data that is being collected should be the minimum, necessary for achieving the purpose for which it is being collected.

The other aspects of this principle prescribe that the data processor should obtain the consent of the data principal before their data is collected. This principle is based on the fact that there is a need to curb the malicious practice of obtaining the personal data of the individuals without obtaining their consent.

¹²⁹Supra Note 115 at 209.

¹³⁰*Id.*

2.5.2 Data Quality Principle

Although couched in a positive language, the meaning of the Data quality principle has been interpreted as a limiting principle. It provides that the

“Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete and kept up-to-date¹³¹”.

The principle specifies that the data collected for a specific purpose should be sufficient for the purpose for which it is being collected. This has to be interpreted as a limitation on the data controller to collect only the data that is essential and relevant for achieving the said purpose.

2.5.3 Purpose Specification Principle

The purpose specification principle provides that the purposes for which the data is being collected and sought to be processed must be specified and be informed to the data principal and any subsequent variations in the purpose must also be conveyed.

“The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited to the fulfilment of those purposes or such others as are not incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of change of purpose¹³²”.

The principle provides that when the objective for which the data had been collected, has been fulfilled then the said data must be destroyed.

¹³¹Tschentscher, A., 2017. Privacy and Data Protection by Rules Rather than Principles. *SSRN Electronic Journal*.

¹³²*Id.*

2.5.4 Use Limitation Principle

This principle is aimed at preventing any sort of unauthorized use of the data collected by the data controller. The principle provides that any deviations from the purposes for which the data had originally been collected would be deemed to be unlawful. Only with the consent of the data principal or with the authority of the law, such deviations may be allowed. For instance, it may be provided that data which have been collected for purposes of administrative decision-making may be made available for research, statistics and social planning.

2.5.5 Security Safeguards Principle

This security safeguards principle is aimed at effectuating the second objective of the OECD guidelines, that is to afford adequate security to the processed personal data of the individual. The principle provides that:

Personal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data¹³³.

The emergence of concepts like privacy by design and data anonymization have their genesis in this principle. Also, the other principles like the accountability and openness principles are intrinsically interconnected with the security safeguards principle.

2.5.6 Openness Principle

The openness principle or the transparency principle is aimed at securing that the right of the data principal to access their data is given its true meaning. The principle prescribes that the data controllers should voluntarily take steps to keep the data principals informed about the purpose for which their data is being collected and in general the data principal must be kept in loop about the entire process.

¹³³*Id.*

“There should be a general policy of openness about developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data. Means should be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of personal data, and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and usual residence of the data controller¹³⁴.”

The principle mandates that all this information must be readily available and the data principal should not face any difficulty in obtaining the information about the one who is processing their data, the purpose for which their data is being processed etc.

2.5.7 Individual Participation Principle

The principle affirms the most important aspect of every robust data protection regime all over the world. The principal pitches for the right of the data principal to have an access to their data as a matter of routine and without any legal or technical hassles. The data principal being the owner of the data has a right to know whether a particular data controller has information relating to him and to obtain all the information related to it. The principle provides that:

“An individual should have the right:

- a) to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the data controller has data relating to him;*
- b) to have communicated to him, data relating to him*
 - 1. within a reasonable time;*
 - 2. at a charge, if any, that is not excessive;*
 - 3. in a reasonable manner; and*
 - 4. in a form that is readily intelligible to him;*

¹³⁴ Oecd.org. 2020.G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance- OECD; <<https://www.oecd.org/corporate/principles-corporate-governance/>>

*c) to be given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs (a) and (b) is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and
d) to challenge data relating to him and, if the challenge is successful to have the data erased, rectified, completed or amended¹³⁵.”*

The principle attaches a great degree of individual participation in the processing of data and goes on to provide that such requests on the part of the data principals should not be refused and in case the dissemination of such information is refused, it must be subjected to an appellate authority. It is submitted that the principle forms the bedrock of the modern conceptualization of a robust data protection framework, at the centre of which lies the data principal.

The object of the principle is to keep the data principal in loop about the possible uses to which their data can be put. In order to give true meaning to the element of consent as a pre-condition to processing of personal data, it is absolutely necessary to keep the data principal informed about their data.

2.5.8 Accountability Principle

A data controller should be accountable for complying with measures which give effect to the principles stated above.

The accountability principle seeks to impose the liability upon the data controller in case they fail to comply with the measures required to be taken for adhering to the mandates of the principles. The principle is based on the normative aspect of the purpose of processing of data, as the data is processed for the benefit of the one who processes the data and hence it is their responsibility to make sure that all steps are taken to protect the data.

¹³⁵*Id.*

2.6 Dissertation

The Chapter essentially traces the foundations of the data protection regime while analyzing the several data protection principles recognized by the global institutions all over the world. The undertaken study provides the finder with an insight into the key limbs of a robust data protection regime in a democratic society. With special emphasis on the OECD Principles, the finder seeks to formulate an optimum data protection model for the Indian scheme in the upcoming chapters. The study has enabled the finder to identify the key aspects of a robust data protection regime.

The discussions in the previous chapters have amply revolved around the jurisprudential issues relating to the concept of data protection all over the world. Be that as it may, every sovereign nation has the right to adopt an approach in its national legislation as per her needs and thus it would not be out of place to discuss about the Data Protection regime in some of the jurisdictions in order to examine the ways in which they have adopted the principles discussed in the previous chapters.

The Big Data imposes a great deal of measures to ensure data security of the individuals all over the world. With the advent of Internet of Things, the volume of dissemination of data will become much more easier which will proportionally increase the risk of threat to individual data. An enormous amount of data that gets involved in the process is personal data and may include the personally identifiable information about the data subjects.

CHAPTER 3: DATA PROTECTION IN EU, US AND UK

3.1 Introduction

Big data is all about the strategic and channelized use of data for the purposes foreign to the purpose for which they were collected.¹³⁶ This may involve processing, analysis and evaluation of data in order to provide customized services. For instance, the shopping pattern of individuals in a particular area may be processed to show the internet users specific advertisements. The process of combination and reevaluation of these data can be used for, financial transactions, creditworthiness, medical treatment, private consumption, professional activity, tracking and routes taken, internet use, electronic cards and smartphones, video or communication monitoring¹³⁷.

No doubt, the scientific benefits of big data may be many but that doesn't mitigate the volume of risk attached to their handling. There are possibilities of manipulation of these data and the use of automotive information based on artificial intelligence further reduces the scope of human intervention. This implies that the right to object and other important rights recognized by the well-developed data protection regimes get nullified. The processing and evaluation of large volume of data thus have emerged as a new challenge to the data protection regime all over the world. The GDPR recognizes the impending challenges related to the data protection vis a vis big data¹³⁸. However, due to the lack of human intervention, a lot of serious issues relating to the right and the remedies have arisen. In the next section we shall discuss some of the impending challenges that the big data is set to pose to the data protection regime. The Indian bill mirrors and appears to endorse parts of the stance taken by the GDPR. Federal data privacy approaches in the United States have to date taken a much more

¹³⁶Matthias Berberich, Malgorzata Steiner, *Blockchain Technology and the GDPR-How to Reconcile Privacy and Distributed Ledgers*, 2 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 422, 431-432 (2016).

¹³⁷STUAR TRUSSELAND PETER NORVIG, *ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH*, 122-124 (1ST ED. 2009)

¹³⁸European Commission, 'Questions and Answers - Data protection reform' (Press release, 21 December 2015) accessed 13 August 2019.

laissez-faire approach to data regulation than the approach embodied in the EU's GDPR. This perhaps reflects a fundamentally different understanding of how human rights pertain to the protection of online speech and data privacy. The U.S. largely views the protection of online data and information as less the government's responsibility than, for example, many counterparts in the European Union.

What does the bill mean for India's role in the global data conversation? India is an important player in the global internet policy space. Indian government leadership is eager to position India as a global leader on democratic data regulation and has

largely succeeded. India has high levels of global internet policy participation that is, activity in the UN General Assembly and elsewhere on internet issues and analysts have rated the nation high on its ability to influence international policy.

The specific design of institutional choices that India adopts for data protection is likely to have a significant impact on India's economy. These consequences could be direct (such as increased compliance costs) or indirect (the potential stifling of innovation, and overall productivity losses). While the numerical estimates discussed may not necessarily hold true with respect to India, they do highlight the disparate ways in which a GDPR-style data protection law could impact certain sectors of the Indian economy.

Existing literature on the GDPR suggests significant economic consequences for the EU, with a potential to impact small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), labor markets, cross-border trade, and overall economic growth. A detailed analysis of the literature assessing the impact of the GDPR highlights both the potential negative consequences of a GDPR-like data protection law for India and the necessity of undertaking similar studies in India prior to the bill's implementation. As a legislative proposal that will have a significant impact on critical sectors of India's economy, it is vital that the DPC's proposed bill be carefully and critically evaluated in context of the data protection regimes in the US and EU.

The right to personal data protection bears close resemblance to the right to respect for the private life. While both of these rights are based upon the theme that an individual has a right to live their life with dignity and hence, they need a personal sphere which

is free from outside intrusion, the right to respect for private life is a much broader concept. It includes within itself the right to fundamental freedoms, the right to life etc. whereas the right to protection of personal data is an organic concept which encapsulates a mechanism that protects the personal information of the individuals by a systematic regulation for processing, storage and security of the data... Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter) not only affirms the right to personal data protection, but also spells out the core values associated with this right. It provides that the processing of personal data must be fair, for specified purposes, and based on either the consent of the person concerned or a legitimate basis laid down by law.

The right to protection of personal data is guaranteed to individuals every time their data is processed, irrespective of the fact that such processing has any impact on the privacy of the subject¹³⁹. Although, such processing may infringe the right to privacy but even in cases where such processing has no bearing on the right to privacy, the right to protection of data comes into play. The European court of justice has interpreted the term privacy in very broad sense and the instances where mere collection of the individual data has been held to be a potential to breach the right to privacy in case of unauthorized transmission to the third parties.

3.2 Role of ECHR In Developing Data Protection Jurisprudence In EU

The ECHR provides that, everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and correspondence¹⁴⁰. The theme of the European data protection regime revolves around restricting the interference of the public authority in the private sphere of life of the individuals. Other than the cases involving legitimate public interest the right to be left alone is recognized as a basic tenet of dignity-based life. With the emergence of revolutionary technological changes, the meaning of the term right to be left alone assumed a much wider definition as the states recognized the increasing threat of breach of privacy thereby giving a push to evolution of

¹³⁹ See CJEU, Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/02, *Volker und Markus Schecke GbR v. Land Hessen*, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, 17 June 2010, para. 71

¹⁴⁰ See, *Gaskin v United Kingdom* (1989) 12 EHRR 36,

concepts like informational self-determination.¹⁴¹ The growing need of regulating the personal data saw a large number of states coming up with legislations regulating the processing and storage of personal data of the citizens in early 1970's.

The European courts have taken a very strict stance on the issue of protection of data and have given a very liberal interpretation of the right to privacy and have described, as covering intimate situations, sensitive or confidential information, information that could prejudice the perception of the public against an individual, and even aspects of one's professional life and public behavior. It can be inferred that the such wide interpretation of the term privacy is intended at filling all the possible potholes in the interpretation that may have the potential to jeopardize the right to privacy of the individuals.

In *Digital Rights Ireland*¹⁴², the CJEU while examining the validity of Directive 2006/24/EC on the issues concerning the fundamental rights to personal data protection and respect for private life held that the directive was indirectly interfering with the right to privacy of the individuals while observing that:

“When taken as a whole, the personal data retained pursuant to the directive, which could be accessed by competent authorities, could allow very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data has been retained, such as the habits of everyday life, permanent or temporary places of residence, daily or other movements, the activities carried out, the social relationships of those persons and the social environments frequented by them.”

One of the key aspects of any healthy Data Protection Regime is the scope of Rights that it recognizes for the citizens. An express recognition of some of the rights which

¹⁴¹GG FUSTER, EMERGENCE OF PERSONAL DATA AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT IN THE EU, 106-113 (1ST ED. 2014).

¹⁴²Supra Note 168 at 115.

are understood to be the contours of the Right to Privacy is an essentially element of a robust Data protection regime that seeks to uphold the sanctity of all cherished rights in all its forms. Therefore, it is deemed optimum to analyse some of the key rights recognized by the EU law in the field.

3.2.1 Right to Religion

In the present times, one's faith, belief and method of worship may have a huge impact on the way the rest of the society views them and hence the protection of data relating to religious belief is considered an important facet of right to privacy. Anyone's personal religious, spiritual or philosophical data is considered as sensitive data under the EU Charter of fundamental rights. Article 9 of the charter protects the freedom of the individual to thought, religion and conscience and any breach of data concerning these rights are presumed to threaten these rights.¹⁴³ In *Sinak Isik v. Turkey*¹⁴⁴, the petitioner had challenged a legislation on the ground of wrong name of the religion in the identity card. Holding the directive as illegal, the ECtHR noted that,

“Religious freedom entails the freedom to manifest a person's religion in community with others, in public and within the circle of persons sharing the same faith, but also alone and in private. The domestic legislation applicable at the time obliged individuals to carry an identity card, a document that had to be shown at the request of any public authority or private enterprises, indicating their religion. Such obligation failed to recognize that the right to manifest one's religion also conferred the reverse, i.e. the right not to be obliged to disclose one's beliefs.”

Notably, the government had argued that the obligation to mention the religion in the identity card had been dropped and those who chose not to mention their religion could opt for leaving it blank. The argument was rejected by the court on the ground

¹⁴³See EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW 29-30 (1ST ED., 2011).

¹⁴⁴ECtHR, *Sinan Işık v. Turkey*, No. 21924/05, 2 February 2010.

that such recusal would put the concerned individuals in an odd position and hence the contested legislation was declared to be violative of the Article 9 of the ECHR. Some commentators argue that the Churches that maintain the records of the information about their visitors must have been mandated by the Article 91 of the GDPR to form internal regulations for data processing which must comply with the norms of GDPR.¹⁴⁵

3.2.2 Financial Interests

The advent of digital era has brought a paradigm shift in the way business is done throughout the world. The importance of data had never been so highlighted and deservingly so, a lot of economists agree that the data is the new oil. A lot business around the world have data processing as a focal business element and apprehensions are raised time and again about the economic implications of strict compliance measures for protection of personal data by both the data controllers and the data subject. The question as to whether the financial interests can be treated as a justifiable ground for limiting the process of data was raised in the landmark Google Spain case. The court held that the data accumulated by these search engines do have a potential to cause serious privacy threats in the wake of vast amount of personally identifiable information held by them.¹⁴⁶ While addressing the argument about the underlying economic interest in such processing of data, the court held that, a fair balance should be sought in particular between that interest and the data subject's fundamental rights, in particular the right to privacy and the right to protection of personal data. Thus, it was held that the right to privacy and the right to personal data overrides the underlying economic and other interests. Court observes, furthermore, that this information potentially concerns a vast number of aspects of his private life and that without the search engine, the information could not have been interconnected or could have been only with great difficulty. Internet users may thereby establish more

¹⁴⁵ S and Marper v United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 50 para 103; Directive 95/46 EC (n 4) art 6(1)(e) and Proposed Regulation (n 17) art 5(e)

¹⁴⁶ Supra Note 171 at 201.

or less detailed profile of the person searched against. Furthermore, the effect of the interference with the person's rights is heightened on account of the important role played by the internet and search engines in modern society, which render the information contained in such lists of results ubiquitous. In the light of its potential seriousness, such interference cannot, according to the Court, be justified by merely the economic interest which the operator of the engine has in the data processing.

The approach of the ECHR has been to balance the data protection rules and the concerned interests in each case. At times, in absence of the ... the court has denied the right of erasure of data. In, *Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura di Lecce v. Salvatore Manni*¹⁴⁷, the court was called upon to decide on to decide whether the petitioner Mr. Salvatore Manni could stake a claim for erasure of personal data (concerning the bankruptcy of a company headed by him few years ago) in order to secure their financial interests. The court observed that the potential clients of the petitioners had a legitimate interest in accessing the information while holding that the basic documents of the company concerned should be disclosed in order that third parties may be able to ascertain their contents and other information concerning the company, especially particulars of the persons who are authorized to bind the company¹⁴⁸. Hence it was observed by the learned court that the infringement of the interference with the personal data of the petitioner was justified as the disclosure was aimed at serving the legitimate general interest.¹⁴⁹ However, the court did state that there may be cases where the individuals could object the processing of their personal data even when legitimate general interests exist in exceptionally specific situations.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷CJEU, C-398/15, *Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura di Lecce v. Salvatore Manni*, 2017

¹⁴⁸*Id.* Para 60

¹⁴⁹*Id.* Para 56

¹⁵⁰*Id.* Para 61

It can be noted that the court has repeatedly emphasized on the existence of a legitimate public interest by taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances in each case.

3.2.3 Freedom of the arts and sciences

In *Vereinigung bildender Künstler v. Austria*¹⁵¹ where the dispute concerned a dispute arising out of a painting that showed nudity and featured a parliamentarian who had prayed for injunction on the grounds of violation of privacy which was duly granted by the domestic court. However, the ECtHR observed that, the painting could hardly be understood to address details of [the depicted's] private life, but rather related to his public standing as a politician and that in this capacity [the depicted] had to display a wider tolerance in respect of criticism.¹⁵²

3.2.4 Freedom of Expression

Article 85 of GDPR governs the relationship between the right to privacy and the freedom of expression. The Article mandates the state to reconcile the two rights and prescribes several exemption and derogations from different chapters to do so. Prior to the enactment of the GDPR, the relationship between the two rights were governed by the Article 9 of the directive¹⁵³. That being said, it must be noted that the data protection rights and the freedom of speech and expression have been at loggerheads at numerous occasions. The CJEU took the opportunity to define the relationship between the two rights in *Tietosuojavaltuutettuv. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia*¹⁵⁴ where it held that there is a need to strike a balance between the two

¹⁵¹V. RICHARD BENJAMINS, POMPEU CASANOVAS, JOOST BREUKER, ALDO GANGEMI, LAW AND THE SEMANTIC WEB: LEGAL ONTOLOGIES, METHODOLOGIES, LEGAL INFORMATION RETRIEVAL, AND APPLICATIONS 35-102 (1ST W.D. 2010).

¹⁵²Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ 2007 C 303

¹⁵³Mike Hintze, *Privacy Statements under the GDPR*, 42 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 1129 (2019)

¹⁵⁴C-73/07, *Tietosuojavaltuutettuv. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy* [GC], 16 December 2008 [Concept of 'journalistic activities' for the purposes of Article 9 Data Protection]

rights and while the freedom of speech and expression is an indispensable attribute of every democratic society, in order to strike the balance, the derogations and limitations of the right to data protection must apply only insofar as strictly necessary.

The court held that political debate is an inherent aspect of every organic democracy and there can't be any justifiable restriction on debates concerning public interest however the editorial gossips that are aimed at satisfying the curiosity of a chunk of readers do not contribute to the debate and there is no underlying public interest. In such cases the freedom of expression can't be expanded to eclipse the right to data protection¹⁵⁵.

In *Axel Springer AG v. Germany*,¹⁵⁶ an injunction order against a publishing company that prohibited the reportage of arrest of a well-known German actor was challenged the ECtHR on the grounds of the order being violative of Article 10 of the ECHR. The court examined the underlying issue by applying the principle of margin of appreciation and laid a detailed criterion for striking a balance between the right to privacy and freedom of speech and expression¹⁵⁷. Whether the publication contributes to a debate of general interest; How well known is the person concerned and what is the subject of the report; The prior conduct of the person concerned; The method of obtaining the information and its veracity; the content, form and consequences of the publication; and the severity of the sanction imposed.

In the lights of the facts of the case it was found that since the actor was well known to the public and his arrest concerned public interest the injunction posed disproportionate restrictions and hence held that the said order violated the Article 10 of the ECHR.

Directive], also see, ECtHR, *Mosley v. the United Kingdom*, No. 48009/08, 10 May 2011, paras. 129 and 130

¹⁵⁵ CJEU, C-131/12, *Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González* [GC], 13 May 2014, paras. 81–83.

¹⁵⁶ ECtHR, *Axel Springer AG v. Germany* [GC], No. 39954/08, 7 February 2012, paras. 90 and 91

¹⁵⁷ CJEU, C-28/08 P, *European Commission v. The Bavarian Lager Co. Ltd* [GC], 2010 CJEU, C-615/13P, *ClientEarth, PAN Europe v. EFSA*, 2015

3.2.5 Professional Secrecy

Although not a fundamental right, the concept of professional secrecy has deep roots underpinning the ethical practices of every profession. The professions like client-lawyer, doctor-patient relations etc. are trust-based relations and confidentiality is one of the vital aspects involved. The ECtHR has ruled that it may be necessary to prohibit the disclosure of certain information which is classified as confidential, in order to protect the fundamental right of an undertaking to respect for its private life enshrined in Article 8 ECHR and Article 7 of the Charter¹⁵⁸. The courts have emphasized on the need to maintain balance between the underlying legitimate interests and the rights of the data subjects.

3.3 Important Definitions under GDPR

Before analyzing the various contours of the European data protection law, it will be optimum to have a glance at some of the relevant definitions in the GDPR that have had a vital role in shaping the data protection laws across the European Union.

3.3.1 Personal Data

Recognizing the fact that the personal data is of course the most fundamental aspect of the data protection regime. The GDPR prescribes that any information that can be attributed to any person or reveal the identity of any individual is considered to be personal data¹⁵⁹. The regulation requires the data controllers to take all measures to assess the nature of the information collected¹⁶⁰. Further, the most important stakeholder of the data is the data subject, the person whose information is being processed.

¹⁵⁸CJEU, Case T-462/12R, *Pilkington Group Ltd v. European Commission*, Order of the President of the General Court, 11 March 2013, para. 44.

¹⁵⁹*Id.*

¹⁶⁰CYRUS FARIVAR, *HABEAS DATA: PRIVACY VS. THE RISE OF SURVEILLANCE TECH* 353 (2ND ED. 2018).

3.3.2 Data Subject

The term Data subject refers to any identifiable natural person whose individual data is being processed. However, legal persons can claim the protection of Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter in relation to such identification only in so far as the official title of the legal person identifies one or more natural persons. The right to respect for private life with regard to the processing of personal data, recognized by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, concerns any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual.

3.4 Principles of EU Data Protection Regime

Like all well-developed jurisdictions, the European Courts have developed a sound basis of legal reasoning in their pursuit to accord the right of data protection to the greatest possible extent. These principles serve as a parameter for judging the lapses in the right to data protection of the data subjects. Notably, the GDPR does retain all these principles to ensure maximum security and control of the data subjects over their data.

3.4.1 Data Accountability Principle

That the controller is responsible for, and must be able to demonstrate compliance with, the personal data processing principles that the controller is responsible for, and should be able to ensure, compliance with the data protection principles. This principle is based on the notion that when the data controllers are held accountable for the breaches.¹⁶¹

3.4.2 Data security principle

The European data protection regime is based on the principle of securing adequate security and confidentiality for the data subjects. It encompasses the principle of a mechanism that

¹⁶¹General Data Protection Regulation, Art. 24.

ensures that appropriate technical or organizational measures are implemented when processing personal data to protect the data against accidental, unauthorized or unlawful access, use, modification, disclosure, loss, destruction or damage¹⁶². The GDPR also requires the data controllers to use, the state of the art, the costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purpose of processing, as well as the risk of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons in order to secure the data protection rights of individuals¹⁶³. The GDPR expressly mentions the use of pseudonyms and encryptions for ensuring greater safety. Also, as discussed earlier, the GDPR imposes a duty upon the controller to notify the data subjects within a given time frame about the possible data breaches¹⁶⁴.

3.4.3 The Storage Limitation Principle

The Storage Limitation Principle is also based upon the tenets of securing data security to the greatest possible extent. It mandates that the data ought to be stored only till it is absolutely necessary to use it, for weeding out the possibilities of potential breaches. The GDPR duly incorporates this principle and provides that the data should be kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data¹⁶⁵ is collected. Also, it provides that time limits should be established by the controller for erasure or for a periodic review¹⁶⁶.

In *S. and Marper*¹⁶⁷, the ECHR, observed that retention of the personal data for a disproportionate amount of time is not a trait of a democratic society governed by the rule of law. The case concerned the retention of indefinite retention of the fingerprints,

¹⁶²Council of Europe, Committee of Convention 108, Opinion on the Data protection implications of the processing of Passenger Name Records, T-PD(2016)18rev, 19 August 2016, p. 9.

¹⁶³General Data Protection Regulation, Recital 39 and Art. 5(1)(f); Modernized Convention 108, Art.

7

¹⁶⁴ See only art 32 GDPR, —with its risk-based approach setting out encryption measures as a factor to determine the adequate level of data security, or art 6(4)(e) GDPR, allowing changes in the purpose of processing under certain circumstances.

¹⁶⁵*Id.*

¹⁶⁶General Data Protection Regulation, Recital 39

¹⁶⁷ See e.g. *S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom* [GC], Nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, 4 December 2008

cell samples and DNA profiles of the two applicants even after their acquittal. These judgments do highlight the European courts with regards to the inherent risks that storage of data may possess to the right to privacy of the individuals. The principle is aimed at reducing the data storage by the policy of erasing all the data which have ceased to be absolutely necessary for the purpose for which they were collected. However, the courts have recognized a wide range of exception to the storage principle and data may be retained for public interest, scientific or historical purposes, or for statistical use, may be stored for longer periods, with a precondition that the data will be used solely for these purposes. In Digital Rights Ireland case¹⁶⁸ while CJEU outlined the need for an objective criterion for issuing data retention directive¹⁶⁹. The observation was based on the principle that the data ought not be stored for more than the period for which it is strictly necessary to do so.

3.4.4 Data Minimization Principle

GDPR provides that the data processed must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose for which they are collected and/or further processed. Noting the importance of data minimization, the ECHR in Digital Rights Ireland case, invalidated a provision of data retention directive due to the vast scope of data processing by using a generalized language. The directive provided that the, all individuals and all means of electronic communication as well as all traffic data without any differentiation, limitation or exception being made in the light of the objective of fighting against serious crime¹⁷⁰. Noting that the directive goes against the principle of barring the excessive processing of data, the court reaffirmed its endorsement of the principle by observing that the, personal data which is adequate

¹⁶⁸ CJEU, Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, *Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others* [GC], 8 April 2014.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid. Para 63

¹⁷⁰ CJEU, Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, *Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others* [GC], 8 April 2014

and relevant but would entail a disproportionate interference in the fundamental rights and freedoms at stake should be considered as excessive¹⁷¹.

3.4.5 Purpose Limitation Principle

If the purpose of processing is sufficiently specific and clear, individuals know what to expect and transparency and legal certainty are enhanced. At the same time, clear delineation of the purpose is important to enable data subjects to effectively exercise their rights, such as the right to object to processing¹⁷². The principle of purpose limitation has been at the focal point of jurisprudence of European Courts as far as the right to data protection is concerned. Commentators have often hailed this principle as a guarantor of transparency and user control as this principle requires that the personal data shall be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes¹⁷³. The strongly worded provision bars the collection and processing of data for future, vague uncertain purposes by requiring that even for the purposes that are ancillary to the one for which the data is collected, a separate legal basis must exist. The principle that the processing of the data may not, therefore, be done in a way that is unexpected, inappropriate or objectionable for the data subject has its genesis in the tenets of purpose limitation principle. As per the Only for the purposes that are compatible with the initial purpose, the data can be further processed. These set of compatible purposes include, further processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes¹⁷⁴. This means that even if the data obtained by the subject doesn't satisfy the compatibility test, the data controller will be allowed to process the data in these cases. However, the law on the subject as to what category of data can be regarded as compatible is well settled and the following

¹⁷¹ Explanatory Report of Modernized Convention 108, para. 52; General Data Protection Regulation, Art. 5 (1) (c).

¹⁷² Article 29 Working Party (2013), Opinion 3/2013 on purpose limitation, WP 203, 2 April 2013.

¹⁷³ GDPR Art. 4(1).

¹⁷⁴ General Data Protection Regulation, Art. 5 (1)(b); Modernized Convention 108, Art. 5(4) (b). An example of such national provisions is the Austrian Data Protection Act (Datenschutzgesetz), Federal Law Gazette I No. 165/1999, para. 46

aspects must be considered by the data controller: any link between those purposes and the purposes of the intended further processing; the context in which the personal data have been collected, in particular concerning the reasonable expectations of data subjects based on their relationship with the controller on its further use; the nature of the personal data and the consequences of the intended further processing for data subjects; and the existence of appropriate safeguards in both the original and intended further processing operation. The principle also prescribes that the data subjects have a right to know the purposes for which their data is being collected and the right to object against collection.

3.4.6 Fairness Principle

The rationale behind the fairness principle is to assure the data subjects that their information shall be processed in a transparent and lawful manner. The principle requires that the data controllers should demonstrate the compliance measures and notify the data subjects about the potential threats. Also, where consent of data subject forms the legal basis of data processing, the controllers are under an obligation to comply with the wishes of data subject¹⁷⁵. In *K.H. and Others v. Slovakia*¹⁷⁶, the petitioners were denied the access to their own medical reports by the hospital on the risk of abuse of the data. The ECHR found that the state had failed to show the existence of sufficiently compelling reasons to deny the applicant's effective access to information concerning their health. It was held that unless there are compelling reasons to deny the right to access the data to the data subjects, they can't be denied this right.

¹⁷⁵ General Data Protection Regulation, Art. 5(1)(a);

¹⁷⁶ ECHR, *K.H. and Others v. Slovakia*, No. 32881/04, 28 April 2009; ECtHR, *Godelli v. Italy*, No. 33783/09, 25 September 2012

3.4.7 Transparency Principle

Nothing assumes more important position in the entire data protection regime of the European union that the element of transparency. The GDPR expressly requires that the data must be processed in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject. The term transparency has been used in the widest sense and it includes, the information given to the individual before the processing starts¹⁷⁷, the information that should be readily accessible to data subjects during the processing¹⁷⁸ and the information given to data subjects following a request of access to their own data¹⁷⁹. *Haralambiev.Romania*¹⁸⁰, is one of the landmark cases where the right to accessibility of the data was highlighted. The petitioner was granted the information held on him after a span of 5 long years, the ECtHR while noting that Article 8 had been violated held that, individuals who were the subject of personal files held by public authorities had a vital interest in being able to access them. The authorities had a duty to provide an effective procedure for obtaining access to such information.¹⁸¹ It was also held that the defects in the archive section can't be a ground for delaying giving the access of data to the data subjects. Also, the Recital 39 to the GDPR expressly provides that the Processing operations must be explained to the data subjects in an easily accessible way which ensures that they understand what will happen to their data. This means that the specific purpose of processing personal data must be known by the data subject at the time of the collection of the personal data. An important theme that runs uniformly across these principles is the effectuation.

3.5 Rights of Data Subjects under GDPR

The EU legal order recognizes the right of the data subjects to access their own data. The EU Charter of fundamental rights expressly recognizes the right of the data

¹⁷⁷General Data Protection Regulation, Article 5(1) (a)

¹⁷⁸ CJEU, C-553/07, *College van burgemeesteren wethouders van Rotterdam v. M. E. E. Rijkeboer*, 2009

¹⁷⁹CJEU, C-201/14, *Smaranda Bara and Others v. Casa Națională de Asigurări de Sănătate*

¹⁸⁰ECtHR, *Haralambiev.Romania*, No.21737/03, 27 October 2009

¹⁸¹*Id.*

subjectstoaccesstheirinformationandgetitrectifiedwheneverneeded.TheGDPR lays down a comprehensive right based provisions to give the optimum data control totheindividuals.Infurtheranceofthisobjective,theArticle8mandatesthatawide range of rights that the individuals have as far as their data is concerned. In addition to providing individuals with rights, it is equally important to establish mechanisms that enable data subjects to challenge violations of their rights, hold controllers responsible and claim compensation.

3.5.1 Right to Rectification

Keeping in view the importance of protection of data of the individuals, the GDPR envisages a legal order that seeks to give the data subjects maximum control of their data.The datasubjectshallhavetherighttoobtainfromthecontrollerwithoutundue delaytherectificationofinaccuratepersonaldataconcerninghimorher.Takinginto account the purposes of the processing, the data subject shall have the right to have incomplete personal data completed, including by means of providing a supplementary statement¹⁸². In *Ciubotaru v. Moldova*¹⁸³, where the petitioner was denied the rectification of the name of his ethnicity even in presence of objective evidence in favor of his claim. The court noted that, Preventing the applicant from having his claim examined in the light of objectively verifiable evidence, the State had failed to comply with its positive obligation to secure to the applicant effective respect forhis private life¹⁸⁴. Thedata controllers are under an obligation to give the data subjects the chance to amend the stored information in a timely manner. In *Cemalettin Canli v. Turkey*, the court regarded the police information report as systematically collected public information stored in files held by the authorities could also fall within the meaning of private life¹⁸⁵.

¹⁸²GeneralDataProtectionRegulation,Article16

¹⁸³*Ciubotaru v. Moldova*, No.27138/04,2010

¹⁸⁴ECtHR,*Cemalettin Canli v. Turkey*, No.22427/04,18November2008, paras.33and42–43; ECtHR, *Dalea v. France*, No. 964/07, 2 February 2010

¹⁸⁵ Similarly, the 14 June 2000 version stipulated that 'Everyone has the right to determine forhimselfwhetherpersonaldataconcerninghimmaybecollectedanddisclosedandhow

3.5.2 Right to Data Portability

The right to data portability is guaranteed to the data subjects only in the cases where the data has been provided in pursuant to contractual obligations or is based on consent. Cases where the data has been obtained on legal grounds do lack this right in the EU data protection regime. The data controller is required to develop mechanisms that allow the transmission of data from one controller to the other as per the preferences of the data subjects. The GDPR stresses on the need to develop interoperable formats in order to secure greater data portability.¹⁸⁶

It may be noted that the regulation doesn't overburden the data controllers with stringent obligations as far as the data portability is concerned. By allowing data to be retained on genuine public interest or in furtherance to the operation of law, the GDPR seeks to balance the interests of data subjects and data controllers. Nonetheless, except for these two compelling circumstances, the right to data portability can't be constricted. It is also apparent that the sole objective behind the recognition of the right is to ensure support user choice, user control and user empowerment, aiming to give data subjects control over their own personal data.¹⁸⁷

3.5.3 Right to Be Informed

In pursuance of the pursuit to vest the control of data in the data subjects to the maximum extent, the GDPR recognizes the right of the data subjects to be informed. The right is based on an assumption that when the data subjects know about the whereabouts of their data, the ones who are controlling it and the purposes for which their data shall be used, the data subjects get better placed in as much as their control over data is concerned. The data controllers are required to inform, their identity and habitual residence, the legal basis and purpose of the processing, the categories of

they may be used'. See CHARTRE 4284/00, 14 and CHARTRE 4360/00, 25 respectively.

See further Canmataci and Mifsud-Bonnici (n 13) 10

¹⁸⁶Recital 68 to the GDPR

¹⁸⁷*Id.*

personal data processed, the recipients of their personal data (if any) and how they can exercise their rights under Article 9, which includes the rights to access, rectification and legal remedy¹⁸⁸. Furthermore, in order to expand the ambit of the volume of information that the data subjects have with regard to their data, any other additional information deemed necessary to ensure fair and transparent personal data processing should also be communicated to the data subjects¹⁸⁹.

In order to promote transparency in data processing the GDPR further paces an obligation upon the data controllers to provide information in an easily understandable manner and to inform the data subjects about the ways in which they can exercise their rights. It requires that, the information must be concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible, using clear and plain language. It must be provided in written form, including electronically where appropriate, and it may even be provided orally at the data subject's request and if his or her identity is proven beyond doubt. The information shall be provided without excessive delay or expense¹⁹⁰.

Further, the GDPR ensures that the data subjects are well acquainted with the purpose for which their data is collected and the period for which their data will be retained. It states that the data controller will inform to the data subjects, the period for which the personal data will be stored, or if that is not possible, the criteria used to determine that period; the existence of the right to request from the controller access to and rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of processing concerning the data subject or to object to processing as well as the right to data portability, whether the provision of personal data is a statutory or contractual requirement, or a requirement necessary to enter into a contract, as well as whether the data subject is obliged to provide the personal data and of the possible consequences of failure to provide such data¹⁹¹.

¹⁸⁸General Data Protection Regulation, Recital 39

¹⁸⁹ CJEU, C-473/12, *Institut professionnel des agents immobiliers (IPI) v. Geoffrey Englebert and Others*, November 2013

¹⁹⁰ See, eg. General Data Protection Regulation, Article 5(1)(a) CJEU, C-201/14,

¹⁹¹ CJEU, C-473/12, *Institut professionnel des agents immobiliers (IPI) v. Englebert*, 2013

In *Smaranda Bara and Others v. Casa Națională de Asigurări de Sănătate and Others*¹⁹², where the personal data of the applicants were transferred from one government body to the other with them being informed, the court while applying the fairness principle held that in the absence of legislative procedures (to protect the economic interests of the government) such transfer don't get governed by the derogation clause. It was also held that the right to be informed is all the more important since it affects the exercise by the data subjects of their right of access to, and the right to rectify, the data being processed and their right to object to the processing of those data¹⁹³.

Under the GDPR, when personal data are collected from the data subject, the controller is obliged to provide the following information to the data subject at the time the personal data are obtained¹⁹⁴:

- The controller's identity and contact details, including the DPO's details, if any;
- The purpose and legal basis for the processing, i.e. a contract or legal obligation;
- The data controller's legitimate interest, if this provides the basis for processing;
- The personal data's eventual recipients or categories of recipients;
- Whether the data will be transferred to a third country or international organization, and whether this is based on an adequacy decision or relies upon appropriate safeguards;
- The period for which the personal data will be stored, and if establishing that period is not possible, the criteria used to determine the data storage period;

¹⁹²CJEU, C-201/14, *Smaranda Bara and Others v. Casa Națională de Asigurări de Sănătate and Others*, 1 October 2015.

¹⁹³CJEU, C-201/14, *Smaranda Bara and Others v. Casa Națională de Asigurări de Sănătate and Others*, 1 October 2015.

¹⁹⁴General Data Protection Regulation, Art. 13(1); Modernised Convention 108, Art. 7bis(1).

- The data subjects' rights regarding processing, such as the rights of access, rectification, erasure, and to restrict or object to processing; whether the provision of personal data is required by law or a contract, whether the data subject is obliged to provide his or her personal data, as well as the consequences in case of failure to provide the personal data;
- The existence of automated decision-making, including profiling;
- The right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority;
- The existence of the right to withdraw consent¹⁹⁵

The GDPR also casts an obligation upon the data controllers to inform the data subjects about their right to complain to a supervisory authority in cases of breach.¹⁹⁶

Our analysis so far suggests that the GDPR places a great deal of responsibility upon the data controllers in informing the data subjects about every aspect of data processing. However, as noted earlier, there are certain cases where the data controllers are exempted from furnishing the information to the data subjects¹⁹⁷. The data controllers are under no obligation to do so if the provision of information is impossible or disproportionate, in particular where the personal data is processed for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes

Keeping in tune with the practical aspects of every democratic society, the GDPR accommodates the view that it may be too burdensome and irrational to put a blanket ban on non-disclosure of all kinds of information. Issues relating to safeguard national and public security, defense, protection of judicial investigations and proceedings, or the protection of economic and financial interests, as well as private interests which are more compelling than data protection interests and the GDPR gives the discretion to the member states to restrict the flow of data. However,

¹⁹⁵General Data Protection Regulation, Art. 13 and 14

¹⁹⁶Explanatory Report of Modernised Convention 108, para. 68.

¹⁹⁷CJEU, C-201/14, Smaranda Bara and Others v. Casa Națională de Asigurări de Sănătate and Others, 1 October 2015, paras. 28–46

these restrictions must flow strictly from legislative process and have respect for the fundamental rights recognized by the EU charter, this implies that the domestic law should contain specific provisions clarifying the purpose of the processing, categories of personal data included, safeguards and other procedural requirement¹⁹⁸.

3.5.4 Right to Erasure

The right to be erasure or the right to be forgotten is the most recent entrant to the long list of rights recognized by the EU data protection regime¹⁹⁹. Jurisprudentially, the right to erasure can be viewed as an offshoot of the data minimization principle as it essentially involves destroying the data that are no longer available. The GDPR recognizes the right to be forgotten in the following circumstances.²⁰⁰ In *Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others v. Sweden*²⁰¹, where the data concerning the political affiliations of the claimants were retained for unreasonable amount of time, the ECtHR found this information could have no relevant national security interest, particularly given its historical nature²⁰²

In *Brunet v. France*²⁰³, where the police had retained the information related to the applicant were stored in the criminal data base despite their acquittal, the ECtHR observed that it was intrusive to the applicant's privacy, as it contained details of his identity and personality. In addition, it found that the retention period for personal

¹⁹⁸*Id.*

¹⁹⁹See further D McGoldrick, 'Developments in the Right to be Forgotten' 13(4) HRLR 761 (2013).

²⁰⁰ The General Data Protection Regulation, Art. 17 (1) provides that: Art. 17 (1) provides that: —the personal data are no longer necessary regarding the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed; the data subject withdraws the consent on which the processing is based and there is no other legal ground for the processing; the data subject objects to the processing and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing; the personal data have been unlawfully processed; the personal data have to be erased for compliance with a legal obligation in Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject;

²⁰¹ECtHR, *Segerstedt Wiberg and Others v. Sweden*, No. 62332/00, 2006

²⁰²*Id.*

²⁰³ECtHR, *Brunet v. France*, No. 21010/10, 18 September 2014.

records in the database, which amounted to 20 years, was excessively lengthy, particularly since no court had ever convicted the applicant²⁰⁴.

3.6 International Data Transfer

GDPR, when viewed from the prism of data controllers, appears on the face of it to be strictly tilted in favor of data subjects. While this may be partly true but GDPR does intent to create a legal order that is favorable to free flow of data. The GDPR does take into practical considerations attached to the importance of data in the international trade. In order to ensure that the data subjects are accorded adequate level of protection all over the world, the GDPR lays down several guidelines that ought to be followed in order to transmit data from an EU member state to a non member states²⁰⁵.

GDPR seeks to regulate the transfer of the of personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer to a third country or to an international organization.²⁰⁶ While there is no restriction on the flow of data amongst the member states, the transfer to a third country is subject to the following reservations.

Adequacy of protection: Article 45 of the GDPR provides for the mechanism through which data can be transferred to third countries. The CJEU in *Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner*²⁰⁷ has held that the adequate level of protection requires the third country to ensure a level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms that is essentially equivalent. While it is not necessary for the third country to have the same point to point resemblance of the protection but a legal regime that

²⁰⁴ *Id.*

²⁰⁵ See, Commission Communication on Exchanging and Protecting Personal Data in a Globalized World, COM(2017) 7 final.

²⁰⁶ General Data Protection Regulation, Art. 44.

²⁰⁷ See, CJEU, C-362/14, *Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner* [GC], 6 October 2015.

is equally capable as that of GDPR in its commitment for data protection rights of the individuals. The European commission has the mandate to assess the domestic laws of the third countries and decide as to if their data protection laws comply with the adequate safeguards' standards.

3.7 The Link between Data Protection Laws and Privacy in the Legal System of European Union

The Article 7 of EU Charter on fundamental rights recognizes right to privacy as one of the fundamental rights and is supplemented by the right to data protection under Article 8. Several member states of the EU treat the right to data protection as a subset to the right to privacy and hence don't recognize it as an independent right altogether²⁰⁸. However, the mere inclusion of the right to data protection under the charter must not be read as a uniform stance of the member states with regard to data protection throughout the EU. Unfortunately, there is a negligible reference to the underpinnings of mentioning the data protection rights in the charter²⁰⁹. In order to assess the need behind creating a separate right in the form of right to data protection, the section shall strive to establish a link between the right to privacy and data protection laws. Following are the ways in which the relationship between the two rights can be established.

- Right to Privacy and Data protection are separate and yet complimentary rights.
- Data protection right is a subset of the right to privacy for all practical purposes.
- The data protection right is an independent right with a broader ambit than the right to privacy.

²⁰⁸ Federico Ferretti, The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law, 2 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 278,(2016).

²⁰⁹ JA Cannataci and JP Mifsud-Bonnici, Data Protection Comes of Age: The Data Protection Clauses in the European Constitutional Treaty (2005)

These sections shall also take into account the interpretation by the European Courts of Human Rights regarding the overlapping meanings of the both rights. It may be noted that the data protection rights offer the individuals a greater control over their personal data as compared to the right to privacy for all practical purposes.²¹⁰

3.7.1 Right to Privacy and Data Protection are Separate Yet Complimentary Rights

The proposition that the data protection laws are a set of instruments aimed at protecting the human dignity outlines one of the most normative foundations for their recognition as a fundamental right. The 1983 Population Census Decision is one of the earliest judicial precedents that recognized the rights of individuals to control the flow of their data²¹¹. While holding that the right of individual self-determination of their information finds its genesis in the right to human dignity.²¹² In the case of *Netherlands v Parliament*, the Court held that the fundamental right to human dignity must be observed while disallowing the patentability of the human organs. Another credible argument in the favor of the model can be traced in the inclusion of the right to human dignity in the EU charter which recognizes it as one of the inviolable aspects of life. The data protection laws and the right to privacy appear to be collectively fostering the right to human dignity and individual liberty,

However, there still exists certain ambiguity about the dignity-based conception of the data protection laws due to their non-inclusion in the based rights chapter of the EU charter²¹³. It may be safely concluded that the drafters of the charters did not recognize data protection rights as a human dignity based right.

²¹⁰M.-P., and Irion, K. (2018). 'The right to protection of personal data: the new poster child of European Union citizenship?' in: de Vries, S., de Waele, H., and Granger, M.-P., eds., *Civil Rights and EU Citizenship*

²¹¹Population Census Decision, 1 BvR 209/83, BVerfG 65, 1.

²¹²Kevin McGillivray, *Conflicts in the Cloud: Contracts and Compliance with Data Protection Law in the EU*, 17 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 217, 254 (2014).

²¹³National Panasonic v Commission [1980] ECR I-2033, paras 18-20

3.7.2 Data Protection Laws as a Subset of Right to Privacy

One of the most accepted views regarding the nature of relationship between data protection laws and the right to privacy revolves around the conception that the data protection laws are a subset of the right to privacy²¹⁴. This view has garnered a lot of academic and legal basis in the past few years and the proponents of this theory have regarded the data protection laws as one of the latest developments to the evolution of the right to privacy²¹⁵. It is argued that the data protection laws do not cater to any other rights that are not related to the concerns of the protection of privacy of the individuals in one way or the other. The reasoning that the right to privacy had been recognized as a right to be left alone and with the advancement of technology such right can't be preserved without the data protection laws seems plausible. As per Solves, the data protection laws and the right to privacy are the members of a family which resemble each other but are not identical²¹⁶.

3.7.3 Right to Privacy and Data Protection Rights are Independent Rights

The report of the Expert Group on Fundamental Rights, Affirming Fundamental Rights in the EU can be regarded as one of the most notable endorsements of the view that the data protection laws are an independent right altogether. The report recognized the right to determine the use of personal data as a complementary right to the rights set out under Article 2 to 13 of the UNHCR²¹⁷. This model suggests that although both, the right to privacy and data protection rights seek to ensure informational privacy, their scope varies considerably. Gutwirth argues that the purposes served by the data personal laws are far greater in number and amplitude as

²¹⁴Rights in Conflict-Reconciling Privacy with the Public's Right to Know, 63 LAW LIBR. J. 551, 563 (1970).

²¹⁵Netherlands v Parliament and Council [2001] ECRI-7079.

²¹⁶Rouvroy and Poullet, The Right to Informational Self-determination (n1) 47

²¹⁷ See, Technical Report on the Review of the European Data Protection Directive: accessed 5 August 2019, the RAND report the Directive therefore serves a number of purposes, privacy protection being only one

compared to the privacy laws and vice versa²¹⁸. It is argued that the data protection law serves a multitude of purposes and one of them is the protection of privacy of the information of the users. The provisions of the data protection laws that are not concerned with the right to privacy deal with other aspects of data security that are far broader in their amplitude.²¹⁹

This model can be regarded as the closest one to the constitutional framework of several member states that consider right to privacy to be an independent right tagged with the right to privacy. For example, the French data protection law is anchored around the notion of individual liberty whereas the data protection laws of Germany treat human dignity as an indispensable aspect of human life²²⁰. The analysis of the propositions of all the three models suggest that there still is a dearth of an all-encompassing explanation as to how the data protection laws and right to privacy are related to each other.

3.8 Reading the Right to Data Protection under the Article 8 of the ECHR

The right to privacy is recognized under the Article 8 of ECHR.²²¹ The European Court of Human Rights have interpreted the right to be privacy in a much a much flexible manner as compared to the approach of characterizing it as a right to be let alone. However, the right to privacy is not recognized as an unqualified right under the convention and Article 8(2) permits interference in the right as per the procedure established by law.²²² Hence, in order to determine the application of Article 8 of the ECHR, few important questions need to be answered. First of all, the courts try to determine if at all there exists any interest protected under Article 8(1) of the ECHR. If such any interest exists, has there been any unwarranted interference with those

²¹⁸De Hert and Gutwirth, *Data Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg and Luxembourg* (n8) 8.

²¹⁹Susan Nevelow Mart, *The Right to Receive Information*, 95 *LAWLIBR. J.* 175, 190 (2003).

²²⁰ Judy Meadows; Bob Oakley, *Balancing Act - Reconciling Privacy with the Public's Right to Know*, 8 *AALL SPECTRUM* 14, 35 (2004).

²²¹See Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, *The Right to Privacy* (1890) *IV Harvard Law Review* 193

²²²Article 8(2) ECHR, allows interference with it exercised when the interference is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society

interests?²²³ This section of discussions shall be concerned with the extent of interests guaranteed by the data protection laws which are protected by Article 8 of the ECHR.

In order to attract the application of the Article 8(1) of ECHR the petitioners must be able to show that their interests concerning private and family life, the correspondence and the home is affected. However, the ECtHR has taken a broader view of the term private life by while including video surveillance images²²⁴, email sent from the work²²⁵, traffic data on phone calls²²⁶ in its purview. Precedents suggest that the courts have not given any weightage to the decisive nature of the information. In its landmark judgment in *Sand MarpervUK*²²⁷, the Court observed that while assessing whether a personal information falls within the private-life aspect of the Article 8 of ECHR, due emphasis has to be given to the specific context in which such information have been recorded and retained. The judgment also outlines the stance taken by the courts to rely on the non-exhaustive parameters in order to determine the nature of data. The court has also held that the data that is in public domain can also be treated as a private data as the zone of interaction between an individual and public at large is well within the scope of private life.²²⁸

The factual circumstances of every case are taken into consideration while determining the extent of alleged interference of the interests recognized under Article 8(1) of ECHR. At times, the Court has treated the mere storage of data and its subsequent disclosure to the employees of the petitioners as a violation of right to

²²³ Beate Roessler, *Should Personal Data Be a Tradable Good? On the Moral Limits of Markets in Privacy* in Beate Roessler and Dorota Mokrosinska (eds), *Social Dimensions of Privacy: Interdisciplinary Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015)

²²⁴ *PerryvUnitedKingdom*(2004)39EHRR3.

²²⁵ *CoplandvUnitedKingdom*(2007)45EHRR 37.

²²⁶ *Malone*(n83)para64

²²⁷ *Sand MarpervUK*(2009)48EHRR 50.

²²⁸ *GoodwinvUnitedKingdom*(2002)35EHRR18,para 90

privacy. The court held that the mere storage of data of an individual amounts to the breach of right to privacy irrespective of the motive behind such storage.²²⁹

3.9 The New Data Protection Law Regime

The Need for GDPR

The issue with the Directive is that it's no longer relevant to today's digital age. Its provisions fail to address how data is stored, collected, and transferred today—a digital age. Like many regulations and statutes throughout the EU and U.S., these regulations haven't been able to keep up with the pace of the levels of technological advancement.

Data is becoming very valuable for today's economy and are essential to daily lives of the citizens. The new rules offer a unique opportunity for businesses and the public alike. Businesses, especially the smaller ones, will be able to benefit from the innovation-friendly single set of rules and put their houses in order in terms of personal data to restore consumer's trust and use it as their competitive advantage across the EU. Citizens will be able to benefit from the stronger protection of personal data and gain better control over how the data are handled by the companies.²³⁰

Directive 95/46/EC was replaced by the new data protection regime known as the General data protection regulation from 25th May 2018²³¹ The European union adopted the GDPR on 16th May 2016 and thus replaced over two decades old data

²²⁹ International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 73; and Maria Tzanou, Data Protection as a Fundamental Right Next to Privacy? —Reconstructing a Not So New Right (2013) 3 International Data Privacy Law 88

²³⁰ ITGP Privacy Team (2017). BU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): An Implementation and Compliance Guide - Second edition. IT Governance Ltd.

²³¹ The Regulation has been in force since 24 May 2016 and was applicable from 24th May 2018.

protection directive²³² along with the police directive²³³. The new rules promise a better data protection mechanism for protection of data of every individual and company operating within the EU irrespective of their place of origin. This part of deals with the underlying principles behind the new regulations and the impact that they will have on the stakeholders.

The underlying reason behind the well-established legal framework regarding data protection in the EU is based on the two important factors:

1. The need to modernize the data protection laws in order to keep them in tandem with the needs of the modern world.
2. Strengthening the individuals' control over their data by recognizing the data protection right as a fundamental right.

The GDPR has been hailed as a bold step towards strengthening the right to data protection by endorsing it as a fundamental right for the EU.

These rules are set to ensure greater uniformity and thus allow the businesses throughout the EU to explore new opportunities by reinstating the trust among their customers. The guidelines arising out of a single set of rules will also make way for a much easier flow of data among the member states²³⁴. At the onset, it must be clarified that the GDPR doesn't make any notable departure from the data protection directive and follows its objectives in pith and substance. However, these guidelines do incorporate the principles laid down in various judicial precedents on the subject and hence offer a set of guidelines which are suited for the modern day. The inclusion

²³² Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament regarding the processing of personal data of the individuals and their free movement and it was adopted on 23rd November 2015, OJ L 281 of 23.11.95.

²³³ Directive (EU) 2016/680 the regulation dealt with the powers of the authorities to process the information for investigation, detection and prevention of crimes and had repealed the council framework decision 2008/977/JHA, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016.

²³⁴ Kevin McGillivray, *Conflicts in the Cloud: Contracts and Compliance with Data Protection Law in the EU*, 17 Tul. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 217 (2014).

of several benign elements in the guidelines vouch for greater control of the individuals over their data.²³⁵

3.10 Better Protection of the Data and New Opportunities for the Businesses

In the erstwhile data protection regime, the member states have applied the Data protection directive differently and as a result in lot of cases inconsistencies used to arise amongst the laws of two different states. Perhaps, the greatest incentive of GDPR will be uniformity and consistency amongst the laws of member states through this one shop stop mechanism.

The GDPR also promises a level playing field for the companies doing business in the European markets. It lays that the same rules will be applied to the companies who transact in the EU irrespective of their place of origin and hence paves way for a much more uniform and even regime. The detailed guidelines on the ease seem to leave no room for ambiguity as regards to the application of the provisions on any corporation that is even a virtual stakeholder in the European markets.

As per the Directive 95/46/EC, these guidelines are aimed at addressing the issues related to the data protection from the scratch²³⁶. Moreover, they set out a range of innovative remedies against any breach thereof.

One of the most notable changes that the GDPR will bring to the fore is the immensely greater control of the individuals over their personal data. The regulations had expanded the right of the individual over their personal data by recognizing the right to portability. This would mean that the individuals will be allowed to let the

²³⁵Mike Hintze, Privacy Statements under the GDPR, 42 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1129 (2019)

²³⁶Article 29 Working Party (2005), Working document on a common interpretation of Article 26(1) of Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995, WP 114, Brussels, 25 November 2005.

companies transfer their personal data under a contract²³⁷. This will ensure free flow of data and hence it will be much easier for the common man to which between different companies for better handling and security of their data. Moreover, this is bound to increase the competition amongst the companies and thus the interests of the individuals will be served better.

The guidelines also lay down a comprehensive road map for remedies against the breach of data. Notably, it clearly defines what will constitute Data Breach²³⁸. Also, it imposes a duty upon the companies to inform the individuals whose data is likely to be breached in a specified time frame²³⁹. Once, it becomes apparent that the potential data breach may have an impact upon the fundamental rights of the individuals, the concerned company is required to communicate the same to the supervising authority within 72 hours from the incident. The guidelines also provide for a detailed and organized mechanism to prevent any potential breach of data and requires that adequate technological measures are taken in order to prevent any infringement of rights of the individuals.²⁴⁰ Also, the supervisory authority is required to take actions in a timely manner in order to mitigate the impending risks²⁴¹. This is certainly going to ensure effective redressal and greater protection of data of the individuals.

²³⁷*Id.*

²³⁸ Art. 30 GDPR

²³⁹ “It should be ascertained whether all appropriate technological protection and organizational measures have been implemented to establish immediately whether a personal data breach has taken place and to inform promptly the supervisory authority and the data subject. The fact that the notification was made without undue delay should be established taking into account in particular the nature and gravity of the personal data breach and its consequences and adverse effects for the data subject. Such notification may result in an intervention of the supervisory authority in accordance with its tasks and powers laid down in this Regulation”

²⁴⁰ Article 29 Working Party (2004), Opinion 10/2004 on More Harmonized Information Provisions, WP 100, Brussels, 25 November 2004.

²⁴¹ Lilian Edwards, *Privacy, Security and Data Protection in Smart Cities: A Critical EU Law Perspective*, 2 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 28 (2016)

These guidelines ensure that there exists effective governance to implement these rules in letter and spirit by providing for a comprehensive remedial procedure.²⁴²

3.11 Rights and Obligations of Individuals under GDPR

While as we have noted in our discussions so far that the GDPR lays down extensive guidelines for protection against the data breach, it also imposes obligations upon the individuals and data controllers accordingly. Barring few exceptions, the theme of the regulation revolves around securing the maximum protection of the rights of individuals. We shall now look in detail the kinds of rights that these guidelines seek to confer upon the data subjects.

3.11.1 Right to be forgotten

Under Article 17 of the GDPR, the Right to be forgotten, also termed as the Right to erasure is granted to the individuals in certain cases. This means that they have a right to get their data erased/deleted from the controllers after making a request for the same in the following scenarios. The purpose for which the data was collected has been accomplished. The consent for processing of data has been withdrawn by the individual. There isn't any underlying legitimate interest in retaining the data that exceeds the interest in its deletion.

3.11.2 Right to portability of Data

Right to portability of data is one of the most notable rights reorganized by the GDPR which will have the practical benefits for the commoners in as much as their control over data is concerned²⁴³. This will mean that the individuals will be able to transmit their personal data from one controller to the other in any transmittable medium. This

²⁴²Asang Wankhede, *Data Protection in India and the EU: Insights in Recent Trends and Issues in the Protection of Personal Data*, 2 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 70 (2016).

²⁴³Lina Jasmontaite, *European Union: The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) Opinion 4/2015 Towards a New Digital Ethics*, 2 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 93 (2016).

will enable the users to use their data for availing multiple kinds of services even by submitting their data to any controller.²⁴⁴

3.11.3 Right to Information

The recital to Article 12, the principle of transparency requires that any information addressed to the public or to the data subject be concise, easily accessible and easy to understand, and that clear and plain language and, additionally, where appropriate, visualization be used. Such information could be provided in electronic form, for example, when addressed to the public, through a website. The GDPR guarantees the right to the data subjects the right to know the purpose for which their data is being collected and processed²⁴⁵, the right to know the period for which their data will be retained²⁴⁶ and period for which such retention will be in existence²⁴⁷. The regulation requires the data controller to render all this required information to the data subjects in an understandable and plain language.²⁴⁸

3.11.4 Right to Seek Remedy

The GDPR envisages a Data Protection Regime that keeps the importance of informational self-determination at the helm. This is amply reflected in the provisions providing for the remedies in cases of breach of the personal data of the individuals. It provides in the clearest of terms the right of the data subject to initiate all the proceedings in the appropriate courts will be independent of one's right to lodge a complain with the Data Protection Authority²⁴⁹. It further provides that authority shall keep the data subject informed about the progress of the complaint

²⁴⁴Recital 68 to Article 20,— Where technically feasible, the data subject should have the right to have the personal data transmitted directly from one controller to another

²⁴⁵ECtHR, *K.H. and Others v. Slovakia*, No. 32881/04, 28 April 2009; ECtHR, *Godelliv. Italy*, No. 33783/09, 25 September 2012

²⁴⁶See Further, Laura F. Edwards, *Rights That Made the World Right*, 102 *Judicature* 15 (2018)

²⁴⁷General Data Protection Regulation, Art. 4(11). See also Modernized Convention 108, Art. 5 (2).

²⁴⁸General Data Protection Regulation, Art. 7.

²⁴⁹General Data Protection Regulation, Art. 77.

and the alternative legal remedies²⁵⁰. Further the regulation provides that the data subject shall have the necessary recourse against the data protection authority in the event of every binding decision of the authority against them. Further the scheme of the provisions of the GDPR recognize the right of the data principal to seek remedy against the breaches without any impediments.

3.12 Data Protection in the United States

The United States, unlike the European Union doesn't have a standardized and uniform data protection legal regime in place. The country has enacted several enactments in order to secure the data protection rights of the individuals to the maximum possible extent²⁵¹. These laws are extremely specific in their scope and subject matters and cover very limited industry participants. While, it is outside the scope of this research to cover all the data protection legislations in the United States at the federal and the state level, the following section will strive to outline the underlying theme of these legislations. After exploring the mandate of a few notable data protection enactments will be taken up to explore the quality of protection that have been conferred to the individual in the United States.

Apart from these specific enactments that seek to regulate the processing of data the concept of right to be left alone can be gathered from the constitution as well. One of the earliest cases where the Supreme Court took a broad view of the fourth amendment and held that it protected people and not just the places from the state's intrusions was *Katz v. United States*²⁵². However, the court didn't recognize the right to privacy as a separate right. It was only after the case *Whalen v. Roe* that the right to privacy was recognized as the right to privacy as recognized as a separate constitutional right, the SC held that the right to privacy in fact involve[s] at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of

²⁵⁰General Data Protection Regulation, Art. 78.

²⁵¹SGUTWIRTH, DATA PROTECTION IN A PROFILED WORLD, 210 (1ST ED. 2010).

²⁵²See, e.g., *Olmstead v. United States*, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928)

personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions²⁵³.

3.12.1 The Right to Privacy in United States

No study about the evolution of right to privacy as a distinct right in the US can be justified without mentioning the ground breaking Article The Right to Privacy by... The propositions of the work have proved to be a beacon of eternal light to anyone who is interested in the development of the right to privacy as a separate right in the United States²⁵⁴. However, the assertions about the right of individual to be let alone had previously been made by the judiciary but the authors of the article were successful in drawing a close association between the right to life and the right to privacy by striking the collective conscience of the policymakers and the civil society at large. Before we delve further in the process of evolution of right to privacy as a distinct right, it will be optimal to discuss the series of judicial pronouncements that have created the jurisprudential basis for recognition of Right to Privacy in America.

What lies at the core of justification of recognition of right to privacy as a distinct right is the recognition of intangible harm to the human mind.²⁵⁵ Thoughts, emotions, and sensations demanded legal recognition, and the beautiful capacity for growth which characterizes the common law enabled the judges to afford the requisite protection, without the interposition of the legislature. In one of the earliest cases on intrusion into the privacy of an individual's life, the New York court had issued an injunction against the publication of a photograph of an actress while performing in a theatre while terming it an unwanted intrusion in the person life²⁵⁶.

²⁵³Samuel D. Warren; Louis D. Brandeis, *Right to Privacy*, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890-1891).

²⁵⁴ Daniel J. Solove, A Brief History of Information Privacy Law, in PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY § 1-4 (2006) (citing DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 1 (1972)).

²⁵⁵Herbert Spencer Hadley, *Right to Privacy*, 3 N.W.L. Rev. 1 (1895).

²⁵⁶ GWEN KENNEDY, DATA PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICAL GUIDE 432-433, (2ND, LSP PRADHU ED., 2018).

One of the most vociferous challenges that the recognition of right to privacy faced was the assertion that the torts like libel and defamation more or less cover the same set of injuries that the right to privacy claimed to address and provide a remedy against. However, it is important to note that the torts of libel, slander, defamation etc. do provide remedy against the damage to the reputation of an individual in the eyes of the society and in case the petitioner is unable to prove such injury, the claim doesn't subsist. But what right to privacy seeks to cater is the personal pain inflicted on one's feeling. That branch of the law simply extends the protection surrounding physical property to certain of the conditions necessary or helpful to worldly prosperity. On the other hand, our law recognizes no principle upon which compensation can be granted for mere injury to the feelings.

As per Justice Yates, *it is certain every man has a right to keep his own sentiments, if he pleases. He has certainly a right to judge whether he will make them public, or commit them only to the sight of his friends*²⁵⁷. Whatever be the mode of publication, the common law has always been conferring right upon the individual to control what they wish to publish to the rest of the world and what they wish to keep with themselves. Take for example, a man writes a letter to his girlfriend about his feelings for her, even if a third person obtains the possession of the letter, he doesn't get the right to publish the contents of the letter to the world. What does the law seek to protect here?

The principle which has been applied to protect these rights is in reality not the principle of private property, unless that word be used in an extended and unusual sense. The principle which protects personal writings and any other productions of the intellect or of the emotions, is the right to privacy, and the law has no new principle to formulate when it extends this protection to the personal appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal relation, domestic or otherwise.

²⁵⁷*Id.*

3.12.2 The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)²⁵⁸

Children are by far one of the most populous consumers of the internet today. A lot of gaming, chatting and education websites have children as the greater share of their consumer segment.²⁵⁹ The ever-evolving presence of the children as the online consumers creates room for the breach of the privacy of the children (a lot of whom aren't capable of understanding the implications of the submitted information). For long, a lot of jurists across the country have pitched for strict federal regulations for protecting the privacy rights of the children and the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act is the manifestation of these propositions. The COPPA was enacted in 1998 to ensure protection of the collection, storage and processing of the personally identifiable information of the children. This section shall deal with the underlying concerns that triggered the enactment of the Act and then move on to examine the extent of parental consent under the Act and thus examine the feasibility of the resolution to protect the privacy interests of the children. The impetus of the Act can be traced to an investigation report by the Federal Trade Commission in the alleged breaches in handling the information by KidsCom.com which highlighted the need for a comprehensive regulation to highlight the risks associated with the online submission of the information and the need for parental consent in any such disclosure.²⁶⁰

Mandates of COPPA:

The COPAA is aimed at informing the children and their parents about the information collection, storage and processing policies of the websites that they are using. It requires that the consent about the submission of information must be obtained from the parents and they must be given a chance to review the information

²⁵⁸ 15 U.S.C. 6501–6505

²⁵⁹ Melanie L. Hersh, Is COPPA a Cop Out? The Child Online Privacy Protection Act As Proof That Parents, Not Government, Should Be Protecting Children's Interests on the Internet, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1831 (2001). Available at: <https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol28/iss6/4>

²⁶⁰ Dawn A. Edick, Regulation of Pornography on the Internet in the United States and the United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis, 21 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 437 (1998).

and limit such information.²⁶¹ The regulations provide for a reasonable standard of compliance in collection, storage and processing of data. The Act regulations are aimed at protecting the children by regulating the website operators and online service providers. The term operator has been very broadly defined in the Act and it encompasses any online service provider operating for commercial purposes. Another important aspect of the Act is its definition of the term directed at children and it must be conceded that the definition is broad enough to encompass all the websites which the children potentially use. All the websites that have a dedicated are for children, the subject matter of the website relate to children are categorized as directed towards children.

The Act also provides for a broader definition of the term Personally identifiable information²⁶² and provides for inclusion of all the information that have the potential of disclosing the personal details of any individuals. Any information such as the email address, the name, the contact details, social security number, resident address and other ancillary information. More importantly, the use of the persistent identifiers (such as the cookies) have also been identified as PII.²⁶³ Another notable aspect of the Act is the obligation on the part of the operator to maintain the confidentiality of the furnished information. It is required that the operators must have a detailed mechanism to protect the information provided by the users which must include fixing responsibility for the breach of confidentiality, ensuring adequate security of data through use of encryptions, firewalls and passwords. It can be gathered from the wordings of the provision that the act requires the websites to take reasonable steps to prevent any breaches.

3.12.2.1 Scope of parental consent

The most critical aspect of the Act is no doubt the process of obtaining the verifiable parental consent as the relevance of the legislation lies on its practicality. As per

²⁶¹Id.

²⁶²Thomas B. Nachbar, Paradox and Structure: Relying on Government Regulation to Preserve the Internet's Unregulated Character, 85 MINN. L. REV 215 (2000)

²⁶³ Jay Krasovec, Cyberspace: The Final Frontier, For Regulation?, 31 AKRON L. REV. 101, 115 (1997)

the Act, the operator must obtain verifiable parental consent before collecting any information from the children. The Act aims at giving the parents the full authority over the collected information and the operator is bound to inform the parents before making any material alteration to the collected data and revealing the said information with a third party.

However, the Act does provide several relaxations and exceptions to the rule of obtaining parental consent. Keeping in view the hardship that could result out of the strict compliance to the above rule, the websites are at the liberty to get the payment done through the parents, make a toll-free parent call, send a verification mail to the parents among other things. Also, the Act also exempts the websites from obtaining the parental consent for collection of information on a one-time basis.²⁶⁴ However, for further communication, the website is under an obligation to take reasonable steps to obtain the verifiable consent of the parents. In the cases where it is necessary for the website to obtain the name and other details of the children for securing the safety of the child, the obligation may be done away with.

Another important aspect of the parental consent is the mode of its obtaining. Opinions on the legislative intent on the mode of collecting the consent of the parents vary and a lot of jurists are of the opinion that the email verification may not be adequately safe mode of obtaining the parental consent and it ought to be supplemented by other steps as well.²⁶⁵ However, there is a very little scope for switching back to the print and send method of approval, as this may substantially increase the transaction costs and adversely impact the businesses. Unfortunately, in spite of all the benign intentions behind the regulations, the Act doesn't take into consideration the practical commercial realities. As one of the commentator's notes

"COPPA's parental consent measures are difficult to implement and costly to realize. Print-and-send methods are antithetical to the speed and efficiency of e-

²⁶⁴See C.F.R. § 312.5(c)(2)

²⁶⁵Joshua Warmund, Can COPPA Work - An Analysis of the Parental Consent Measures in the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, 11 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 189 (2000).

commerce. Ill Postal, fax, and credit card fees, when aggregated, can be substantial." Although some companies are developing new technologies to comply with the Act, the end-product usually makes browsing a painfully slow and laborious process. Indeed, companies will need to hire and compensate personnel to oversee and implement these new policies. As a result, the offline labor associated with these methods is prohibitive, for both parents and operators²⁶⁶".

It is no doubt true that the COPAA intend to protect the interests of the children and their personal information online by making strict regulations for the website operators but these guidelines do seem far from the practical realities as there is a high likelihood of children manipulating the consent of their parents. In absence of a full proof way of obtaining the parental consent, the changes sought to be brought by COPAA may be minimal.

3.12.2 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act had for long been projected as the polestar in the dark skies of the privacy regime of the US. Several commentators have time and again retreated that the ECPA was one of the first laws in the US to have provided for a detailed framework for protection of the privacy of the users online²⁶⁷. With the advent of emails and other digital modes of communication meant that the exchanges in the course of communication could be recorder and further accessed by the third parties. Moreover, the judiciary was of the view that the information voluntarily submitted for business purposes didn't get the protection of the fourth amendment. In the wake of growing usage of email and the internet, a good chunk of policy makers were propelled to come up with a piece of legislation that protected the privacy of users in these communications. The genesis of the ECPA can be traced in the Office of Technology's assessment report that highlighted the grave risk to the individual liberty in the digital communications. However, the technological world has undergone a sea of changes from 1986 till today and there looms a challenge over the relevance of the Act in providing

²⁶⁶Id.

²⁶⁷Anne Eisenberg, What's Next; Memories as Heirlooms Logged into a Database, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2003, at G6

adequate protection to the users from the existing threats online. In this section, we shall first have a look at the genesis of the Act and then examine whether the ECPA has been successful in keeping up with the pace of time. Among many suggestions that the report made was the extension of the protection guaranteed to the conventional first-class mail to all the digital communications.

3.12.3 Fair Credit Reporting Act(FCRA)

The Fair Credit Reporting Act is a comprehensive code aimed at regulating the consumer credit rating agencies and the retail credit bureau. These reporting agencies have the access to the credit history of the millions of Americans through their Associated credit business bureau. Every transaction involves several parties such as the lender, the borrower and a credit rating agency that decides upon the credit worthiness of the borrower. It is of common practice for the banks and other financial institutions to rely upon the credit score of the loan applicants for sanctioning the loans and notable is the fact that the credit score is obtained by a cumulative assessment of a wide range of information about the background of the applicant²⁶⁸. Keeping in view the bulk of the information that lies in these files, the threat to privacy becomes an ever-growing risk attached to the industry. The following sections will discuss the measures that the FCRA seeks to bring in to protect the financial privacy of the consumers.

The most notable change the FCRA brought was the remedies against the false information furnished by the credit agencies. Prior to the enactment, a consumer had no remedy against any inappropriate report provided by the credit rating agencies nor did arise any cause of action against any unauthorized disclosure of such information²⁶⁹. The Act requires the rating agencies to establish a notification system to inform the consumers about the existence of information about them. This obligation the part of the lenders to notify the consumers about the information that is used against them gives them an opportunity to know and if possible, challenge the

²⁶⁸*Id.*

²⁶⁹See, e.g., *Watwood v. Stone's Mercantile Agency*, 194 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1952)

information. The Act also imposes a duty upon the rating agencies to inform the consumers about the details of the information. One of the other ways in which the FCRA seeks to guarantee the privacy of the consumers is by assuring the confidentiality of the data. Before the enactment of the Act, there were several instances in which the entities which did not have a genuine business interest in the information were also able to get this information with impunity. The doctrine of conditional privilege was used largely to mask the breach of right to privacy.

3.12.4 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act(HIPAA)

The essence of the right to privacy is reflected in the state's ability to ensure you that the data which you don't wish to reveal to others remains under your control, it's your right to be left alone. While it has been an ethical medical practice to ensure the privacy of the fiduciary relationship between the doctors and patients, the era of digitalization has emerged as one of the greatest risks to the medical privacy. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act aims at safeguarding the protected health information of the citizens all over the United states from potential breaches. The Act bars all the health care providers from disclosing any information about the citizens without the consent of the individuals.²⁷⁰ Following are some of the notable aspects of the Act concerned with the protection of privacy

- Sharing of Protected health information to the individuals: Once requested, the institutions must share the information with the applicants in a limited time frame²⁷¹.
- The PHI may be disclosed for the purposes of treatment and payment²⁷².
- The institution must notify any potential breach of data to the concerned individuals²⁷³.

²⁷⁰Id. §§ 164.104, 164.306, 164.502

²⁷¹See, e.g., *Univ. of Colo. Hosp. v. Denver Pub. Co.*, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1143 (D. Colo. 2004) (holding that no private right of action exists under HIPAA).

²⁷²*Id*

²⁷³Samuel D. Warren; Louis D. Brandeis, *Right to Privacy*, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890-1891).

The code nonetheless doesn't recognize right to privacy as a fundamental right protected by the constitution; all it guarantees is a greater level of protection against unlawful disclosure of the medical history of the patients while recognizing an existence of legitimate privacy interest of the individuals in such data. The fact that the medical history includes sensitive information about the medical and health background of the individuals makes their protection an indispensable aspect of right to privacy. An excerpt from the federal register amply reflects the recognition according to the right to privacy.

*“Privacy is a fundamental right. As such, it must be viewed differently than any ordinary economic good. The costs and benefits of a regulation must, of course, be considered as a means of identifying and weighing options. At the same time, it is important not to lose sight of the inherent meaning of privacy: it speaks to our individual and collective freedom. A right to privacy in personal information has historically found expression in American law. All fifty states today recognize in tort law a common law or statutory right to privacy. Many states specifically provide a remedy for public revelation of private facts. Some states, such as California and Tennessee, have a right to privacy as a matter of state constitutional law. The multiple historical sources for legal rights to privacy are traced in many places, including Chapter 13 of Alan Westin's *Privacy and Freedom* and in Ellen Alderman & Caroline Kennedy, *The Right to Privacy* (1995). Throughout our nation's history, we have placed the rights of the individual at the forefront of our democracy. In the Declaration of Independence, we asserted the "unalienable right" to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Many of the most basic protections in the Constitution of the United States are imbued with an attempt to protect individual privacy while balancing it against the larger social purposes of the nation”.*²⁷⁴

²⁷⁴Joan M. Kiel, *The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Implementation Via Case Law*, 20 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 435 (2004).

Interestingly, the Act does not seek to regulate all the medical relationships and only those interactions that fall under the definition of covered entities are regulated²⁷⁵. Several commentators do consider the patients, the covered entities and the business organizations as the three stakeholders representing an equilateral triangle to form the beneficiaries of the Act. In the following sections, the definition of all the three entities will be discussed in a nutshell followed by an examination of the other relevant aspects.

Patient: As per the Act, the any person who submits the Individually identifiable health information is said to be patient. The information may range from the name, address, medical history etc. of the subject. As one of the commentators have put it "Individually identifiable health information is a fancy, verbose way of describing all information that in any manner may identify the individual who has received health care services or could be used to identify that individual."²⁷⁶ Interestingly, the HIPAA applies to all kinds of written as well as oral communications to ensure that no loopholes exist.

Business Associates: The entities associated with the covered entities (such as the lawyers, accountants, assistants etc.) fall within the category of business associates. As per the code, Business associates" are those businesses, individuals, and entities that are required, as a part of the function and/or service performed for a covered entity, to have access to and knowledge of individually identifiable health information²⁷⁷.

Covered entities: The most important stakeholders in the sojourn for ensuring the privacy of the health records of the patients are the covered entities. The HIPAA regulates the Health care service providers, the health plans and the health maintenance organizations. The onus of complying with the mandate of the Act lies on these covered entities and they are required to appoint a compliance officer to ensure non-disclosure of the sensitive information related to the patients.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁵ *Burgerv. Lutheran General Hospital*, 759 N.E.2d 533 (Ill. 2001).

²⁷⁶ *Arbsterv. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review*, 690 A.2d 805 (Pa. 1997)

²⁷⁷ *Id.*

²⁷⁸ *Id.*

Curbing the growing instances of the private dissemination of the confidential medical information in the absence of legitimate business interest remains to be the most vital aspect of the HIPAA²⁷⁹. However, in the wake of practical realities, the Act doesn't prohibit legitimate health information sharing in the ordinary course of business in order to promote the discussions among the healthcare providers to come up with the most optimal treatment plans for their patients.

3.12.5 Video Privacy Protection Act, 1998

The Video Privacy Protection Act, 1988 has been in a limelight for quite a while due to a surge in the lawsuits under the law against Netflix and Twitter in recent years. The VPPA seeks to preserve personal privacy with respect to the rental, purchase, or delivery of video tapes or similar audio visual materials²⁸⁰. The Act bars the audio-visual digital service providers from disclosing personally identifiable information as includ[ing] information which identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape service provider. Information related to their consumers to a third party without their expressed approval. Despite numerous technological changes in past three decades, the relevance of VPPA in protecting the rights of the consumers due to liberal interpretation of the Act. In *re* Hulu Privacy Litigation, a US district court held that the online video streaming service providers also come within the meaning of video tape service providers²⁸¹. In *Stanely v Georgia*²⁸², the court recognized the right to even receive obscene material in one's private premises.

The provisions of the Act have for long been associated with the first amendment and time and again it has been argued that absence of such freedoms would severely

²⁷⁹Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462,

²⁸⁰Marc Chase McAllister, *Modernizing the Video Privacy Protection Act*, 25 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 102 (2017).

²⁸¹Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-619, 102 Stat. 3195 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2710).

²⁸² Marc Chase McAllister, *Modernizing the Video Privacy Protection Act*, 25 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 102 (2017)

inhibit the intellectual and liberal thought process.²⁸³ It is notable that the provisions of the Act which could have potentially become redundant in the onslaught of revolutionary technological changes have held their ground firmly in the wake of liberal interpretation by the judiciary²⁸⁴. Following are some of the drafting lapses which have been a bone of contention

Locus Standi: The question as to whom may sue under VPA has been at the helm of affairs regarding the drafting lapses in the Act. The wordings of the Act remain vague on deciding the liability of the receiver of the disclosed data. A majority of the courts have held that only the service provider can be held liable under the Act on the grounds that these platforms which store the information in bulk can leak detailed records of an individual's reading materials, purchases, diseases, and website activity.²⁸⁵

Personally Identifiable Information (PII): In what is termed as the most flexible explanation of the term Personally Identifiable Information, the first circuit court held that, PII constitutes of information reasonably and foreseeably likely to reveal, directly or indirectly, an individual consumer's identity²⁸⁶. The interpretation provides for a reasonable foreseeability test and thus goes on to lay that any information which is likely to disclose the identity of the person may be classified as a PII. In re Hulu Privacy litigation, the district court observed that even a barcode that has the potential of disclosing the personal information of an individual can be held to be a PII. However, just because an information can be processed and tapped into an identifiable information doesn't make it a PII²⁸⁷.

²⁸³ See *Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc.*, 820 F.3d 482, 484

²⁸⁴ See *Dirkes v. Borough of Runnemede*, 936 F.Supp.235, 238 (D.N.J.1996)

²⁸⁵ *Mollet v. Netflix, Inc.*, 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir.2015) (stating that the newspaper detailed 146 films that the Bork family had rented from an area video store)

²⁸⁶ In re Hulu Privacy Litig., 2012 WL 3282960, at *6.

²⁸⁷ See In re Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 284, 290 ("In our view, personally identifiable information under the [VPPA] means the kind of information that would readily permit an ordinary person to identify a specific individual's video-watching behavior.").

However, the VPPA does provide certain exceptions to the rule of non-disclosure and allows the service providers to disclose the information that is incidental to the ordinary course of business.²⁸⁸ Also, the Act doesn't provide for any penalty against the breaches and only private cause of actions can arise out of any violation under the Act. In *Austin-Spearman v. AMC Network Entertainment LLC*, the court held that, wrongful disclosure even without additional injury [afforded] a right to relief²⁸⁹.

In *Camfield v. City of Oklahoma City*²⁹⁰, an Oklahoma citizen complained that the academy award-winning German movie *The Tin Drum* contained child pornography and therefore violated Oklahoma law. The police took the film to a local judge, who informally viewed it and agreed that it was probably child porn. The police subsequently went to neighborhood video stores and removed all copies of *The Tin Drum*, and obtained, without a warrant, the names of those who were recurrently renting it. One copy had been rented by a local ACLU employee who got wind of the impending seizure and wanted to see if the movie was really objectionable. Police came to Mr. Camfield's house and asked for the cassette, which he handed over after some discussion of "the artistic merits of the movie. The court found that the city violated Camfield's rights under the VPPA by obtaining his rental records without a court order or warrant. He was awarded the statutory minimum of \$2500 and a victory for civil liberties.

3.12.6 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 1974

The family educational rights and Privacy act of 1974 is one of the most specific federal privacy laws of the United States as it aims to protect the purely educational records of the students across the country. The term educational record has a very

²⁸⁸ *Albright v. Rodriguez*, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995)

²⁸⁹ See *Austin-Spearman v. AMC Network Entm't, LLC*, 98 F. Supp. 3d 662, 669-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (adopting this view of the VPPA and requiring VPPA plaintiffs to engage in an "ongoing relationship with the provider initiated by the plaintiff's own actions")

²⁹⁰ Cf. *Camfield v. City of Oklahoma City*, 248 F.3d 1214, 1220-21 (10th Cir. 2001). The district court had allowed suit against the recipients of personally identifiable information. While this determination was not appealed, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals did not sua sponte reverse

wide connotation and it includes all the materials, documents and information that are directly related to any student studying in the US and are under the possession of any educational institution. As far as the scope of the Act Further the term educational institution includes any public or private agency or institution which is the recipient of funds under any applicable program. The Act aims at vesting the control all the academic information of the students with them and their legal representatives and thus bars any unauthorized disclosure of any such information with third party. It mainly confer three distinct right to the students with regard to their data with their educational institution.

Right to authenticate and amend the information at any time: The act lays down detailed procedures for the redressal of any grievances related to the student's data.

Right to control the recipient of the data: The Act bars the educational institutions from having a policy that denies the access of these information to students and their parents.

Right to challenge and review any information: The authorities are under an obligation to act on the review requests within 45 days failing which a complaint can be lodged with the education department.

These rights against disclosure of data to the third party and bar on any policy that aims at denying the disclosure of the information²⁹¹ to the students and their parents are aimed at securing the students data to the greatest extent. However, the consent of the students and their representatives does have some exceptions and the educational institutions may not require any consent before disclosure under these windows. The schools may disclose the data to officials with legitimate educational interest, or the bodies that are conducting researches for the purpose of developing, validating, or administering predictive tests, administering student aid programs, and improving instructions. Also, if the data falls within the directory information, and a student has

²⁹¹20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(A).

not opted out of it under a reasonable amount of time, the information can be disclosed.

The Act also provides that the institutions are bound to give the students an opportunity to the students to challenge the authenticity of their data on the grounds of the records being inaccurate, misleading, or otherwise in violation of the privacy rights of students. The Act also provides appropriate remedies for any breach of provisions of the Act by providing for appropriate action against the concerned institution. However, the violations of these rights have not been criminalized but the appropriate actions are limited to withholding of funds and terminating eligibility for future funds.

The scheme of provisions do suggest a half-hearted commitment by the state to protect the personal data of the students in as much as the breach of the provisions aren't criminalized however it does seem that these sections of the Act do provide ample protection against any misuse of data of the students by the educational institution. It is worthwhile noting that the Act doesn't guard against the possible breach of the obligations to store this information safely.

3.12.7 Gramm Leach Bliley Act, 1999

The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 Act, also popularly known as the Gramm Leach Bliley Act seeks to provide a prudential framework for the affiliation of banking institutions.²⁹² One of the key aspects of the Act is its emphasis upon the Financial Privacy of the customers which was most unaddressed hitherto the passing of the Act.²⁹³ The Act provides for a The Finance Privacy Rules which form a part of the Act lay are modeled upon the principles of informed consent and informational self-determination. These rules, inter alia, govern the manner and extent of collection, storage and processing of the financial data of the consumers by the financial

²⁹² What is GLBA Compliance? Understanding the Data Protection Requirements of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 2019, Digital Guardian (2021), <https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-glba-compliance-understanding-data-protection-requirements-gramm-leach-bliley-act>

²⁹³ Corinne Crawford; Borough of Manhattan Community College, "The Repeal Of The Glass-Steagall Act And The Current Financial Crisis" (PDF). *Journal of Business & Economics Research*, 2011, pp. 127–133

institutions. Notably, these rules also apply to the entities which receive these data irrespective of the fact whether they are financial institutions or not.

A common theme that binds the rules is the emphasis upon the principle of informed consent through the provision for notice at each step of processing of personal data.²⁹⁴ The rules mandate that the financial institutions are bound to notify the clients explaining what information is being collected, why is it being collected, where will it be stored etc.²⁹⁵ Additionally, the financial institutions are duty bound to inform the customers about the changes, if any in the privacy policy of the institution while giving the clients an option to opt out at any time. The Act also provides for penalties as well as punishment in cases of breaches.

3.12.8 Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act, 2003

The Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography And Marketing (CAN-SPAM) Act of 2003 is a federal Act that aims to regulate the inter-state commerce by imposing limitations or punishments on unsolicited communications by e-mail or Internet. The legislation was enacted as a response to the unprecedented growth in the instances of spam mails as a marketing tool. The Act specifically defines a "commercial electronic mail message" to be "*any electronic mail message the primary purpose of which is the commercial advertisement or promotion of a commercial product or service (including content on an Internet website operated for a commercial purpose)*".²⁹⁶

The Act lays down detailed limitations upon the unsolicited commercial email by banning false or misleading header information. It also inter alia prohibits the usage of deceptive subject lines and mandates that every unsolicited commercial has to be tagged as "advertisement" while availing the option to the recipients to opt out of receiving the e-mails in future.²⁹⁷ The Act also enjoins the responsibility upon the

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ Phil Gramm, "Deregulation and the Financial Panic, 2017-08-11 at the Wayback Machine, opinion pages of *The Wall Street Journal*, published and retrieved on February 20, 2009

²⁹⁶ Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act, National Credit Union Administration (2021), <https://www.ncua.gov/regulation-supervision/letters-credit-unions-other-guidance/controlling-assault-non-solicited-pornography-and-marketing-act>

²⁹⁷ Ftc.gov (2021), <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2019/2019-privacy-data-security-report-508.pdf>

FTC to issue rules regulating and labelling the Sexually explicit emails as such. The legislation may thus be considered to be an extension of the right to not receive unsolicited communications as an aspect of informational self-determination.

3.12.9 Federal Trade Commission Act, 1914

The Federal Trade Commission Act, 1914 established the Federal Trade Commission, the body which has the authority to enforce all the federal Privacy legislation that we have previously discussed including the Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN-SPAM) Act, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act to name a few.²⁹⁸ The Commission derives its power from the Section 5 of the Act which empowers it to prevent unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.

The Act also allows the Commission to penalize the entities that violate their own policies by false advertising and other actions that can harm consumers. The agency uses a wide set of tools to achieve its objective of securing consumer privacy. These tools include policy initiatives, consumer and business education to create awareness about the evolving aspects of data privacy. The commission uses its long standing experience and expertise in the data protection arena to assist the federal and state legislatures and U.S. and international government agencies to improvise the data protection regime in the country.

3.13 Data Protection in the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom is considered to have a more liberal data protection framework than most of its erstwhile EU counterparts. The earliest data protection enactment in the country can be traced back to 1984. However, it was only the Data Protection Act of 1998 that a comprehensive code for the protection of the rights of the citizens was enacted, it recognizes eight principles that must be followed by the data controllers for data processing. These principles are famously known as the Data Protection Principles. They are

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

- 1) The personal data ought to be processed lawfully. Unless the conditions prescribed in the schedule 2 are complied, no data can be processed, also in the cases of sensitive data, at least one of the conditions of schedule 3 must be met.
- 2) Only for the lawful purposes, the personal data of the data subjects should be processed. Also, the data must not be processed for the purposes other than for what it is obtained.
- 3) The personal data collected must not be excessive for the purpose it is being collected.
- 4) The data controller is under an obligation to keep the data up to date and accurate.
- 5) The data shall not be processed in violation to the rights of the data subjects.
- 6) The personal data shall not be stored for the period longer than the period for which it is absolutely necessary for the purposes for which it was collected.
- 7) The data transfer to a third country is not permitted unless that country affords adequate amount of data security.
- 8) Appropriate mechanisms must be put in place to prevent the instances of data breaches

It is quite apparent that our discussions about the features of GDPR have also highlighted the same set of principles. It may be noted that the data protection acts in United Kingdom have been in tune with the European data protection regime ever since the emergence of the concept of data protection.

3.13.1 Features of the Data Protection Act of 2018

The purpose behind enactment of the 2018 Act is twofold. First to implement the provisions of the GDPR in the domestic arena and to modernize the data protection laws to bring them in resonance with the challenges to the data protection rights in the current scenario. Following are some of the quintessential features of the UK Data protection laws.

3.13.1.1 Resolve for Protection of Personal Data

The applied GDPR (provisions of GDPR) with certain modifications and the 2018 Act form the basis of the data protection laws in the UK as of now. The Act applies to the processing of all kinds of personal data.²⁹⁹ As the provision expressly reads, it must be read as a supplementary of the GDPR and envisages a regime that accords almost same level of protection to the data subjects as that of GDPR. Notably, the Act retains all the definitions of the GDPR in letter and spirit and does not propose any alterations.³⁰⁰ Other terminologies such as the Data Subjects, the public authority etc. have been incorporated from the GDPR with minimal alterations from the GDPR.³⁰¹

Notably, the Act provides a completely different framework for safeguards by law to the automated decision making. It concerns with significant decisions based solely on automated processing that are authorised by law and subject to safeguards for the data subject's rights, freedoms and legitimate interests.³⁰²

The Act defines the term significant decision as:

- a) A decision they can manifest into legal effects
- b) A decision that affects the rights of the data subjects in a similar manner.

The Act prescribes that when a data controller takes a significant decision that is based only on the automated processing mechanism, they are under an obligation to notify

²⁹⁹Part 2, Chapter 1 of the Data Protection Act, 2018 covers the types

(1) This Part is relevant to most processing of personal data.

(2) Chapter 2 of this Part—

(a) applies to the types of processing of personal data to which the GDPR applies by virtue of Article 2 of the GDPR,

(b) supplements, and must be read with, the GDPR.

(3) Chapter 3 of this Part—

(a) applies to certain types of processing of personal data to which the GDPR does not apply (see section 21), and

(b) makes provision for a regime broadly equivalent to the GDPR to apply to such processing

³⁰⁰Part 2, Chapter 1

³⁰¹See e.g. Adriana-Maria Sandru; Daniel-Mihail Sandru, *Humanitarian Law and Personal Data Protection*, 2018 Pandectele Romane 58 (2018).

³⁰²Data Protection Act 2018, Sec. 14

in writing, the data subject about such decision in a reasonable amount of time. This provision is aimed at giving the data subject a chance to request for a revision of the decisions. However, the Act reduces the protection granted under Article 15(1), 15(2) and 15(3) of the GDPR (concerning the confirmation of processing, access to data and safeguards for third country transfer)³⁰³. As per the Act, these protections shall extend only to the financial transactions in absence of a contrary intention expressed by the data subject earlier.³⁰⁴

3.13.1.2 Transfers of personal data to third countries

The Act vests in the secretary of the state, the power to specify, circumstances in which a transfer of personal data to a third country or international organisation is to be taken to be necessary for important reasons of public interest. It may be noted that the same provision vests in the secretary the power to determine the question as to whether the third country offers adequacy of protection for the purposes of Article 45(3) of the Act.³⁰⁵ Almost all other aspect of the Act are on the lines of the GDPR with occasional alteration to make the provisions more compatible with the domestic needs.³⁰⁶ In the next section, we shall consider the possible implications of the BREXIT on the data protection laws in UK.

3.13.2 Brexit and GDPR

The UK Data Protection Act, 2018 seeks to modernize the provisions of the 1998 Act by incorporating the changing aspects of the data protection arena. The Act is also aimed at implementing the GDPR with certain modifications in the legal order of United Kingdom. Given the fact that the UK has left the EU, the GDPR shall cease to apply to it and it will be treated as a third country for the purposes of the regulation.

³⁰³ *Id.*

³⁰⁴ Data Protection Act 2018, Sec. 12(1) b

³⁰⁵ Data Protection Act 2018, Sec. 18(2) a

³⁰⁶ Ico.org.uk.2020. *Data Protection And Brexit*. [online] Available at: <<https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/data-protection-and-brexit/>>

As already discussed in the previous section³⁰⁷, in order to pave ways for exporting data into the UK from the member states of the EU, the country must demonstrate that adequate level of protection exists.

The United Kingdom and the European Union have to chalk out the Brexit Deal by October 2020, a deadline which is most likely to get extended. However, until the deal is struck, the GDPR will continue to apply in the United Kingdom as well³⁰⁸. The finder would like to point out that there are no material differences whatsoever in the approaches of the GDPR and United Kingdom in their approach towards data protection³⁰⁹ and hence it is not deemed proper to reengage in the same analysis.

The analysis of some of the notable legislations relating to the data protection laws in the United States do come across as a potential tool to secure the rights of the individuals to have complete control over their personal data. However, some of the important lacunas that have emerged are as follows

Unlike the European Union that has a comprehensive code in the form of General Data Protection Regulation, the US has too many data protection laws with every limited scope. As a result, the data protection framework in the country is quite complex, technical and vast. Also, there are several state laws and federal laws on the same subject matter which leads to unnecessary confusions.

- Most of the enactments (at least a majority of them) were enacted over two to three decades ago and as a result of enormous technological developments a lot of these guidelines do struggle to address the challenges posed in the

³⁰⁷ GDPR Associates. 2020. *GDPR And Brexit - Does The UK Still Need To Comply?*. [online] Available at: <<https://www.gdpr.associates/gdpr-brexit/>>

³⁰⁸ Bird & Bird. 2020. *Brexit: Data Protection And Cybersecurity Law Implications*. [online] Available at: <<https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2016/uk/brexit-data-protection-and-cyber-security-law-implications>>

³⁰⁹ *Id.*

modern era. Hence there is a pressing need to incorporate the aspects of technological developments in order to serve the purpose of securing data privacy for the citizens.

- Despite these shortcomings, it must be admitted that the United States does have in place an effective and robust framework to secure the data protection rights of the individuals. However, the data protection regime in EU is way ahead, advanced, comprehensive and modern as compared to that of US.
- The European Union has some natural edge in the field of data protection due to the following two reasons. First being the absence of a comprehensive federal law to regulate processing of data in US in contrast to the EU which has perhaps the most individual centric data protection law in the world. The second reason is the approach of liberal interpretation of the European Courts towards the issues concerning data protection.
- Also, there is a need to have a comprehensive federal law in the United States on the lines of the General Data Protection Regulation to effectively cater to the challenges of the modern day.
- India has been time and again described as the most important of shoring business location in the world³¹⁰ and it was due to the ever-expanding network of the data offshoring companies in India that marked the herald of the concerns of potential data breaches in India. It is often said that but for the threats of breach of informational privacy as an outcome of the data offshoring companies, India would never have had required a data protection regime at all³¹¹. With no legal framework in place to regulate the data offshoring process in India, there were numerous instances of data theft and breaches of informational privacy by these offshoring companies³¹². Of course, these incidents didn't go unnoticed by the international media which eventually put pressure on the Government of India to enact data protection law.

³¹⁰*Id.*

³¹¹Silvia Lucia Cristea & Viorel Banulescu, *The Right to Personal Data Protection. The Right to Privacy. A Comparative Law Approach*, 64 *Analele Stiintifice Ale Universitatii Alexandru Ioan Cuza Din Iasi Stiinte Juridice* 1 (2018).

³¹²*Id.*

Since the finder has identified the key components of a robust Data Protection Regime in the countries with advanced Data Protection law framework, an optimum platform for a thorough analysis of the existing law in India on the subject has been made. The finder has so far identified the best practices adopted by different jurisdictions in imparting a fair degree of protection to the personal data of the citizens and the challenges faced by the governments in effectively tackling the privacy issues that are related to technological developments. The outcome of the chapter has enabled the author to also identify a threshold of protection that a digitalized society expects as far as the issue of informational privacy is concerned. Hence the forthcoming chapter seeks to obtain a comprehensive picture of the existing Data Protection legislation in India.

SAMPLE BOOK

CHAPTER 4: DATA PROTECTION REGIME IN INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM

4.1 Introduction

The Previous chapter has equipped the finder with a very broad understanding of the different approaches adopted by the European Union, the United States and the United Kingdom towards protection of Personal Data. Before getting into the discussions about the optimality of a certain Data Protection Model in India, it would be necessary to have a thorough review of the existing data protection legislations in India. The sole objective of the discussions in this chapter is to strike gather the best possible understanding of the state of Data Protection in India.

The world is becoming more and more intensely digitalized by each passing day and India is no exception to the phenomena³¹³. With billions of people all over the world communicating with each other through the transmission of information through digital mediums a huge volume of data is generated all over the world. The new found digital mediums of communications including the social media intermediaries such as the WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter and other platforms have an extensive outreach amongst a huge chunk of population³¹⁴. With the availability of cheaper internet and broader connectivity, the more than 53% of the Indian population has an online presence³¹⁵.

Further, the use of online payment applications such as the Paytm and Google pay have got an extensive presence in the Indian economy³¹⁶. The use of these apps by

³¹³TheHindu.2020. *What Is The Right Way Of Regulating Social Media?*. [online] Available at: <<https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/what-is-the-right-way-of-regulating-social-media/article29291424.ece>>

³¹⁴*Id.*

³¹⁵Mandavia, M., 2020. *India Has Second Highest Number Of Internet Users After China: Report*. [online] The Economic Times. Available at: <<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/india-has-second-highest-number-of-internet-users-after-china-report/articleshow/71311705.cms?from=mdr>> [Accessed 28 May 2020].

³¹⁶*Id.*

the citizens have added to the enormous amount of data that is involved in the digital sphere. However, the progress in technology has also armed both the public and private sector entities to get access to the personal data of the individuals, store them and process them within a matter of moments³¹⁷.

A surge in the internet users also indicates that a lot of personal and financial data is usually involved in these transactions. The immense popularity of these applications amongst the Indian users, make India a hotbed of digital transmissions³¹⁸. It must be noted that these mobile applications that offer various kinds of services to the users such as online chatting, digital transactions, online shopping, cab service etc. do store and process a huge volume of the personal data of the individuals³¹⁹. The evolution of a digital economy with the Data at its Centre-stage can be amply traced in the following excerpt:

Something as simple as hailing a taxi now involves the use of a mobile application which collects and uses various types of data, such as the user's financial information, her real-time location, and information concerning her previous trips. Data is fundamentally transforming the way individuals do business, how they communicate, and how they make their decisions. Businesses are now building vast databases of consumer preferences and behaviour. Information can be compressed, sorted, manipulated, discovered and interpreted as never before, and can thus be more easily transformed into useful knowledge³²⁰.

Along with the collection and processing of the personal data, the process more often than not involves storage and transmission of the personal data. With the advancement of technology, the storage and processing of personal data has become extremely

³¹⁷*Id.*

³¹⁸The Hindu. 2020. *India'S Digital Transformation*. [online] Available at: <<https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/indias-digital-transformation/article8224206.ece>>

³¹⁹*Id.*

³²⁰*Id.*

viable option economically and technically as well. These phenomena ensure that the data aggregators not only collect but also store the personal data of the individuals which can be used to make the individual profiles of the users, of course for a more efficient functioning of the applications. The creation of customized user profiles helps the service providers to reduce the transaction time and make the services more efficient. The online aggregators and the e-commerce companies make use of the online history of the users to suggest the products that the users may be interested in buying³²¹. To be precise, the use of data can have a great impact on the way things work in the digitalized world and every entity, whether be it the private sector or the public sector, does strive to get the maximum output through the data of their users. Use of data for analyzing the locations of people living in a particular area may be used to improve traffic conditions³²², the analysis of health data of the patients may help the finder come up with a better diagnosis procedure³²³, the analysis of the demography and economic condition of the individuals can be of great help to the government in framing policies and targeted delivery of socially beneficial policies³²⁴. The processing of data can also be of great help to the financial regulators in detecting frauds and the law enforcement agencies prevent crimes³²⁵. There has been an increasing trend among the law enforcement authorities to use drone cameras and using more complex methods of surveillance with the help of the internet and sophisticated technologies³²⁶.

³²¹*The Solutions State: Why The Digital Needs The Human*. THE INDIAN EXPRESS (Feb. 2020)

<<https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/the-solutions-state-why-the-digital-needs-the-human-5625290/>>

³²²*Some Reforms In India Show Benefits Of Digitalisation: IMF*, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, (July, 2020) <<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/some-reforms-in-india-show-benefits-of-digitalisation-imf/articleshow/68806028.cms?from=mdr>>

³²³*Id.*

³²⁴*Id.*

³²⁵*State Of Privacy India*, PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL (Aug. 2019) <<https://privacyinternational.org/state-privacy/1002/state-privacy-india>>

³²⁶*Data Protection: Why A Comprehensive Law Is Needed* (June 2020) THE FINANCIAL EXPRESS, <<https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/data-protection-why-a-comprehensive-law-is-needed/1694205/>>

However, while making things convenient for the users, and providing for a safer society, the storage of the personal data of the individuals possesses a great threat to the informational privacy at the same time³²⁷. An increasingly prevalent use of the internet has thrown open a plethora concerns related to the possibility of data breaches. With government being the largest processor of personal data in India, it becomes extremely important to have a law in place that would regulate the entire affair of collection, storage and processing of the data and put in place necessary safeguards. However, the threat to the informational privacy in India, just like the entire world is not something that has just loomed up, it is just that the threat has become much more larger with the advent of digitalization³²⁸.

With the development of science, Information and Communication Technologies through the computer and other electronic instruments have greatly enhanced our capacities to collect, store, process and communicate information. At the same time, it makes us vulnerable to intrusions of our privacy on a larger scale. This privacy invasion may happen from the personal sphere also. It may happen through any of the following ways:

- data on our own personal computers can compromise us in unpleasant ways with consequences ranging from personal embarrassment to financial loss³²⁹,
- transmission of data over the Internet and mobile networks is equally fraught with the risk of interception³³⁰,
- in this age of cloud computing when much of our data, e.g. our emails, chat logs, personal profiles, bank statements etc., reside on distant servers of the companies whose services we use, our privacy becomes dependent on the internal electronic security systems of these companies³³¹

³²⁷*Id*

³²⁸*Id*.

³²⁹Subhajit Basu, *Policy-Making, Technology and Privacy in India*, 6 *Indian J.L. & Tech.* 65 (2010).

³³⁰*Id*.

³³¹*Id*.

- the privacy of children, women, old persons, and minorities tend to be especially fragile in this digital age as they have become frequent targets of exploitation³³², and
- online data handling has procreated new kinds of annoyances such as electronic voyeurism, spam or offensive email, 'phishing' etc., and each of these can affect the privacy of any individual³³³

4.2 The Information Technology Act, 2000

The Indian Information Technology Act 2000 ("Act") was based on the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. The suggestion was that all States intending to enact a law for the impugned purpose, give favourable consideration to the said Model Law when they enact or revise their laws, in view of the need for uniformity of the law applicable to alternatives to paper-based methods of communication and storage of information. As noted earlier, the scheme of data protection laws in India was initially hinged at the affairs related to the off-shoring businesses and the information technology sector³³⁴. It was the result of the void in the existing laws in India that there were several instances of data theft and amidst growing international pressure, India came up with the Information Technology Act, 2000 to regulate the flow of data in the country. Even to this date, the IT Act remains the most foundation of the several Indian laws aimed at securing a society conducive to the cause of data protection. The boost in the technological sector marked the beginning of a data driven culture in India and it was through the problems outlined above are regulated primarily by the IT Act. The Act has been amended several times till now in order to tackle the ever-evolving challenges posed to the security of data with the advancement of technology.

³³²Raghunath Ananthapur, India's New Data Protection Legislation, 8 SCRIPT ed 192 (2011)

³³³Lothar Determann & Chetan Gupta, India's Personal Data Protection Act, 2018: Comparison with the General Data Protection Regulation and the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, 37 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 481 (2019).

³³⁴Sougata Talukdar, *Privacy and Its Protection in Informative Technological Compass in India*, 12 NUJS L. Rev. 1 (2019).

This section shall deal with the existing provisions of the Act in order to analyze the existing framework for data protection in India.

The IT Act adopts a conventional e-commerce-oriented definition of the term “data” under its scheme. The emphasis on computer and other forms of memory storage implies the initial legislative intent behind the provision. It should also be noted that the restricted meaning of term data has undergone considerable changes in the wake of subsequent provisions³³⁵.

“(o) 'data' means a representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts or instructions which are being prepared or have been prepared in a formalized manner, and is intended to be processed, is being processed or has been processed in a computer system or computer network, and may be in any form (including computer printouts magnetic or optical storage media, punched cards, punched tapes) or stored internally in the memory of the computer³³⁶.”

The scope of the IT Act appears to be confined to the e-commerce activities and the prime focus of the definition of data in the Indian law was to further the cause of internet governance in the information technology sector. This proposition may be appreciated from the fact that the concept of data protection was far away from the Indian conception of privacy and informational self-determination. The fact that there is any law in existence in India can be attributed to the subsequent amendments³³⁷ that were brought in the IT Act. The two most notable pillars of the data protection scheme in the country are Section 43A and Section 72A of the Act.

The scheme of data protection in India can be broadly classified under two categories, viz. the Cyber Contraventions and the Cyber offences. While, the Cyber

³³⁵*Id.*

³³⁶THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000.2(0).

³³⁷Latha R. Nair, *Data Protection Efforts in India: Blind Leading the Blind*, 4 Indian J.L. & Tech. 19 (2008).

Contraventions, are in the nature of civil wrongs the Cyber offences, as the name suggests are more severe in nature and attract penal consequences. The first post for an insight into the provisions of a statutory law in India saw its dawn in the form of Section 43 A of the IT Act and the provision seeks to impose a liability upon the companies that fail to process the data in a negligent manner without taking reasonable safeguards and security procedures.³³⁸ Violations of the provisions of the section falls within the ambit of cyber contravention. The term contravention is notably very restricted in its extent and it includes all the unwarranted inference in the informational privacy of the individual through an unauthorized intrusion into the data stored in computer or computer network³³⁹.

The bulwark of codified Indian data protection law lies in the Chapter IX of the IT Act. The Section 43 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 provides for the liability of the data controller in case there is a breach

43A Compensation for failure to protect data. -Where a body corporate, possessing, dealing or handling any sensitive personal data or information in a computer resource which it owns, controls or operates, is negligent in implementing and maintaining reasonable security practices and procedures and thereby causes wrongful loss or wrongful gain to any person, such body corporate shall be liable to pay damages by way of compensation to the persons so affected. Explanation. -For the purposes of this section, -

- (i) "body corporate" means any company and includes a firm, sole proprietorship or other association of individuals engaged in commercial or professional activities;
- (ii) "reasonable security practices and procedures" means security practices and procedures designed to protect such information from unauthorised access, damage, use, modification, disclosure or impairment, as may be specified in an agreement

³³⁸Asang Wankhede, *Data Protection in India and the EU: Insights in Recent Trends and Issues in the Protection of Personal Data*, 2 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 70 (2016).

³³⁹Wilson, B., 2010. *Data Privacy in India: The Information Technology Act*. SSRN Electronic Journal.

between the parties or as may be specified in any law for the time being in force and in the absence of such agreement or any law, such reasonable security practices and procedures, as may be prescribed by the Central Government in consultation with such professional bodies or associations as it may deem fit;

(iii) "sensitive personal data or information" means such personal information as may be prescribed by the Central Government in consultation with such professional bodies or associations as it may deem fit³⁴⁰.

As implicit from the text of the provision, the Section purports to impose penalties upon those body corporates dealing, possessing and handling the sensitive data and fail to maintain and implement reasonable security measures and as a result of which there is a wrongful gain or a wrongful loss to a person, the said body corporate shall be liable to pay damages to the affected person. The meaning of wrongful gain has to be construed in accordance with the definition in the Indian Penal Code.

As can be inferred from the bare reading of this section, the liabilities will arise out only against the body corporates, that is to say companies, corporations, proprietorships and the other sections of group of individuals. The exemption of the individuals from the fangs of the penal provision does suggest that the intention of the legislature behind enacting the said section was primarily to the body corporates dealing with processing of personal data. However, in the view of the author the scope and ambit of the provision is immensely limited and the following are the pre conditions that must be satisfied in order to attract the penal provisions.

- The Data in possession must be of sensitive character
- The Computer resource processing the data must be owned and run by a body corporate.
- The body corporate must not be negligent in handling the data and there must be a lack of reasonable security standard.

³⁴⁰THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000 43A

- Most importantly, such negligence must have resulted in wrongful gain or wrongful loss.

Apart from the very restrictive provision that seeks to protect the breaches of informational privacy in the non-contractual relations, the Indian legislature in 2009, through an amendment introduced section 74 A of the Information Technology Act to protect the privacy under the contractual relations.

The IT (Amendment) Act, 2008 (ITAA 2008), introduced in the aftermath of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks has established a strong data protection regime in India. It addresses industry's concern on data protection, and creates a more predictive legal environment for the growth of e-commerce that includes data protection and cyber-crimes measures, among others. Sensitive personal information of consumers, held in digital environment, is required to be protected through reasonable security practices by the corporates. Additionally, ITAA 2008 made it obligatory for them to protect data under lawful contracts by providing for penalty for breach of confidentiality and privacy.

4.3 Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Person Data or Information) Rules, 2011

As implicit from the provisions of the Information Technology Act, 2000, the definition of the sensitive personal data was nowhere provided, leaving out a wide room for confusion and instances of misinterpretation³⁴¹. This section 43A of the Act provides for the framing of new rules from time to time and in exercise of this power, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology in 2011 came up with the "Information technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Person Data or Information) Rules, 2011". It would be optimum for our

³⁴¹ Information technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Person Data or Information) Rules, 2011, Rule 03.

analysis to have a glance at some of the relevant parts of the rule to have a holistic view of the existing data protection regime in India.

While the rules, do leave a major chunk of the definitions of the IT Act, 2000 unaltered, they do fill some of the major loopholes of the Act and thus seek to chalk out a workable piece of data protection legislation that is conducive to the protection of informational privacy of the citizens. One of the most notable additions of the Rules is the definition of the Sensitive Data.

The Rule is quite widely worded and does take into its fold almost all the data that can have a direct bearing upon the right to privacy of an individual in case it gets leaked. However, the proviso to the rule does exclude the data already in public domain from the ambit of the definition of sensitive data.

The requirement to obtain the consent of the provider of the sensitive data does embody the necessity of element of consent for processing the data. Further the rule specifies that the data shall be collected only for the purpose sanctioned by the law. These rules further recognize the established principles of data protection including the right to purpose limitation³⁴², the right to fairness in processing³⁴³ and the principle of time limitation³⁴⁴. In addition to these principles, the rules also require the body corporate collecting sensitive information to have a robust privacy policy³⁴⁵ and take adequate measures to afford safety to the personal sensitive data of the individuals. However, the rules provide a free pass to the government to send all the principles of data protection on a toss and allow the government and the law enforcement authorities to access the sensitive personal data of the individuals without their

³⁴² Information technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Person Data or Information) Rules, 2011, Rule 04.

³⁴³ Information technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Person Data or Information) Rules, 2011, Rule 04.

³⁴⁴ Information technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Person Data or Information) Rules, 2011, Rule 04

³⁴⁵ Information technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Person Data or Information) Rules, 2011, Rule 04

consent. Moreover, the adjudicating body Cyber Appellate Tribunal is appointed by the central government³⁴⁶. With no independent adjudicating body in place and no shield against the possible intrusions into the right to privacy by the government, a robust data protection regime in India remains a distant dream.

4.4 Privacy in the Health Sector

There can be no denial to the fact that the information related to the health and medical history of the citizens do form an inherent aspect of the right to privacy. It has been repeatedly held by the Constitutional Courts in India and abroad that the disclosure of the medical details could lead to an unwarranted invasion into the personal domain of the individual thereby causing extreme disturbance to the tranquility of the person. The Supreme Court while highlighting the importance of the information self-determination in the matters concerning the medical history, in *Mr. X v Hospital Z* held that:

“Right of Privacy may, apart from contract, also arise out of a particular specific relationship which may be commercial, matrimonial, or even political. As already discussed above, Doctor-patient relationship, though basically commercial, is, professionally, a matter of confidence: and, therefore, Doctors are morally and ethically bound to maintain confidentiality. In such a situation, public disclosure of even true private facts may amount to an invasion of the Right of Privacy which may sometimes lead to the clash of one person's "right to be let alone" with another person's right to be informed. Disclosure of even true private facts has the tenancy to disturb a person's tranquility. It may generate many complexes in him and may even lead to psychological problems. He may, thereafter, have a disturbed life all through”³⁴⁷.

³⁴⁶ Information technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Person Data or Information) Rules, 2011, Rule 04

³⁴⁷ *Mr. X v. Hospital Z*. AIR 1999 SC 495

This binding precedent of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the clearest of terms lays down the rule that even the true information about the medical history of a patient can't be disclosed without their consent. Even the SPDI Rules, 2011 categorize the health-related information as sensitive data and hence prescribe that these data can't be disclosed to a third party without their consent. However, to the contrary, the Clinical Establishment Rules, 2012 mandate the hospitals to maintain an electronic record of the medical history of the patients³⁴⁸. However, due to the non-application of the rules on the public bodies, the Hospitals run by the governments are exempt from any of these rules and thus provide name-sake of protection from the unwarranted intrusions in the right to privacy of the citizens.

4.5 Existing Surveillance Regime in India

The most crucial aspect of the upcoming data protection law in India is the limit that it seeks to impose upon the scope and width of the right to privacy. The law being at a very nascent stage in the field, it is imperative that it shall take a few years for the courts to come up with a settled approach in order to gauge the extent to which the right to privacy can be exercised. The judgment in Puttaswamy, for sure is going to set in motion a regime that will secure data privacy of billions of Indians to a great extent. It would be wrong to presume that Puttaswamy is the end of the endeavour of securing data privacy of the citizens, instead it's the beginning. At this juncture we are concerned with the what the Court held in Puttaswamy and how did it justify it and how shall the upcoming data protection regime in India be influenced by it.

It may be noted that the prime cause of contention between the petitioners and the respondents in Puttaswamy was related to the nature of the right to privacy. Whether the right to privacy is an absolute one or does it come within inherent limitations? And if it isn't absolute, what are the imitations and how does the court justify them? The law on the subject is at quite a nascent stage but the Puttaswamy does provide a template

³⁴⁸See, Clinical Establishment Rules, 2012

to determine the situations in which the breach of privacy by the state can be justified.

Through the course of our discussion in the following sections we shall seek to explore the nuances of the limitations placed by the SC on the right to privacy. This is the most important part of the issue at hand as the government is likely to accept that citizens have the fundamental right to privacy yet it shall certainly look for alternatives to justify its interference in the private domain of the individuals. The Data Protection Bill, 2019 has been sent to the select committee which is highly unlikely to alter the “exemptions” clause in the proposed bill.

4.5.1 Privacy and Surveillance

The greatest inhibition to the recognition of right to privacy in Indian constitutional scheme is the absence of express or even an implied mention of privacy in text of the constitution or the constituent assembly debates. It is only through a functional and structural interpretation of the provisions of the constitution that the courts in India have been able to locate the right to privacy within the constitution. However, unsurprisingly, it has taken over six decades for the Indian courts to recognize the place of individual at the core of right to privacy.

“[i]f India doesn’t want to look like an authoritarian regime, it needs to be transparent about who will be authorized to collect data, what data will be collected, how it will be used, and how the right to privacy will be protected³⁴⁹.”

Unfortunately, the upcoming data protection regime does exactly what it must have not done by giving a free hand to the enforcement agencies to encroach upon the personal data of the individuals.

The only source of guidance (read as misguidance) to the Indian courts all these years was rooted in the space based understanding of the right to privacy under the fourth

³⁴⁹Addison Litton, *The State of Surveillance in India: The Central Monitoring System’s Chilling Effect on Self-Expression*, 14 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 799 (2015).

amendment and the fact that the constituent assembly had summarily rejected the inclusion of any such protection in the constitution of India, played a decisive role in shaping the data protection regime in India for years³⁵⁰. The first case where in the SC had the occasion to examine the existence of right to privacy within the meaning of right to property was *M. P. Sharma and Others vs Satish Chandra*³⁵¹. In order to examine the validity of state's incursion and its adoption under the Indian scheme the SC referred to several judgments of the American Supreme Court to hold. While rejecting the adoption of Spatial privacy in context of search and seizure by the state., the court held that:

“A power of search and seizure is in any system of jurisprudence an overriding power of the State for the protection of social security and that power is necessarily regulated by law. When the Constitution makers have thought fit not to subject such regulation to Constitutional limitations by recognition of a fundamental right to privacy, analogous to the American Fourth Amendment, we have no justification to import it, into a totally different fundamental right by some process of strained construction³⁵².”

Thus, it may be observed that the court refused to adopt the fourth amendment directly within the constitutional scheme on two grounds. First, it relied on the originalist interpretation and simply refused to read the fourth amendment into the Indian scheme for the reason that it had been omitted by the constituent assembly. The second reason was more of justification based on the premise that the state had a finding of overriding power of search and seizure for ensuring the social security. However, this proposition was short-lived and shortly thereafter in *Kharak Singh vs State of UP*³⁵³ the SC came up with an entirely different interpretation of the ambit of the right to privacy. In this case, the issue concerned an administrative order that sought to confer

³⁵⁰Dhiraj R. Duraiswami, *Privacy and Data Protection in India*, 6 J.L. & Cyber Warfare 166 (2017).

³⁵¹M.P. Sharma And Others vs Satish Chandra, 1954 AIR 300

³⁵²*Id.*

³⁵³Kharak Singh vs The State Of U.P. & Others, 1963 AIR 1295

the powers of search and seizures upon the police officers on the houses of history sheeters. This being an executive order would not fall within the meaning of law under Article 13 of the Constitution, nonetheless the court went on to examine the validity of such restriction on the premise of Article 21 of the constitution. Drawing inferences from the word “dignity” mentioned in the preamble, the SC noted that an unreasonable invasion into the home of an individual would deprive him of the mental peace and dignity. Although the court refused to read the right to privacy as one of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution, it virtually endorsed the fact that tracking the movements of the persons does actually violate the privacy. On a different axle, Justice Subba Rao drew a correlation between personal liberty and seclusion and held that:

“It is true our Constitution does not expressly declare a right to privacy as a fundamental right, but the said right is an essential ingredient of personal liberty. Every democratic country sanctifies domestic life; it is expected to give him rest, physical happiness, peace of mind and security. In the last resort, a person's house, where he lives with his family, is his "castle": it is his rampart against encroachment on his personal liberty”³⁵⁴.

It must be noted that the Justice Subba Rao in his dissenting opinion, showed exemplary feat of Judicial creativity by reading the right to privacy in not only right to life and liberty but Article 19 as well. Emphasizing on the word freely, he observed, *“be free from restrictions or encroachments on his person, whether those restrictions or encroachments are directly imposed or indirectly brought about by calculated measures”³⁵⁵.*

He refused to exclude the element of privacy from the freedom of speech and expression while rejecting the notion that the freedom of expression is an abstract concept devoid of any psychological underpinnings:

³⁵⁴Kharak Singh vs The State Of U.P. & Others, 1963 AIR 1295, 1294.

³⁵⁵Kharak Singh vs The State Of U.P. & Others, 1963 AIR 1295, 1301.

“Assuming that Art. 19 (1) (d) of the Constitution must be confined only to physical movements, its combination with the freedom of speech and expression leads to the conclusion we have arrived at. The act of surveillance is certainly a restriction on the said freedom. It cannot be suggested that the said freedom is also bereft of its subjective or psychological content, but will sustain only the mechanics of speech and expression³⁵⁶”.

It may be argued that *Kharak Singh* marked the half-hearted endorsement of the “individual” based conception of right to privacy. It may be argued that this case did highlight some of the most pressing concerns regarding the state of present-day surveillance regime in India. Before revisiting the issues that overlap in the present scenario and those addressed/unaddressed by the court in *Kharak Singh*, a brief analysis of the cases that followed is necessary to intercept the attributes of the present surveillance regime in India.

The telephonic conversation of an innocent citizen will be protected by Courts against wrongful or high handed' interference by tapping the conversation. The protection is not for the guilty. It must not be understood that the Courts will tolerate safeguards for the protection of the citizen to be imperilled by permitting the police to proceed by unlawful or irregular methods. In the present case there is no unlawful or irregular method in obtaining the tape recording of the conversation.

He said that although it is true our Constitution does not expressly declare a right to privacy as a fundamental right, but the right is an essential ingredient of personal liberty, that in the last resort, a person's house where he lives with his family, is his castle that nothing is more deleterious to a man's physical happiness and health than a calculated interference with his privacy and that all the acts of surveillance

³⁵⁶*Kharak Singh vs The State Of U.P. & Others*, 1963 AIR 1295, 1301.

Assuming that the fundamental rights explicitly guaranteed to a citizen have penumbral zones and that the right to privacy is itself a fundamental right, that fundamental right must be subject to restriction on the basis of compelling public interest.

In what has been widely termed as one of the most notable judgments of the Supreme Court against the surveillance regime in India, the SC in *People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India*³⁵⁷, the question under challenge, although not directly was section 5(2) of the Indian telegraph Act, that has been the most used weapon of the government in its surveillance regime.

It may be pointed out that the provision completely endorsed the fact that the event the minutest details relating to the medical history of an individual may be detrimental to the dignity of the individual and hence must be conferred greater protection. At this juncture, the judgment in *Mr. X v Hospital Z*³⁵⁸, where the SC had observed that the provision has been acknowledged in letter and spirit where in the SC had noted that,

*“private facts may amount to an invasion of the Right of Privacy which may sometimes lead to the clash of one person's "right to be let alone" with another person's right to be informed. Disclosure of even true private facts has the tenancy to disturb a person's tranquility. It may generate many complexes in him and may even lead to psychological problems*³⁵⁹.

The Bombay High Court in 2019 was presented with the opportunity to adjudicate upon the law pertaining to phone tapping and surveillance in the post-Puttaswamy era, applying the principles in relation to the right to privacy to section 5(2) of the IT Act.

The High Court in the *Vinit Kumar*³⁶⁰ Case, in the question of interception, held: An

³⁵⁷ *People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India*, (1997) 1 SCC 301.

³⁵⁸ *Mr. X v. Hospital Z*, AIR 1999 SC 495.

³⁵⁹ *Id.*

³⁶⁰ 2019 SCC On Line SC 1380.

order of interception under section 5(2) of the IT Act can only be given in situations of ‘public emergency’ or ‘public safety’. If interception has been undertaken in contravention of Section 5(2) of the IT Act, it is mandatory for the said intercepted messages to be destroyed.

As per the BN Srikrishna committee report, “*the Surveillance should not be carried out without a degree of transparency that can pass the muster of the Puttaswamy test of necessity, proportionality and due process. This can take various forms, including information provided to the public, legislative oversight, executive and administrative oversight and judicial oversight*³⁶¹.” The report explicitly mentioned the need for the state to adhere to the principles laid down in the Puttaswamy judgment for the purposes related to surveillance. In this section, we shall first discuss in detail the principles that were laid down by the Indian Supreme Court which must be followed while depriving a person of their fundamental right. Right to privacy being an intrinsic aspect of right to life and liberty as recognized in Puttaswamy is a fundamental right and hence the exemptions granted to the state agencies where these constitutional safeguards don’t apply need to fulfill the tests identified under the judgment. The Courts in India have traditionally been using different tests for determining the parameters to confine the rights of the citizens. There are three different tests that the Supreme Court has evolved over time to check whether the curtailment of fundamental rights can be justified. In order to analyze whether the provisions under the present bill that seek to exempt the agencies from the application of the protections provided under the Act, will pass muster the tests laid down in binding judicial precedents, we shall now have a brief overview of these tests.

In majority judgment in Puttaswamy adopted a unique version of meaning of the proportionality test to apply in the Indian constitutional scheme. For determining the extent of privacy in fractions, the courts in India will follow the doctrine of

³⁶¹ A Free and Fair Digital Economy Protecting Privacy, Empowering Indians Committee of Experts under the Chairmanship of Justice B.N. Srikrishna, https://meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Data_Protection_Committee_Report.pdf (Accessed on 12th Dec. 2019).

proportionality in the upcoming days and the constitutionality of the provisions providing for exceptions under the data protection bill will be anchored around the test. The doctrine of proportionality as applied in different jurisdictions across the world isn't exactly the same as the one that was understood by the honorable judges in Puttaswamy. However, it must be acknowledged that the judges did an elaborate study of the contours of the test before altering the existing tests for infringement of privacy.

The Constitutional courts in Germany have adopted a three-pronged test in order to ascertain the validity of any privacy infringement. The first facet of the test concerns with the legitimacy of the goal for which the step is being taken. The second facet requires that there must be a rational nexus between the means and the goal that is sought to be achieved. The third facet requires that there shouldn't be any equally efficacious alternative that is less restrictive in nature to achieve the goal, this is also described as the necessity stage. The last stage is the "balancing stage" which requires that the measure being taken by the state must not have a disproportionate impact on the rights of the citizens. While quoting the stanza from Prof. Bilchitz's thesis the SC has explained that while assessing the determinative step of necessity, the court must first of all identify all the possible alternatives to the policy adopted by the government and then proceed towards examining the issue whether these measures could be an effective alternative. If the alternative and less restrictive policy can achieve the objective sought to be achieved by the government in a real and substantial manner, it should be preferred.

4.6 How will the Doctrine of Proportionality be applied in India?

As per the ratio of Puttaswamy, the courts will apply the following standards to determine the constitutionality of the provisions.

- Is the State pursuing an aim which is legitimate? Here reason may not be, the aim ought not to be a compelling one and if the courts find that the restrictions are sought to be imposed to meet a legitimate aim then the first facet of the test shall pass muster.
- Is the State using reasonable means to achieve the legitimate aim and is there a nexus between the aims and the objective? The second fulcrum of the tests shall lie upon the reasonableness of the means. If the means adopted by the state, in the view of the courts, are not reasonable, the test shall fail.
- The third question involves an enquiry into an equally effective alternative method that could be resorted to for achieving the same ends while having lesser intrusion upon the rights of the citizens. For doing so the courts will go into the following aspects of the subject.
 - a) *Look for the alternative measures that are equally effective in achieving the legitimate aim sought to be achieved by the state*
 - b) *Are these measures taken up by the state really necessary and effective for achieving the objective?*
 - c) *If the first two conditions are satisfied, what will be the impact of these restrictions on the rights of the citizens?*
 - d) *At this juncture, the court shall use the relevant circumstances to perform the balancing exercise.*
- The balancing exercise is done by the courts to check whether the intrusion into the right and the importance of the right are proportionate to each other or not. Since, the test has been applied only once in the Indian domain in Puttaswamy, we would get a clearer picture of the parameters that the court uses to this exercise in the coming years.

In Pursuance of Legitimate Aim: We shall refer to the application of the facets of proportionality in Puttaswamy with respect to Aadhar to analyze whether the provisions in the draft bill, that provide the central government with wide powers of exemption of the agencies from the operation of the Act, shall pass the tests or not. The first test concerns with legitimacy of the aim that the state wishes to purport. The precedent in Puttaswamy can be taken as a yardstick to test the validity of these sections

in the data protection bill that aim to promoting the ends of social justice will fall within the domain of legitimate state interest within the constitutional scheme. The majority in Puttaswamy had noted that³⁶²

“Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act is aimed at offering subsidies, benefits or services to the marginalised section of the society for whom such welfare schemes have been formulated from time to time. That also becomes an aspect of social justice, which is the obligation of the State stipulated in Para IV of the Constitution. The rationale behind Section 7 lies in ensuring targeted delivery of services, benefits and subsidies which are funded from the Consolidated Fund of India”.

The processing of data without the consent of data principal under the provisions of proposed bill that are aimed at furthering the cause of social justice, allotting the subsidies and promoting welfare schemes of the state will likely fall within the ambit of legitimate state interest and hence will pass constitutional muster.

This view was expressly endorsed in Puttaswamy where, the majority affirmed that that, *in a welfare State, where measures are taken to ameliorate the sufferings of the downtrodden, the aim of the Act is to ensure that these benefits actually reach the populace for whom they are meant. This is naturally a legitimate State aim*³⁶³. Hence, as far as the first facet of the proportionality test is concerned the provisions of the proposed bill that seek to process the personal data without the consent of data principal will be satisfied.

The Nexus Test: These second limb of the proportionality test requires a rational nexus between the means and the object sought to be achieved. The judicial interpretation of this facet of the test is quite settled and the majority in Puttaswamy reiterated the established test while holding that:

³⁶²KSPuttaswamy v. Union of India, (2019) 01 SCC 01, 376.

³⁶³KSPuttaswamy v. Union of India, (2019) 01 SCC 01, 378.

“There must be a direct and proximate nexus or reasonable connection between the restrictions imposed and the object sought to be achieved. If there is a direct nexus between the restrictions, and the object of the Act, then a strong presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the Act will naturally arise³⁶⁴.”

Based upon the same principle, the majority upheld the validity of Aadhar and noted, *“We have already held that it has substantial nexus with the appropriation of funds from the Consolidated Fund of India and is directly connected with Article 110 of the Constitution³⁶⁵”*. Based upon this line of reasoning the provisions enshrined under the proposed data protection bill shall presumably pass these second facet of the test as well. The processing of data without the consent of the data principal, when there is a legitimate aim to be achieved by the state and such aim requires the processing of data, the provision shall pass the requirement of “nexus test”.

The third and the most important facet of the proportionality test is the existence of necessity and the existence of equally effective but less restrictive measures to achieve the legitimate aim that is sought to be achieved. We shall analyze the provisions under the exemption clauses under this prong to test whether the necessity of proportionality is met or not. The test of “necessity” is the most important aspect of the third prong of proportionality test; however, the court seems to ignore the relevance of this aspect of the test. While upholding the German notion of doctrine of proportionality, the court holds that there is always a possibility that an alternative will not be as effective as the one that is being adopted by the government while being less intrusive. The court endorses the fact that, *“almost all policies are necessary because any alternative policy will usually have some disadvantage which means that it cannot be considered equally effective.”*

It is submitted that it is unfortunate that the court went ahead with the assumption that there can't be an equally efficient alternative substitute. Following the same line of

³⁶⁴KSPuttaswamy v. Union of India, (2019) 01 SCC 01, 548.

³⁶⁵KSPuttaswamy v. Union of India, (2019) 01 SCC 01, 458.

reasoning, it upheld the validity of section 7 of Aadhar Act without even considering the other options

“Insofar as third component is concerned, most of it stands answered while in the discussion that has ensued in respect of component No. 1 and 2. The manner in which malpractices have been committed in the past leaves us to hold that apart from the system of unique identity in Aadhaar and authentication of the real beneficiaries, there is no alternative measure with lesser degree of limitation which can achieve the same purpose. In fact, on repeated query by this Court, even the petitioners could not suggest any such method³⁶⁶”

It is further submitted that the courts inability to appreciate the relevance of this part of the test leaves a great loophole in the pursuit of protection of fundamental rights of the citizens. As, is quite apparent from the wide window under the proposed data protection bill, the government will easily get away with the argument that there can't be an equally effective method to achieve the legitimate aim and it will always have the observation in the judgment to justify disregard for an alternative method.

It may be pointed out that the right formulation of this aspect of the test requires that the Court must assess the possibility of alternatives that may be applied for achieving the same aim. When the court does get the list alternatives that may be applied to achieve that legitimate aim, it should go on to consider whether these methods would substantially fulfill the objectives that the state seeks to attain through the impugned act. Instead, of measuring two different acts on a goldenscale, the courts must assess whether the alternative method will in pith and substance fulfill the legitimate aim that the state seeks to pursue. Unfortunately, the majority in Puttaswamy failed to apply any of the test in its true spirit and thus left a great lacuna in preserving the privacy infringements of the citizens.

³⁶⁶KSPuttaswamy v. Union of India, (2019) 01 SCC 01, 382.

Necessity: The most controversial aspect of the proposed bill that provides for the wide range of exceptions under the proposed data protection bill, 2019 to the central government agencies³⁶⁷.

An interference will be considered “necessary in a democratic society” for a legitimate aim if it answers a “pressing social need” and, in particular, if it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and if the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are relevant and sufficient. The protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention.

The bill does away with the necessity of consent and notice for the processing of personal data by a sweeping assertion that, “*The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply where such notice substantially prejudices the purpose of processing of personal data under section 12*”³⁶⁸. As a result, the necessity of giving the notice to the data principal in the cases wherein their data is being processed without their consent has been done away with. This is a substantial departure from the provisions of the previous draft bill, which mandated the issuance of notice to the data principals in cases of non-consensual processing of data. The draft bill had curtailed the scope of non-consensual processing of personal data without giving notice to the data principal medical emergency, breakdown of public order and natural disaster³⁶⁹. However, the bill in its present form incorporates every element of section 12 in the domain of “*uninformed non-consensual*” processing of personal data and thus

³⁶⁷The Personal Data Protection Bill, § 35, *supra* note 47. Where the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient,—(i) in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or (ii) for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, it may, by order, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that all or any of the provisions of this Act shall not apply to any agency of the Government in respect of processing of such personal data, as may be specified in the order subject to such procedure, safeguards and oversight mechanism to be followed by the agency, as may be prescribed.

³⁶⁸The Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019, § 7(3), *supra* note 47.

³⁶⁹The Personal Data Protection Bill, 2018, § 15, Draft Bill, 2018 (India).

broaden the ambit of processing without obtaining the consent of the data principals. It may be inferred that such wide windows for non-consensual processing of personal data goes against the very foundation of informational self-determination.

This goes on to imply that, for the purposes of processing of personal data without the consent of the data owner, on the hugely extensive grounds enumerated under section 12, the processor will not be bound to inform the data owner about any aspect of the processing of personal data, if the result of notice would amount to frustration of the purpose for which the data is sought to be processed.³⁷⁰ It must also be noted that the proposed section uses the term, “*prejudices*” the purpose for which data is being processed under section 12, instead of the term, “*frustration*.” This would imply that even an apprehension of a minor deviation from the objective behind the processing of personal data will allow the data fiduciaries from complying with the requirement of notice for non-consensual processing of data.

It is submitted that the provision that affords a huge window to the data processor to deny the right of the data principal to be informed about the purpose for which their data is being processed, by whom is their data being processed and every other aspect related to processing of data. The provision seeks to push all the principles of data protection into abeyance by creating a regime that could secretly process one’s data without even affording them a right to know anything related to the processing of their own data. These provisions if manage to escape the scrutiny of the joint committee, shall fly in the face of the concept of “informed consent” and preclude the billions of Indians from the right to an informed consent. The provision shall be instrumental in laying the foundation of a state sponsored surveillance module, wherein the data of the individuals will be processed without their consent and without them even knowing that their data has been processed. This shall bring into the frame a huge amount of opacity and vagueness in the operations of data fiduciary.

³⁷⁰JOHN KLEINIG, THE NATURE OF CONSENT IN THE ETHICS OF CONSENT-THEORY AND PRACTICE 109-112 (1st ed. 2009).

It is submitted that the provision tilts the pendulum of convenience in the favor of data fiduciaries.

It is an established legal principle that the consent can't be free at all when the one who has given it, is unable to withdraw it without any detriment to his interests³⁷¹. To put it more plainly, the withdrawal of consent has to be as easy as the furnishing of the consent had been³⁷². However, the Personal Data Protection Bill 2019, like the previous draft Bill, does not continue to frown upon the withdrawal of consent. While it adopts, in letter, the principle that “*the ease of such withdrawal comparable to the ease with which consent may be given*” but fails to honor the spirit of the principle. The section 11(6) of the Data Protection Bill, 2019 goes on to lay that in cases where the data principal who has previously given his consent for processing of personal data, withdraws his consent later, without any “valid reason” then he would be liable for all the “*legal consequences for the effects of such withdrawal*”³⁷³.

A close look at the operative part of the order in Puttaswamy signifies that the Court has separately pointed out that the right to privacy, is a protected “*as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 and as a part of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution*”. The insistence upon right to life and liberty goes on to show that the court expects a greater degree of adherence and insistence upon stricter standards for granting their violations. This goes on to suggest that the court considers the right to privacy to be on a greater pedestal as compared to other rights recognized by the part III of the constitution. We shall separately consider right to privacy as a part of the rights recognized by the part III of the constitution and as a part of right to life and liberty as enshrined under article 21 of the constitution.

³⁷¹Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & Yann Padova, *Regime Change: Enabling Big Data through Europe's New Data Protection Regulation*, 17 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 315 (2016).

³⁷²General Data Protection Regulation, Recital 42 (EU 2016); Modernized Convention 108, Explanatory Report ¶42 (EU 2018).

³⁷³The Personal Data Protection Bill, §11(6), *supra* note 47.

This right is subject to reasonable regulations made by the State to protect legitimate State interests or public interest. However, when it comes to restrictions on this right, the drill of various Articles to which the right relates must be scrupulously followed. Each of the tests evolved by this Court, be it legislative or executive action, under Article 21 read with Article 14; or Article 21 read with Article 19(1)(a) in the aforesaid examples must be met in order that State action pass muster. In the ultimate analysis, the balancing act that is to be carried out between individual, societal and State interests must be left to the training and expertise of the judicial mind³⁷⁴.

4.7 Right to Privacy and the Constitution of India

Indian model of constitutionalism has its judiciary at its focal point and thus it becomes extremely vital to assess the approach of the Indian constitutional courts with regards to the right to privacy so as to address some of the normative aspects of the interpretation of the proposed Data Protection Law in India. The preamble of Indian Constitution is the Magna Carta of our nation, it represents the social contract between the people and the state³⁷⁵. It's equally true that the text of the constitution of India doesn't expressly or even incidentally recognize the right to privacy as a fundamental right but how long can the judiciary look the other way while treating the constitution to be cast in rock frame? As per Prof. Upendra Baxi, the constitution represents a social contract between the state and the citizens and is 'a static but an ever-evolving document and it has some "*manifest themselves differently in different ages, situations and conditions*"³⁷⁶. However, a blind reliance upon the organic nature of constitution has been regarded as instrument of facilitating judicial arbitrariness and hence there is a need of evolution of a theory that is based on structure and the ethos of the

³⁷⁴KSPuttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 01, 224., 637.

³⁷⁵Mahendra Pal Singh, *The Constitution of India: A Contextual Analysis*, 14 SOCIO- LEGAL REV. 228, 228-241, (2018).

³⁷⁶Upendra Baxi, *The Rule of Law in India*, 6 SUR-INT'L J. ON HUM RTS. 7, 11-21 (2007)

constitution³⁷⁷. Justice Chalemshwar came close to justifying the living constitutionalist approach:

“The living constitutionalist approach in my view is preferable despite these criticisms, for two reasons. First, adaptability cannot be equated to lack of discipline in judicial reasoning. Second, it is still the text of the constitution which acquires the requisite interpretative hues and therefore, it is not as if there is violence being perpetrated upon the text if one resorts to the living constitutionalist approach³⁷⁸”.

While judicial discretion is central to judicial interpretations, such interpretations can't ignore the constitutional ethos and structure. Justice Kaul, in his opinion discussed the nature and charter of the constitutionalist interpretation and observed that the Constitution ought to be continuously updated to keep up with the pace of the social change.³⁷⁹ It is pertinent to note that the recognition of right to privacy as a facet of right to life and liberty as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution furthers and supplements the individual based notion of the fundamental rights.

4.7.1 Privacy as A Natural Right

The significance of the judgment in Puttaswamy increases manifold when views from the perspective of the source of fundamental rights and the doctrines that would govern the justification of suspension of the fundamental rights. The SC in *ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla*³⁸⁰ had asserted that, *“Independently of the constitution and the laws of the State, natural rights can have no legal sanction and cannot be enforced.”*³⁸¹ In the most notorious judgment which the apex court of any true democracy can come up with, the Supreme Court in *ADM Jabalpur* had hit

³⁷⁷H.M.Seervai, *The emergency, future safeguards and the habeas corpus case: A Criticism* 1,3 (1978).

³⁷⁸K.S.Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 01, 516.

³⁷⁹*Id.* at 516.

³⁸⁰*ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla*, (1976) 2 SCC 521.

³⁸¹*ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla*, (1976) 2 SCC 52.

unprecedented low in holding that there existed no right outside the constitution³⁸². What Puttaswamy did was to recognize that our constitution didn't create the rights but it just recognized their existence³⁸³. The majority regarded privacy as a natural right to hold that:

*“privacy is a concomitant of the right of the individual to exercise control over his or her personality. It finds an origin in the notion that there are certain rights which are natural to or inherent in a human being. Natural rights are inalienable because they are inseparable from the human personality. The humane element in life is impossible to conceive without the existence of natural rights”*³⁸⁴

Justice Bobde (as he then was) held that privacy as an intimately connected to two values whose protection is a matter of universal moral agreement: the innate dignity and autonomy of man³⁸⁵. The other opinions also endorse the evolution of concept of right to privacy and the endorsed the fact that the dignity-based notion of the right to privacy would deny the justiciability of the spatial and the relational notions of the right to privacy. One of the most important aspects of the judgments was the endorsement of an inherent right to informational privacy as one of the prongs of the right to privacy³⁸⁶. It is submitted that recognition of Right to privacy as a fundamental right of which informational privacy is an aspect, which lies at the core of the rationale behind a robust data protection regime in the country.

The 2017 was one of the most remarkable years in the arena of transformative constitutionalism in India wherein the SC shed the shackles of a lot of regressive notions that it had voluntarily allowed to inhibit itself from adopting to the changing social and legal dynamics. The theme of three judgments *Justice Puttaswamy v Union*

³⁸²Maneesh Chhibber, 35 Years Later: A Former Chief Justice of India Pleads Guilty, INDIAN EXPRESS, Sept. 16, 2011, <http://indianexpress.com/article/>.

³⁸³K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 01, 364.

³⁸⁴K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 01, 365.

³⁸⁵*Id.* at 537.

³⁸⁶Gautam Bhatia, Right to Privacy Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, Oct 22, 2019, <https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/category/privacy/>.

of India³⁸⁷, *Joseph Shine v Union of India*³⁸⁸ and *Navtej Singh Jauhar v Union of India*³⁸⁹, are woven round a common thread that endeavors to expand the scope of personal freedom in the fullest extent. For over seven decades the Supreme Court of India had repeatedly ignored the infallibility of right to dignity of the individuals on the pretext of morality and social mores. The most remarkable of the three judgments has to be the privacy judgment³⁹⁰.

In *Justice Puttaswamy v. Union of India*³⁹¹, a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India unanimously recognized the right to privacy as a fundamental right under the constitution of India. In what may be termed as the most notable judgments protection of the civil rights on India after the dissent of Justice Khanna in *ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla* the Supreme Court laid down the law that will have an impact on the constitutional landscape of the country³⁹². The implications of the holding are going to be observed in data protection laws and every other aspect of the law that concerns the aspects of individual liberty. Be it the right to choice of food, dressing, state surveillance, LGBT rights and domains that are likely to surface with the evolution of society. In the upcoming sections, the finder will deal with the contours of the ruling which are likely to have an impact on the way the Indian data protection laws are interpreted by the judiciary in the coming years.

4.8 The Approach of Supreme Court on Right to Privacy

In *Govind v State of MP*³⁹³, while holding that the right to privacy is an intrinsic part of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution, the Supreme Court chose to

³⁸⁷K.S.Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 01, 537.

³⁸⁸Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39.

³⁸⁹Navtej Singh Jauhar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 01.

³⁹⁰Shamnad Basheer, Sroyon Mukherjee & Karthy Nair, Section 377 and the Order of Nature: Nurturing Indeterminacy in the Law, 2 NUJS L. Rev. 433 (2009).

³⁹¹K.S.Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 01, 537.

³⁹²Kalyani Ramnath, *ADM Jabalpur's Antecedents: Political Emergencies, Civil Liberties, and Arguments from Colonial Continuities in India*, 31 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 209, 210-211 (2016).

³⁹³Govind v. State of MP, (1975) 2 SCC 148.

restrict the meaning of privacy to the spaces and institutions within the society while completely omitting the scope of protection of the individuals³⁹⁴. The formulations such as marriage, home and motherhood don't go beyond protecting the social relations and institutions and thus adhere to a restrictive understanding of the right to privacy³⁹⁵. In what used to be understood as the privacy at home, the court in *Govind* justified the restricted understanding of the right to privacy with two theories in the backdrop³⁹⁶.

The first theory that justifies the existence of privacy at the homes is that the acts taking place inside the four walls of the home that cause no offense to the others aren't constitutional protection able. The second theory which sounds much plausible rests on the proposition that an individual's needs a "sanctuary" that is free from social control and intervention where "individuals can drop the mask, desist for a while from projecting on the world the image they want to be accepted as themselves, an image that may reflect the values of their peers rather than the realities of their natures³⁹⁷". The phase witnessed a desperate attempt on the part of the Supreme Court to create a space for the right to privacy in the Indian constitutional scheme, but of course in an extremely restricted form.

One of the most notable objections to the home based spatial and relational notion of the right to privacy is founded upon the argument that the right to privacy stems from the notion that these notions cast a blind eye upon the imbalance of status of relationship within the home³⁹⁸. At times, the right to privacy in home has also been

³⁹⁴ *Govind v. State of MP*, (1975) 2 SCC 148. The Court emphasized on the social and relational aspects of the right to privacy and associated it with home while observing that, "Any right to privacy must encompass and protect the personal intimacies of the home, the family marriage, motherhood, procreation and child rearing."

³⁹⁵ *Govind v. State of MP* (1975), 2 SCC 148, 156.

³⁹⁶ *Id.* at 157.

³⁹⁷ Alan F. Westin, *Privacy and Freedom* 33 (1967); Andrew J. McClurg, *Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality*, 74 *U. Cin. L. Rev.* 887 (2006).

³⁹⁸ Meera Kosambi, *Gender Reform and Competing State Control over Women: The Rakhmabai Case* (1884-1888), (1995) <https://doi.org/10.1177/0069966795029001013>.

regarded as based upon an understanding that seeks to preserve the male authority within the family³⁹⁹. The observations in *Govind* outline the aspects of the right to privacy.⁴⁰⁰

- The right to privacy is limited to the Spatial boundaries and the activities that it governs are related to the things that are done within the four walls of the home.
- Therighttoprivacyisaimedatpreservingthesocialinstitutionssuchasmarrriage and the functions arising out of these institutions⁴⁰¹.
- Decisionalautonomyoftheindividualsthatbasedonthepreremissethat“an individual has the right to take their own decision⁴⁰².”

IttookaboldstepfromtheHCofAndhraPradesh,inadecisionthatwaswellahead of its times to break away from the shackles of restrictive interpretation of the right to privacy. Justice Chaudhary in *T Sareetha*⁴⁰³, entirely premised the understanding of the right to privacy on the right to decisional autonomy and bodily integrity and thus rejected the argument that the site of claim of right to privacy are social institutions and functions arising thereof⁴⁰⁴. The court held that, “*any plausible definition of right to privacy is bound to take human body as its first and most basic referenceforcontroloverpersonalidentity...therighttoprivacybelongstoaperson as an individual and, is not lost by marital association.*”⁴⁰⁵ In what may be regarded as the a very radical step, the Court further observed that, “a decree of restitution of conjugal rights thus enforced offends the inviolability of the body and the mind subjected to the decree and offends the integrity of such a person and invades the marital privacy and domestic intimacies of such a person⁴⁰⁶.”

³⁹⁹RuthGavison,FeminismandthePublic/PrivateDistinction,45Stan.L.Rev.1(1992).

⁴⁰⁰*Govindv.StateofMP*, (1975)2SCC 148.

⁴⁰¹*Id.*

⁴⁰²ThisformulationcanbetracedtothecaseofRoev.Wade,410U.S.113(1973).

⁴⁰³*TSareethavVenkatasubbaiah*,AIR1983AP356.

⁴⁰⁴*Id.*

⁴⁰⁵*Id.*

⁴⁰⁶ Ratna Kapur and Brenda Cossman, *SUBVERSIVE SITES: FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS WITH LAW IN INDIA*, 123 (1st ed. 1996).

4.8.1 Clashes between spatial, institutional and decisional privacy

The Clashes between the individualistic and institutional conception of right to privacy is most amply reflected by the Courts approach on issues concerning the “offences against marriages” and restitution of conjugal rights. In *T Sareetha v Venkatasubbaiah*⁴⁰⁷, the Andhra Pradesh High Court, while giving predominance to the individual right to privacy over the institutional privacy, held the Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act⁴⁰⁸ as unconstitutional on the account of “state interference” in the decision making of the women. However, the Delhi HC regarded the institutional understanding of the right to privacy and held that:

“Introduction of Constitutional Law in the home is most inappropriate. It is like introducing a bull in a china shop. It will prove to be a ruthless destroyer of the marriage institution and all that it stands for. In the privacy of the home and the married life neither Art. 21 nor Art. 14 have any place. In a sensitive sphere which is at once intimate and delicate the introduction of the cold principles of Constitutional Law will have the effect of weakening the marriage bond⁴⁰⁹”. Unfortunately, the view taken by the Delhi HC was endorsed by the SC with the much-used reasoning of, “serves a social purpose as an aid to the prevention of break-up of marriage.”⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰⁷*Id.*

⁴⁰⁸ The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, § 9, No. 25, Acts of Parliament, (India 1955). Section title as: restitution of conjugal rights, provides that: “When either the husband or the wife has, without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society of the other, the aggrieved party may apply, by petition to the district court, for restitution of conjugal rights and the court, on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such petition and that there is no legal ground why the application should not be granted, may decree restitution of conjugal rights accordingly.”

⁴⁰⁹ Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Singh, AIR 1984 Delhi 66.

⁴¹⁰*Id.*

The view taken in *Sareetha* can be traced back to the proposition of Justice Brandie in *Olmstead vs New York* that sought to balance the power between the state and the individual in order to secure the right to privacy.⁴¹¹

The “Convention of female chastity and modesty” has shielded women in a mantle of privacy at a high cost to sexual choice and self-expression.⁴¹² In a considerably male dominated society like India, the proposition would need no further elaboration and unfortunately, until recently the Supreme Court of India had been proving these apprehensions genuine in the guise of protecting the sanctimony of marriage. It was only in the case of *Joseph Shine*, that the Supreme Court was able to do away with a substantial chunk of credible criticism surrounding the ill effects of coerced privacy within the home. The SC in *Puttaswamy*, categorically held accepted the individual based notion of the right to privacy and all the six opinions retreated the view that the view that the individual autonomy lies at the core of right to privacy⁴¹³. The speculation regarding the effect of right to privacy on the women within the four walls was put to rest by Justice Chandrachud in his opinion, he observes,

“Many writers on feminism express concern over the use of privacy as a veneer for patriarchal domination and abuse of women. Patriarchal notions still prevail in several societies including our own and are used as a shield to violate core constitutional rights of women based on gender and autonomy. Privacy must not be utilised as a cover to conceal and assert patriarchal mindsets.”⁴¹⁴

⁴¹¹ Andrew Jay McClurg, *Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places*, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 999-1002 (1995).

⁴¹² RHONDA COPELON, *UNPACKING PATRIARCHY: REPRODUCTION, SEXUALITY, ORIGINALISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, IN A LESS THAN PERFECT UNION: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S. Constitution* 303, 314 (Jules Lobel ed., 1988).

⁴¹³ *K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India*, (2017) 10 SCC 01, 539.

⁴¹⁴ Catherine MacKinnon, *Towards a Feminist Theory of the State*, (1989). Author adverts to the dangers of privacy when it is used to cover up physical harm done to women by perpetrating their subjection. Yet, it must also be noticed that women have an inviolable interest in privacy. Privacy is the ultimate guarantee against violations caused by programmes not unknown to history, such as state imposed sterilization programmes or mandatory state imposed drug testing for women. The challenge in this area is to enable the state to take the violation of the dignity of women in the domestic sphere

Justice Chandrachud, it must be mentioned, was most firm in tackling the genuine propositions raised by the feminist thinkers and placing the individual at the core of the right to privacy. With the individual as the basic unit of the constitution, the normative defenses to regressive practices such as marital rape are going to come under the scanner in near future.

4.9 Puttaswamy and the Aftermath

The observation of Justice Chandrachud in Puttaswamy was influential in shedding the non-individualistic notions attached to the concept of privacy in Indian constitutional scheme to a great extent. The first progressive manifestation of the broader interpretation of right to privacy is reflected in *Joseph Shine v Union of India*, wherein the Supreme Court held the regressive adultery law as unconstitutional, defying all the arguments that it had itself stuck to based on the premise of “saving the institution of marriage”⁴¹⁵. What now represents the current outlook of the supreme court on the concept of privacy is amply reflected in the cases of *Joseph Shine v. Union of India* and *Navtej Singh Jauhar v. Union of India*.

As we have noted earlier, the understanding of the notion of right to privacy has undergone a sea of change over the years. After the landmark judgement in *K S Puttaswamy*, the commentators had rightly noted that the days of archaic Victorian provisions like section 497 and 377 of the Indian Penal Code were numbered and rightly so, following the law laid down in *Puttaswamy*, the Section 497 of the IPC was held to be Unconstitutional. The following excerpt from the judgement will be determinative of the path that will be charted by the Indian Data Protection regime for years to come

“Liberty has a broader meaning of which privacy is a subset. All liberties may not be exercised in privacy. Yet others can be fulfilled only within

seriously while at the same time protecting the privacy entitlements of women grounded in the identity of gender and liberty.

⁴¹⁵*Id.* at 39.

a private space. Privacy enables the individual to retain the autonomy of the body and mind. The autonomy of the individual is the ability to make decisions on vital matters of concern to life. Privacy has not been couched as an independent fundamental right. But that does not detract from the constitutional protection afforded to it, once the true nature of privacy and its relationship with those fundamental rights which are expressly protected is understood. Privacy lies across the spectrum of protected freedoms. The guarantee of equality is a guarantee against arbitrary state action. It prevents the state from discriminating between individuals. The destruction by the state of a sanctified personal space whether of the body or of the mind is violative of the guarantee against arbitrary state action. Privacy of the body entitles an individual to the integrity of the physical aspects of personhood. The intersection between one's mental integrity and privacy entitles the individual to freedom of thought, the freedom to believe in what is right, and the freedom of self-determination⁴¹⁶”.

The Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code that criminalized adultery was based upon the notion of romantic paternalism of women and sought to treat women as a chattel, owned by their husbands. Holding that the decisional privacy was an inherent aspect of the right to dignity, the Supreme Court marked the herald of the chapter of decisional privacy in the Indian scheme.

In *Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India*⁴¹⁷, the Supreme Court once again following its ration in *KS Puttaswamy* decriminalized the hitherto offence of “homosexuality” on the grounds of unwarranted interference in the right to decisional privacy of the individuals. The court held that the scope of the right to privacy is quite broad under the Indian constitutional scheme and it encompasses within its fold the decisional, spatial and informational privacy as well. The right to privacy is inherently related to the autonomy in making personal choices related to food, sexual choices, religion etc. and the unwarranted interference of the state would tantamount to

⁴¹⁶2018 SCC On Line SC 1676

⁴¹⁷(2017)9 SCC 1

violation of the fundamental right to privacy of the individuals. The Court then went on to observe that:

“Privacy enables each individual to take crucial decisions which find expression in the human personality. It enables individuals to preserve their beliefs, thoughts, expressions, ideas, ideologies, preferences and choices against societal demands of homogeneity. Privacy is an intrinsic recognition of heterogeneity, of the right of the individual to be different and to stand against the tide of conformity in creating a zone of solitude. Privacy protects the individual from the searching glare of publicity in matters which are personal to his or her life⁴¹⁸.”

The subsequent decriminalisation of the old notions of the right to privacy which were invariably attached to the social relations have established the fact that the Supreme Court of India has laid the foundations of a robust privacy protection regime in India. However, does that foundation help in establishing a healthy data protection regime in India will depend a lot on the course adopted by the legislature.

The analysis in the present chapter dealt with the facets of the existing data protection regime in India. A bare perusal of the existing legislations and the precedents showcase a very poor picture of the data protection regime in the country. It has to be noted that the Indian society as a whole including the constituent assembly was not open to the idea of accepting the right to privacy as a distinct right that could be attached to dignity and the right to life and liberty. Following the same line of thinking, the Constitutional Courts in India took over seven decades to recognize the existence of a distinct right to privacy within the Indian Constitution scheme. As far as data protection is concerned, the initial approach of the Indian legislature was to tackle the growing instances of data theft and fraud in the booming Indian

⁴¹⁸Navtej Singh Jauhar v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1

Information Technology sector. The fact that the driving force behind the enactment of the Information Technology Act, 2000 was the objective to curb the growing menace of cyber fraud and not the issue of data protection resulted into a very weak data protection law in India.

In the absence of a comprehensive data protection law in India, one has to look for the provisions in various other legislations that are aimed at the providing adequate security to the personal data of the individuals. Some of the enactments that do seek to protect the informational privacy of the individuals do include the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Information Technology Rules 2011, and the finder has analyzed the various provisions of these enactments to gauge the effectiveness of the existing data protection regime in India.

- a) Indian Data Protection adopts a very feeble approach towards data protection and is ill-equipped with provisions that can't afford protection to the personal data of the individuals.
- b) The globally accepted Data Protection Principles have not been adopted under the Indian Data Protection regime in India.
- c) With the State being the largest processor of data, the law should afford sufficient safeguards against the possibility of invasion to the right to data privacy by the state. The current data protection framework in India is inapplicable to the State-actors which renders it impossible to protect the unwarranted data breach by government and its agencies.
- d) The lack of adequate mechanisms to guarantee and enforce the data protection principles are absent in the laws at present and there is a dire need to propel a paradigm shift in the approach of the legislature to confer the ownership of data to the data principals.
- e) There is a need to have an independent Data protection Authority in India to enforce the rights of individuals against data breaches. Currently there is no

provision mandating the establishment of a data protection authority and the whole adjudication framework of data breach claims are manned by the executive.

- f) The provisions of the existing data protection regime in India have negligible emphasis on the data security measures and hence there is a need to include the provisions regulating the social media intermediaries and data localisation.
- g) The Information Technology Act, 2000 poses a great deal of barriers upon the enforcement of the right to be compensated on the grounds of data breach and thus makes it unfriendly to the rights of data principals.
- h) The existing data protection framework lacks the key principles of data protection such as the right to erasure, the right to informational self-determination, right to informed consent, the right to be forgotten etc.
- i) The existing regime doesn't offer any protection to the children's data and fails to include them within the meaning of personal data.
- j) The obligations of the data processors are extremely curtailed in their ambit and thus it becomes extremely difficult to secure the remedies that have been provided for in the existing laws.
- k) The entire framework lacks to incorporate the provisions to tackle the threat of breach of data by using the new technological advancements. The provisions relating to anonymization and privacy by design are completely absent.
- l) The Supreme Court of India has upheld the ante against the existing lacuna in the Data Protection regime in the country and by holding that the right to informational self-determination was an inherent aspect of the fundamental

right to privacy, the apex court has laid down the foundations of a robust data protection framework in the country.

Over one third of a decade has already passed since the day the Right to Privacy was recognized as a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution of India. However, we have seen very little progress in the direction of enacting a comprehensive Data Protection Law in India and the proposed Data Protection Bill, 2019 is yet to see the light of the day. Since the finder has extensively considered the legislations concerning the Data Protection regime in India

SAMPLE BOOK

CHAPTER 5: COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE DATA PROTECTION REGIME IN INDIA WITH REFERNCE TO EU,US &UK

5.1 Introduction

The Previous Chapter has dwelled into the intricacies of the existing data protection regime in India and has enabled the finder to formulate a rational opinion with regards to the existing state of affairs in the realm of data protection in India. With a major portion of groundwork being accomplished, the finders shall in this chapter proceed to contrast some of the Key aspects of the existing and the proposed data protection law in India. The sole object of this discussion is to churn out the feasible and practical suggestions in order to accomplish the objective of establishing a robust data protection framework in India.

The finders shall examine the provisions of the Information technology Act, 2000, The SDPI Rules, 2011 and the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 to test the dissertation, “*The Legal framework for Data Protection in India is not adequate to protect the right to Privacy of the citizens.*” We have already taken into consideration, the approach that the judiciary, in India, has taken with regard to various contours of right to privacy and thus the discussions in the upcoming sections shall be limited purely to the analysis of the provisions of the existing and the proposed data protection laws in bill and their implications with regard to the upcoming data protection regime in India. The detailed analysis of the key provisions of the proposed bill be instrumental in determining the outcome of the dissertation.

The primary focus of the research will be to compare the data protection laws of India to those of European Union, the United States and the United Kingdom and some of the BRICS countries. Given the fact that as of now there exists piecemeal legislation in India that regulates the Data Protection, in order to establish a synergy between the research work and the practicalities, the finder has chosen to compare

the provisions of the proposed Data Protection Laws in India in its entirety. There's no prize for guessing that the days of the existing data protection regime in India are numbered and in a matter of less than a year, we may have an all new data protection regime in the place and hence it becomes imperative to keep a tap on the changing dynamics of the data protection legislation in the country. Keeping this normative aspect in view, the finder shall compare some of the most vital aspects of data protection laws in India with those of European Union, the United States and the United Kingdom.

5.2 Scope of The Indian Data Protection Laws in India and Elsewhere

The preamble of GDPR is extremely broad and lays down through over 168 recitals the object behind enactment of the regulation⁴¹⁹. The recitals set out in the broadest of terms the need of enacting the provisions while recognizing in most clear terms the fundamental right to privacy. Similarly, the preamble of the UK Data Protection Act goes as, *“An Act to make provision for the regulation of the processing of information relating to individuals; to make provision in connection with the Information Commissioner’s functions under certain regulations relating to information; to make provision for a direct marketing code of practice; and for connected purposes.”* It is submitted that the preamble of any legislation is its mere customary formality and it essentially sets the tone and tenor of the legislation. It is also one of the major sources of judicial interpretation of the provisions of the any law. Hence, it is necessary that the preamble entails within its definition a broad set of ancillary objectives without getting deviated from the pith and substance of the legislation. However, the preamble of the IT Act 2000 doesn't refer to the right to privacy even once. Given the fact that India lacks a comprehensive data protection legislation to this date, a comparison between GDPR and the IT Act and the IT rules will do no justice to the comparison, keeping this normative aspect of the analysis in mind, the finder, for the sake of

⁴¹⁹See, Preamble to UK Data Protection Act, 2018.

quality of analysis shall take into account the various provisions of the proposed Data Protection Bill in the fold of Indian data protection regime. The Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 as it has been named, is aimed at providing a robust data protection regime in the country that would accord the right to data privacy of the citizens⁴²⁰ and thus it becomes absolutely necessary for the preamble of the law to specify in unequivocal terms the objectives for which it is being brought. It also provides that it is a constitutional necessity to provide protection to personal data is “*an essential facet of informational privacy.*”

It ought to be highlighted that the preamble of the proposed Indian Act, unlike the GDPR pushes for the promotion of digital economy and pitches for digital governance instead of laying emphasis on the importance of informational privacy. It also recognizes that in the era of digital economy, data has become an essential means of communication and hence they deserve a greater degree of protection, but undue emphasis on the aspect of fostering digital economy while pushing the focal aspect of furthering the goal of securing the right to privacy is an alarming aspect. The Personal Data Protection Bill 2019, which is supposedly the bedrock of the upcoming data protection regime in India doesn't explicitly recognize the aspect of informational self-determination inasmuch as right to informational privacy is concerned and thus raises serious apprehensions about the effectiveness of the proposed data protection regime in India⁴²¹.

Among other things, the bill also proposes to lay down a detailed framework to create a data protection regime that promises to implement technical and structural measures to regulate processing of personal data, prevention of unauthorized use of personal data but doesn't recognize the data principal as the owner of their data. The proposed bill also seeks to establish a data protection authority to secure these objectives but

⁴²⁰The Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019, pmb1, No. 373, Bills of Parliament, (India 2019).

⁴²¹Apar Gupta, Notes from a Digital Republic, Internet Freedom Foundation (January 26, 2020), <https://internetfreedom.in/our-digital-republic/>.

fails to highlighted the aspect of autonomy attached to the authority⁴²². The fact that the data protection regime in India is at an nascent stage and lack of judicial precedents (barring Puttaswamy) leaves us with no option other than relying upon the meaning, facets and limitations of right to privacy and thus the an ideal preamble of a data protection law in a country like India should have been liberal in its approach towards highlighting the importance of protection of right to informational self-determination⁴²³. India doesn't have the advantage possessed by the European Union where the judiciary has already developed a great deal of jurisprudence on Data Protection. Even the various United States legislations do vouch for providing adequate degree of protection to the right to privacy of the citizens in the preambles on the other hand the preamble of the proposed bill, makes no mention of the noble objective of placing the rights of the data principals over any other aspect of data processing. A similar inference can be drawn from the analysis of the various other data protection legislations in the United States such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 1996 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

While, committing to foster a digital economy and promoting innovation, the proposed bill puts protection of rights of the individuals to the back seat⁴²⁴. It is submitted that the failure of the preamble of the bill to expressly incorporate the objective of protection of rights of data subjects against invasion by state, as in a huge majority of the cases, the data controller is the state itself may be detrimental to the cause of putting a robust data protection regime in place. The bill should also provide in clear terms the methods in which the objective of furthering data protection regime is sought to be achieved. Unlike the GDPR, the bill in its present form, gives the

⁴²²Sohini Bagchi, Data Privacy Day: India's PDP Bill Needs Clarification, (Jan. 28, 2020, 8:14 am), <https://www.cxotoday.com/news-analysis/data-privacy-day-indias-pdp-bill-needs-clarification/>.

⁴²³ Swathi Moorthy, Data Protection Authority Will Be A Government Stooage And Weaken Personal Data Bill: Justice BN Srikrishna, (January 30, 2020, 12:18 IST), <https://www.firstpost.com/tech/news-analysis/data-protection-authority-will-be-a-government-stooage-and-weaken-personal-data-bill-justice-bn-srikrishna-7976651.html>.

⁴²⁴*Id.* At 47.

economic aspect of the data precedence over the rights of the data principals. The fact that the preamble ignores the need for establishing a transparent surveillance regime which would be subservient to the rule of law and undue emphasis on fostering a digital economy and “*ensuring empowerment, progress and innovation through digital governance*”⁴²⁵ while omitting the need for good governance, does indicate a genesis of data protection regime that treats the data of the citizens more as a tool of commercialization.

It is submitted that the bill should incorporate, within its realm the principle that the data principal is the true owner of their data and right to informational self-determination and decisional autonomy is the key aspect of the proposed data protection regime. While fostering digital economy and digital governance may be focal to the policy of the government, these objectives shouldn't be allowed to push the greater cause of protecting the right to privacy to the back seat. The preamble ought to include in unequivocal terms, the guarantee of protection against the interference of the state in the private domain of the individuals and pitch for surveillance reform in India. Contrasting the preamble of the bill with that of GDPR shows the inherent lacunas that have found their foot in the very inception of materialization of a robust data protection regime in India⁴²⁶.

5.3 Application of Act to Processing of Personal Data.

The Information Technology Act, 2008 and the SDPI Rules, 2011 do not render any protection whatsoever to the personal data of the individuals unless that data falls within the definition of sensitive data. Notably some aspects of the informational privacy are covered by the Telegraph Act. The Telegraph Act and Rules, which contains provisions that prohibit and penalize unlawful interception of communication. Furthermore, licenses issued to telecom service providers (TSPs)

⁴²⁵*Id.* At 47.

⁴²⁶Ryan M. Calo, *Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere)*, 87(3) NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW, 1031, 1033-37 (2012).

under this Act require TSPs to take measures to safeguard the privacy of their customers and confidentiality of communications.⁴²⁷ Moreover, the provisions of the Act do not apply to the public entities. It is submitted that such exclusions do make the promise of data protection hollow and namesake. However, in the sharp contrast to it, the GDPR offers complete protection to the personal data of the individuals while recognizing the right to have protection of personal data as a fundamental right⁴²⁸. The application of the Act is both territorial and extra territorial and applies to the entities based outside India as well, if the processing of personal data by them concerns with any business or any specific activity in India. In as much as the application of the act is concerned, the scope of GDPR, US data protection laws and the UK Data Protection Act are similar⁴²⁹. The provisions of the Act shall be applicable in the following cases⁴³⁰,

- The data is being processed, collected, stored or disclosed within the territorial limits of India.
- The data is processed by the State, any company based in India or any other juristic person of India.
- The processing of data concerns profiling of data within the Indian territory.
- The processing of data by the fiduciaries or data processors not present within the territory of India, if such processing is in relation to business committed in India or any other specific activity.

While the proposed bill does do away with major shortcoming of previous application of the provisions to the non-sensitive personal data, there are some of the loopholes that make even the upcoming data protection regime weaker than the GDPR in terms of protection accorded to the right to privacy. One of the most peculiar aspects of the

⁴²⁷Privacy and Telecommunications: Do We Have the Safeguards? — The Centre for Internet and Society, Cis-india.org (2021), <https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/privacy-telecommunications>

⁴²⁸Article 1(1) GDPR

⁴²⁹See Article 3 GDPR

⁴³⁰The Personal Data Protection Bill, §2, *supra* note 47.

proposed bill is the exclusion of “non-personal” data from the ambit of the Act which gives the Central government an impunity to deny protections provided under the Act to such data. It is submitted that the definition of the term non-personal data is quite vague and illusory at the same time. It is submitted that a piece of legislation that is being brought with the objective of protecting the personal data of the citizens and creating a healthy data protection regime, shouldn't include windows for enabling the breach of informational privacy by including the clauses like “non-personal” data⁴³¹ and exempting them from the application of the proposed Act. With extensive development in technology and advancement of artificial intelligence, even the data that doesn't have characteristic of individual identifiable information can be transformed into personal data⁴³². It is submitted that the possibility of misuse of the non-personal data shouldn't be ignored altogether. On the other hand, the GDPR, THE UK Data Protection Act and the US Privacy legislations don't provide for any such classification.

5.3.1 Personal Data, Non-Personal Data and Sensitive Data

One of the first loopholes in the proposed bill emerges in the form of a blanket ban on the application of the provisions on non-personal while blindly adopting the trends in global jurisdictions⁴³³. Before, commenting upon the aspects related to these definitions that may be detrimental to the prospects of an effective data protection regime in India, it would be optimal to discuss in a nutshell the definitions of these terms as proposed under the bill.

⁴³¹The Personal Data Protection Bill, §91, *supra* note 47.

⁴³²Ian Walden, Anonymizing Personal Data, 10 INT'L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 224, 229-233 (2002)

⁴³³Jürgen Schaaf and Thomas Meyer, Outsourcing to India: Crouching Tiger Set to Pounce, Deutsche Bank Research (Oct. 25, 2005), <http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBRINTERNETENPROD/PROD0000000000192125.pdf>.

5.3.1.1 Personal Data

The definition of personal data in the GDPR and the proposed bill are almost similar but what makes the Indian approach weaker is the inclusion of the concept of non-personal data. As per, the proposed Bill, provides comprehensive definition of the term personal data and expressly differentiates between personal data, non-personal data and sensitive data. The report relied extensively on the observations in Puttaswamy and reiterated that the, “*sphere of privacy includes a right to protect one’s identity*” and the definition of the personal data in the proposed bill is based on the same line of reasoning. As per the proposed bill:

“Personal data” means data about or relating to a natural person who is directly or indirectly identifiable, having regard to any characteristic, trait, attribute or any other feature of the identity of such natural person, whether online or offline, or any combination of such features with any other information, and shall include any inference drawn from such data for the purpose of profiling⁴³⁴.”

It may be noted that the term “personal data” has been given a very wide and meaning and refers to all the personally identifiable information that can be used either directly or indirectly to identify a natural person. It also covers within its scope all the data which when combined can be used to relate to any trait or characteristic of a natural person. The proposed bill does endorse the recommendation of BN Srikrishna Committee report that had suggested that a “flexible definition” of personal data must be laid down in the legislation. The report also clarified that the flexible definition must not come at the cost of certainty and at the same time it must be conducive to the incorporation of new technological developments that may alter the categories of data.⁴³⁵

⁴³⁴The Personal Data Protection Bill, §2(28), *supra* note 47.

⁴³⁵ Committee of Experts under the Chairmanship of Justice B.N. Srikrishna, A Free and Fair Digital Economy Protecting Privacy, Empowering Indians, (Jan. 20, 2020, 3:40 pm), https://meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Data_Protection_Committee_Report.pdf.

“definition of personal data centered on identifiability must be constructed with the full awareness that its scope will, in many cases, depend on the context, in which the relevant data is being processed. Bearing this mind, we believe that a broad and flexible definition of personal data should be adopted”

The proposed bill does incorporate all the recommendations regarding the width of the definition of personal data and, it must be acknowledged that the legislature, as far as the definition of personal data is concerned, the recommendations of the committee have been extensively incorporated. It is submitted that as far as the definition of personal data is concerned, the proposed Indian law and the GDPR have adopted a similar approach. The judicial precedents of the United States too seem to be following the same path.

5.3.1.2 Sensitive Data

The IT Act, 2000 and the SDPI Rules, 2011 do confer protection only to the personal data that is sensitive in its character. While recognizing the element of dignity attached to the right to privacy under the constitutional scheme, the SC in Puttaswamy has ensured greater protection to the data have direct bearing on the core traits of individuals. The BNSrikrishna Committee report, highlighted the point that, *“certain categories of personal data may be likely to cause greater harm, or harm of a graver nature⁴³⁶”* while endorsing the need for separate delineation of such data. As per, Rama Vedashree, *“concept of Sensitive Personal Data is primarily used for providing higher level protection to the data subject from instances of profiling, discrimination and infliction of harm that are identity driven⁴³⁷.”* The proposed bill defines sensitive information to include, biometric data, genetic data, health related information,

⁴³⁶ Aron Deep, *The dissenting voices in the Srikrishna Committee's Data Protection report*, MEDIANAMA (July 28, 2018), <https://www.medianama.com/2018/07/223-srikrishna-dissent/>.

⁴³⁷ *Id.*

information related to caste, religious belief, sex, sexual orientation, political affiliation, caste, intersex status or any other officially identifiable information.

5.3.1.3 Financial Data

The existing provisions concerning the right to data protection in India, do categorize the financial data as a sensitive data and thus provide them protection from unwarranted interferences. The personal data protection Bill, 2019 also recognizes the financial data as sensitive data. As per, the Bill, *“financial data” means any number or other personal data used to identify an account opened by, or card or payment instrument issued by a financial institution to a data principal or any personal data regarding the relationship between a financial institution and a data principal including financial status and credit history*⁴³⁸. This would mean that the PAN, Income tax details, bank details, insurance details and related information will be considered as sensitive data and thus there will be greater level of protection accorded to them.

Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)⁴³⁹, in the United States too grants a great degree of protection to the financial data of the citizens and mandates the credit rating agencies to guarantee confidentiality of the financial data of the customers. The Act also mandates that the credit agencies have to provide notification to the customers about the data that can be used against them. *“This obligation the part of the lenders to notify the consumers about the information that is used against them gives them an opportunity to know and if possible, challenge the information. The Act also imposes a duty upon the rating agencies to inform the consumers about the details of the information. One of the other ways in which the FCRA seeks to guarantee the privacy of the consumers is by assuring the confidentiality of the data*⁴⁴⁰”.

⁴³⁸The Personal Data Protection Bill, §2(18), *supra* note 47.

⁴³⁹15 U.S.C. §1681

⁴⁴⁰Supra Note

5.3.1.4 Health Data

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) does afford a great degree of protection to the personal health data of the individuals and bars their processing without consent. The fact that the medical history includes sensitive information about the medical and health background of the individuals makes their protection an indispensable aspect of right to privacy. The provisions of HIPAA ensure that the sensitive information related to the right to privacy are guaranteed ample protection. On the other hand, as we have observed in the provisions of the IT Act 2000 and the SDPI Rules, 2011 and the various rules of the medical council of India, there exists a contradiction amongst the provisions about the legality of the processing of health data. Even though the SDPI Rules, 2011 do categorize the data related to the medical history as sensitive data, the non-application of the provisions to the government agencies leaves a major window for privacy breach.

In the European Union as well, as we have observed in the previous chapters, the catena of judgments of the ECtHR have highlighted the importance of providing adequate protection to the data concerning medical history of the individuals⁴⁴¹. The draft bill takes a cautious approach while including all details related to the medical history of an individual and does include a very exhaustive definition of the health data. As per of the proposed bill, *“health data means the data related to the state of physical or mental health of the data principal and includes records regarding the past, present or future state of the health of such data principal, data collected in the course of registration for, or provision of health services, data associating the data principal to the provision of specific health services.”*⁴⁴²

It may be pointed out that the provision completely endorsed the fact that the event the minutest details relating to the medical history of an individual may be detrimental to the dignity of the individual and hence must be conferred greater protection. At this

⁴⁴¹K.H.and Others v. Slovakia, ECtHR, K.H.and Others v. Slovakia, No.32881/04, 28 April 2009

⁴⁴²The Personal Data Protection Bill, §2(21), *supra* note 47.

juncture, the judgment in *Mr. X v Hospital Z*⁴⁴³, where the SC had observed that the provision has been acknowledged in letter and spirit where in the SC had noted that,

*“Private facts may amount to an invasion of the Right of Privacy which may sometimes lead to the clash of one person's "right to be let alone" with another person's right to be informed. Disclosure of even true private facts has the tenancy to disturb a person's tranquility. It may generate many complexes in him and may even lead to psychological problems*⁴⁴⁴.

The proposed bill places the health-related data under the category of sensitive data and thus accords a greater level of protection to it⁴⁴⁵. The bill does strive to fulfill the existing void in the protection of sensitive nature of medical data which are recurrently governed by the IMC codes which are not adequate to confer protection and safeguards mechanism to sensitive medical data. Also, the present data protection regime absolutely offers no protection to the personal data in the public sector medical institutions, however as per the Preamble of the proposed bill, this void will no longer be in place and thus these safeguards will be applied to the public sector as well.

5.4 Data Anonymisation

The existing data protection regime in India offers a very negligible guide upon the existence of policy of anonymised data. Neither the Information Technology Act, 2000 nor the SDPI Rules 2011 have any provisions mandating data anonymisation. On the other hand, the global jurisprudence on the principles of data anonymisation is abundant and extremely well developed. But the GDPR as well prescribes that the anonymised data that cannot be brought back to its original form, should not be exempt from the application of the provisions of the regulation. The proposed bill

⁴⁴³ *Mr. X v. Hospital Z*, AIR 1999 SC 495.

⁴⁴⁴ *Id.*

⁴⁴⁵ The Personal Data Protection Bill, §3(21), *supra* note 47.

does incorporate the principle of data anonymisation to change the characteristic of the personal data. As per, the recommendations of the B N Sri Krishna committee which had suggested adherence to the principle of data anonymisation in order to curb the misuse of personally identifiable information. The Act provides a broad definition of data anonymisation and provides that:

“anonymisation” in relation to personal data, means such irreversible process of transforming or converting personal data to a form in which a data principal cannot be identified, which meets the standards of irreversibility specified by the Authority⁴⁴⁶;

While, the principle of data *anonymisation*, isn't peculiar to the data protection regimes all over the world, the tangled web of treachery by the state to process the personal data certainly is. The proposed bill at the first instance ignores the possibility of the de-anonymisation of the anonymised personal data through the technological developments in the future and proceeds with this unscientific presumption to compel any processor to share these anonymised personal data for the better targeting of the service⁴⁴⁷.

To put this in simpler terms, the central government can compel the data fiduciaries to share the anonymised and non-personal data of the citizens for the purposes of evidence-based policy making and better targeting of service. It is submitted that the proposed bill lacks a comprehensive definition of anonymised data and the non-personal data. The bill also ignores the possibility of process through which the anonymised and non-personal data could be turned into personally identifiable data. Equally worrying is the fact that the central government can compel the data fiduciaries to share the data in these categories for evidence-based policy making and better targeted of service⁴⁴⁸. The dissenting opinion of Justice Chandrachud in the

⁴⁴⁶The Personal Data Protection Bill, §3(2), *supra* note 47.

⁴⁴⁷The Personal Data Protection Bill, §91(1), *supra* note 47.

⁴⁴⁸The Personal Data Protection Bill, §91(1), *supra* note 47.

Aadhaar judgment had also expressed doubts over the irreversibility of the anonymised data.

5.4.1 Points of Concern

The most pressing concern regarding the non-personal data in general and the anonymised data in specific is the possibility of their conversion into personally identifiable information⁴⁴⁹. While, the opinion of the commentators all over the world has always been sceptical about the irreversibility of the anonymised data⁴⁵⁰, the bill while leaving these concerns unaddressed, brings in another window for injecting uncertainty into the data protection regime in the form of non-personal data. At the very outset, the finder would like to point out that the inclusion of terminologies like non-personal data was absolutely unnecessary and unworthy of a place in a data protection regime. As it will be noted in the subsequent chapters, it is highly likely that the Central government may harness the loophole to breach the informational privacy of the individuals⁴⁵¹.

The most formidable concern emerging out of the so-called anonymised data stems from the possibility of its reversibility. It may be noted at the outset that the definition of the anonymized data as adopted in the Bill is fallacious. The provision ought to expressly mention that for a data to be categorized as an anonymised data, "*it can be no longer be used to identify a natural person by using "all the means likely reasonably to be used."*⁴⁵²" Instead of coming up with an objective and wholesome standard for determining the nature of data, the provisions leaves it upon the Data Protection Authority to prescribe the standards for determining the standards of

⁴⁴⁹ Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: *Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization*, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1744-1769. (2010).

⁴⁵⁰ *Id.*

⁴⁵¹ *Id.*

⁴⁵² *Common Servs. Agency v. Scottish Info. Comm'r* [2008] UKHL 47.

irreversibility⁴⁵³. Moreover, the process of anonymisation is risk-free. It should be noted that a data which is of the non-personal nature in the current scenario, may obtain the character of personal data over a period of time⁴⁵⁴.

It may be thus observed that the legislature has left open a wide window through which the personally identifiable information under the disguise of non-personal and anonymized data may escape the application of the data protection law and thus jeopardize the fundamental rights of the individuals. One of the other worrying aspects of the bill is the power of the central government to classify data as sensitive data, which will be taken up later in discussion. However, the indifference of the legislature towards the risks posed by a cut and dried demarcation between the personal data and the anonymised data raises serious apprehensions about the effectiveness of the proposed data protection regime.

Unfortunately, the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019, in its current form, ignores the arguments against uniqueness of the biometric data, put forth by Justice Chandrachud and bases, the definition of biometric data on its ability to, “allow or confirm the unique identification of the individual.” The definition within the proposed bill provides that:

“Biometric data” means facial images, fingerprints, iris scans, or any other similar personal data resulting from measurements or technical processing operations carried out on physical, physiological, or behavioural characteristics of a data principal, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person;⁴⁵⁵”

⁴⁵³Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon & Alison Knight, *Anonymous Data v. Personal Data - False Debate: An EU Perspective on Anonymization, Pseudonymization and Personal Data*, 34 WIS. INT’LL.J. 284, 285-287 (2016).

⁴⁵⁴*Id.*

⁴⁵⁵The Personal Data Protection Bill, §3(7), *supra* note 47.

The definition of biometric data under the proposed bill is based on the premise that the biometric data includes only those data which allow the confirmation of the personal identification of natural persons. By doing this, the proposed bill virtually paves the gateway for excluding a large volume of personal data on the pretext of their inability to provide enough information about the identity of an individual. Nonetheless, as per the recommendations of the committee the bill includes biometric data within the meaning of sensitive data and hence pitch for a greater degree of protection for such data.

5.5 Rights of Data Principals

No data protection regime that restricts the rights of the data principals can be instrumental in shaping a robust data protection regime. The very concept of informational privacy is anchored around the theme of informational self-determination and a data protection law must not only recognize the rights of the data principals in the broadest sense; it should also provide adequate mechanisms to enforce these rights⁴⁵⁶. We have considered the scope of the rights of the Data Principals in the jurisdiction of the European Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. This section is invariably aimed at comparing the rights conferred upon the data owners all over the world and the Indian data protection regime. In order to widen the scope of our analysis the finder will also consider some of the BRICS countries' data protection legislations. The Personal Data Protection Bill, recognizes the following rights of the data principals namely: Right to be forgotten⁴⁵⁷, the right to correction and erasure⁴⁵⁸, the right to confirmation and access⁴⁵⁹ and the right to data portability⁴⁶⁰. It may be pointed out that the scope and extent of the rights recognized by the proposed law are quite limited.

⁴⁵⁶Peter Blume, Practical Data Protection, 2 Int'l J.L. & Info. Tech. 194 (1994); Rupert Battcock, Data Protection: Where Next, 3 Int'l J.L. & Info. Tech. 156 (1995); Anneliese Roos, Core Principles of Data Protection Law, 39 Comp. & Int'l L.J. S. Afr. 102 (2006).

⁴⁵⁷The Personal Data Protection Bill, §20, *supra* note 47.

⁴⁵⁸The Personal Data Protection Bill, §18, *supra* note 47.

⁴⁵⁹The Personal Data Protection Bill, §17, *supra* note 47.

⁴⁶⁰The Personal Data Protection Bill, §19, *supra* note 47.

5.5.1 Principles for Protection of Individual's Data

As of today, the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and procedures and sensitive personal data or information) Rules, 2011 do provide a very a very restricted notion of the rights afforded to the data principal. The provisions of the bill, do adopt an abridged

version of the rights of the data principals, which might be detrimental to the objective of a robust data protection regime in India. Thus, it becomes optimal to have adopted a liberal approach in recognizing the rights of the data principals. The rights guaranteed under the proposed bill concerning the right to correction, completion, updation and erasure of data have substantially been curtailed under the provisions of the bill. This right of the data principal has been made conditional upon the obligations of the data fiduciary. The provision places forth a complex web of procedure for enforcement of the right, which is unbecoming of a robust data protection regime.

What reaffirms the proposition of the finder that the Personal Data Protection Bill 2019, is actually a data grab bill is the sheer indifference of the legislature towards the rights of the data principal. The bill recognizes a fairly low number of rights of the data principal and thus leaves a wider room for abuse of the right to privacy by the data fiduciaries. However, it must be noted that the application of these rights are quite limited in their scope and thus there is a need to adopt an exhaustive sets of rights of the data principals under the bill. The following rights of the data principals could be incorporated for creating a data protection regime that is "protective" of the rights of the data principals in the truest sense⁴⁶¹. The bill recognizes The right to informed consent, The right to data security, The right to Informational Privacy, The right to know, Right to object, Right to free withdrawal of consent, Right to informational self-determination.

⁴⁶¹Sreenidhi Srinivasan and Namrata Mukherjee, *Building an effective data protection regime*, VIDHI CENTRE FOR LEGAL POLICY, New Delhi (2017).

Interestingly, one may find some of these rights in the form of obligation for data fiduciary within the bill, however, it is submitted that the inclusion of these principles within the rights of the data principal will accord them a greater protection against the threats to the right to privacy⁴⁶². It is submitted that, in order to have a robust data protection regime in India, the bill must not shy away from granting the data principals adequate rights so as to empower them to take recourse to the law in case of even a minimal breach of data privacy⁴⁶³. While, it is appreciable that the bill includes the concepts such as privacy by design and notifications about the breach under the obligations of data fiduciaries, the failure on the part of the legislature to adopt same principles within the framework of rights of the data principal doesn't serve the cause of a healthy data protection regime⁴⁶⁴. Hence, the legislature should make it a point to include these exhaustive rights within the rights of the data principals so as to accord a greater degree of protection to the rights of the data principals. This would also rightfully tilt the balance of convenience in favor of the data principals as against the existing position.

Contrast it with the rights conferred upon the data principals in the GDPR. The GDPR doesn't mince its words and provides a very wide meaning to the rights of the data principals. It provides as many as 12 rights to the data principals including the right to erasure and the right to data portability, these rights are notably omitted in the proposed Indian data protection regime.

The Indian awakening about the right to privacy has been rather delayed by over at least three decades⁴⁶⁵. One of the most notable objectives behind introduction of the personal data protection bill, 2019 is to promote consciousness among the Indians

⁴⁶²Nandan Nilekani, *Data to the People: India's Inclusive Internet*, 97 *FOREIGN AFF.* 19 (2018).

⁴⁶³*Id.*

⁴⁶⁴Umang Joshi, *Online Privacy and Data Protection in India: A Legal Perspective*, 7 *NUAL SL.* J. 95 (2013).

⁴⁶⁵*Id.*

about the importance of right to privacy and affording adequate security to the personal data. However, the proposed bill doesn't seem to do enough to meet its noble objectives. What India needs today is a robust data protection regime that is extremely sensitive to the rights of the data principal, a law that would not only protect the citizens from possible data breaches but also empower them to detect and seek remedies against the breach of right to privacy. The bill proposes to adopt an approach that would virtually make it impossible for a majority of the Indians who live below poverty line to spend money for getting their rights under the proposed Act enforced. The proposed bill categorically states that it is open for the government to allow the data fiduciaries to impose fees on the data principals, if at all they wish to get their recognized rights under the bill to be enforced⁴⁶⁶. It is submitted that the legislature has not taken into the account, the indifference of Indian population towards their right to privacy and posed another barrier in the pursuit of getting their rights under the upcoming regime to be enforced. It is extremely difficult to comprehend that a Data Protection regime would expect, the data principals, who are least aware about their privacy right, will have to pay fees to their data fiduciaries to get their "own rights" enforced⁴⁶⁷. It is submitted that the legislature must do away with the clause of "fees" in order to show its commitment to informational self-determination.

The General Data Protection Law, GDPR also includes a wider range of principles for processing of personal data and stipulates that the data has to be processed in accordance with the principles of purpose limitation, transparency, fairness and lawfulness.⁴⁶⁸ Notably, the GDPR also provides that the data principal will be entitled to seek any information about data free of cost, unlike the proposed personal Indian Data Protection law that seeks to dis-incentivize the data principals including the provision for imposition of fees by data processors for providing any information about the data. The GDPR is miles ahead of its supposed Indian counterpart when it

⁴⁶⁶The Personal Data Protection Bill, §21(2), *supra* note 47.

⁴⁶⁷ Stephen Mason, *Electronic Signatures in Law*, School of Advanced Study, University of London, 2016, pp. 387–396. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv5137w8.23. (Accessed 13 February 2020)

⁴⁶⁸ Article 46, GDPR (Brazil)

comes to affording respect to the notion of individual's control of their data. It provides that the data has to be processed only with the consent of the data principals barring very few instances. Moreover, the data processor is under an obligation to inform the data principal about the breaches of data in every case without any exception whatsoever. It must be pointed out that the GDPL puts the data principal in the drivers' seat as far as the processing of data is concerned and vests under them the authority to give and withdraw their consent for processing of data anytime⁴⁶⁹. It should be noted that this aspect of the Brazilian law is strictly in resonance with the principles of informational self-determination unlike the Personal Data Protection Bill.

The GDPL provides that the requirement of the consent of the data principal will not be necessary for the processing of personal data only in a very limited number of cases. The Article 11 provides that⁴⁷⁰

“The processing of sensitive personal data shall only occur in the following situations: I – when the data subject or her/his legal representative specifically and distinctly consents, for the specific purposes; without consent from the data subject, in the situations when it is indispensable for:

- a) controller's compliance with a legal or regulatory obligation;*
- b) shared processing of data, when necessary, by the public administration for the execution of public policies provided in laws or regulations;*
- c) studies carried out by a research entity, whenever possible ensuring the anonymization of sensitive personal data;*

⁴⁶⁹Article 13, GDPL (Brazil)

⁴⁷⁰Article 11, GDPL (Brazil)

d) the regular exercise of rights, including in a contract and in a judicial, administrative and arbitration procedure, the last in accordance with the terms of Law No. 9,307, of September 23, 1996.”

One may notice the striking difference between the standards set out by the Brazilian legislature while determining the cases wherein there can be a deviation from the principle of informational self-determination. To the contrary of the Indian approach, the Brazilian law prohibits the processing of sensitive data without the consent of the data principal except in just 4 cases. These exceptions are quite justified for the functioning of a state and they are on the lines of grounds identified under the GDPR.

5.6 Obligations of Data Fiduciary

The proposed bill seeks to place obligations upon the data fiduciaries in as much as processing of personal data is concerned. As we have already discussed under the previous chapter, the global data protection regimes are based upon the data protection principles that are aimed at maximizing the scope of data protection. In a nutshell, this section shall analyze the principles that the present Personal data protection bill propose to adopt in the Indian data protection law regime. At the onset, it must be acknowledged that the Bill takes all the eight data protection principles enshrined under the European laws and seeks to mould them into the Indian scheme. Nonetheless, it would be fair to have a brief overview of these principles as they have been adopted under the proposed bill.

5.6.1 The lawfulness, fairness and transparency of processing principle

The principal bars processing of personal data and only in cases where such processing is *necessary, specific and lawful*, such processing is allowed⁴⁷¹. The section 5 of the proposed bill seeks to incorporate the fairness principle and provides

⁴⁷¹Evans, A.C. "European Data Protection Law." 29 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 570, 571-82 (1981).

that every person processing personal data must do so in just, fair and reasonable manner in order to ensure that the privacy of the data subject is not violated. What would qualify as the “just, fair and reasonable manner” is not explicit and will have to be interpreted from the judicial precedents. As per the precedents, the test of arbitrariness would be applied by the courts to decide whether the data has been processed in a lawful and fair manner.

The genesis of the concept of “consent” can be traced in the Indian constitutional scheme in the Puttaswamy judgment itself. While emphasizing on the aspect of consent, Justice Nariman observed, “*informational privacy... does not deal with a person’s body but deals with a person’s mind, and therefore recognizes that an individual may have control over the dissemination of material that is personal to him. Unauthorised use of such information may, therefore lead to infringement of this right*⁴⁷².”

5.6.1.1 The Principle of Purpose Limitation

The proposed bill provides that when the data subject has consented to processing of data, such data shall not be used for any purpose other than the one for which the consent was given. Although, it allows that processing can be done for the purpose incidental to the actual purpose for which the consent was given. We’d have to extensively rely upon the precedents from the European and US courts to analyze the court’s interpretation of the purpose limitation principle. However, it is highly likely that the courts will follow the established principles from these jurisdictions. The Bill in clear terms incorporates the principle of data minimization and provides,

for the purpose consented to by the data principal or which is incidental to or connected with such purpose, and which the data principal would reasonably expect that such personal data shall be used for, having

⁴⁷²KSPuttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 01, 132.

*regard to the purpose, and in the context and circumstances in which the personal data was collected*⁴⁷³.

Further, the bill provides “*the personal data shall be collected only to the extent that is necessary for the purposes of processing of such personal data*”⁴⁷⁴. The provisions do promise a data protection regime that would give to individuals complete autonomy of deciding by whom will their data be processed, the purpose for which their data shall be processed. However, as we shall note in the upcoming section, this benign beginning doesn’t live up to the promise that it makes to the citizens.

5.6.1.2 Storage Limitation Principle

The proposed bill incorporates the storage limitation principle as well and places upon the data fiduciaries an obligation of not retaining the personal data after the completion of the purpose for which it was collected⁴⁷⁵. A parallel between the GDPR and the present regulation can be drawn to suggest that the Indian data protection regime is all set to follow the European model as far as the data processing by the data and data autonomy is concerned. Although, time will tell how the courts in India will interpret these principles, a close look at the principle of data autonomy and informational self-determination recognized in Puttaswamy may be helpful in giving an insight into the importance of storage limitation principle. It is submitted that as far as the obligations of the data controllers are concerned, the proposed Indian law appears to be in synergy with the global best practice.

5.7 Element of Consent and Processing of Data Without Consent

Element of consent is the sine qua non of every robust data protection regime. The GDPR contains a very limited definite set of grounds in which the data can be processed without the consent of the data owner. Similarly, in the United States as

⁴⁷³The Personal Data Protection Bill, §5(b), *supra* note 47.

⁴⁷⁴The Personal Data Protection Bill, §6, *supra* note 47.

⁴⁷⁵The Personal Data Protection Bill, §9(4), *supra* note 47.

well, as we have noticed earlier, the grounds for processing data without the consent are extremely limited. On the other hand, the IT Act 2000 sends this principle for a toss and there is no requirement of consent at all, when the processor is the government. However, while the proposed Act does inculcate the principle of consent, there are few points of concern. The Section 11 of the proposed bill is based on the principle of data autonomy as recognized by the Supreme Court in *K.S. Puttaswamy*.⁴⁷⁶ It bars the processing of personal data except when the consent for the same has been validly obtained by the data processor. The provision delves in the details as to how and when can the personal data be processed with the consent and the manner and medium in which such consent is supposed to be obtained. The provision places the

⁴⁷⁶“The Personal Data Protection Bill, § 11, *supra* note 47.

- (1) The personal data shall not be processed, except on the consent given by the data principal at the commencement of its processing.
- (2) The consent of the data principal shall not be valid, unless such consent is—
 - (a) free, having regard to whether it complies with the standards specified under section 14 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872;
 - (b) informed, having regard to whether the data principal has been provided with the information required under section 7;
 - (c) specific, having regard to whether the data principal can determine the scope of consent in respect of the purpose of processing;
 - (d) clear, having regard to whether it is indicated through an affirmative action that is meaningful in a given context; and
 - (e) capable of being withdrawn, having regard to whether the ease of such withdrawal is comparable to the ease with which consent may be given. Restriction on retention of personal data. Accountability of data fiduciary. Consent necessary for processing of personal data. Quality of personal data processed. 9 of 1872
- (3) In addition to the provisions contained in sub-section (2), the consent of the data principal in respect of processing of any sensitive personal data shall be explicitly obtained—
 - (a) after informing him the purpose of, or operation in, processing which is likely to cause significant harm to the data principal;
 - (b) in clear terms without recourse to inference from conduct in a context; and
 - (c) after giving him the choice of separately consenting to the purposes of, operations in, the use of different categories of, sensitive personal data relevant to processing.
- (4) The provision of any goods or services or the quality thereof, or the performance of any contract, or the enjoyment of any legal right or claim, shall not be made conditional on the consent to the processing of any personal data not necessary for that purpose.
- (5) The burden of proof that the consent has been given by the data principal for processing of the personal data under this section shall be on the data fiduciary.
- (6) Where the data principal withdraws his consent from the processing of any personal data without any valid reason, all legal consequences for the effects of such withdrawal shall be borne by such data principal.”

burden of proving that a valid consent for processing of data was obtained, entirely upon the data fiduciary. Also, the text of section 11 in clear terms specifies that the data fiduciary is under an obligation to inform the data subject about the purpose for which the data is being processed and bars enjoyment of any goods, services and legal right conditional upon such consent of processing. An exhaustive analysis of the section 11 of the proposed bill does indicate that the legislation does promise adequate ample protection to the citizens as far as their control on their data is concerned. However, the benign beginnings anchored around the concept of consent do come to a shocking end in the very next provision. The rights accorded to the individuals in the private domain are on the lines of protection accorded to data subjects in the GDPR., however things do take a disappointing turn when one analyzes the provisions where the data can be processed without the consent of data subjects.

5.7.1 Grounds for Processing of Personal Data Without Consent

It is submitted that an express threat of liability of the legal consequences arising out of the withdrawal doesn't in any way amount to "free consent." One can't be expected to make a free choice of withdrawal of consent with the sword of litigation hanging over their head. The Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 ought to have taken into consideration, the underlying meaning of the term "liable for all legal consequences" which would have an effect of putting the data principal into a constant threat of legal repercussions. While, it is not being suggested that the data principal should be able to withdraw their consent abruptly without any genuine reasons, to put the interests of other stakeholder in jeopardy out of malafide reasons but it should be pointed out that the bill lacks any comprehensive framework for determining what exactly would be a "valid reason" and who would decide the validity of the reason.⁴⁷⁷ The legislature must take into account the fact that the data principal is the sole owner of their data and they must not be put to peril, in rightfully deciding to withdraw their consent for sharing something which is entirely theirs'. It is submitted that the legislature should come up with a more human text as far as the consequences of withdrawal are

⁴⁷⁷*Id.*

concerned, the text could be limited to the consequences of contractual obligations in order to accord the scope of free consent a true meaning. Also, the legislature should lay down broad guidelines regulating the meaning of “valid reason” for the purposes of the Act.

Grounds of Processing of Personal Data Without Consent: A very succinct method to gauge the effectiveness of any Data Protection legislation is to analyze the tilt of balance of convenience in favor of the data principals. With, Consent being a cornerstone of the “informational self-determination”, it acts as the most vital component of every data protection legislation⁴⁷⁸.

In what came as a rude shock to most of the commentators in the field, the proposed a wide range of exceptions wherein the data of the individuals may be processed without obtaining their consent⁴⁷⁹. The Chapter titled as “Grounds for processing of personal data without consent in certain cases.” lays down a very extensive list of the grounds that prima facie appears to be very loosely defined.

*“(a) for the performance of any function of the State authorised by law for—
(i) the provision of any service or benefit to the data principal from the State; or (ii) the issuance of any certification, licence or permit for any action or activity of the data principal by the State; (b) under any law for the time being in force made by the Parliament or any State Legislature; or (c) for compliance with any order or judgment of any Court or Tribunal in India; (d) to respond to any medical emergency involving a threat to the life or a severe threat to the health of the data principal or any other individual; (e) to undertake any measure to provide medical treatment or health services to any individual during an epidemic, outbreak of disease or any other threat to public health; or (f) to undertake any measure to ensure safety*

⁴⁷⁸Jonathan Miller, S., *How Did You Know That: Protecting Privacy Interests of Research Participants via Certificates of Confidentiality*, 17 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 90, 99-103 (2015).

⁴⁷⁹The Personal Data Protection Bill, §12, *supra* note 47.

of, or provide assistance or services to, any individual during any disaster or any breakdown of public order⁴⁸⁰.”

The provision has been describing as a traditional data grab law by a noted commentator, while Justice B N Sri Krishna himself, under whose chairmanship the recommendation of the proposed bill was prepared noted that the bill in its current form is going to turn India into an Orwellian state⁴⁸¹. In the upcoming sections we shall analyze the validity of these clauses which virtually seek to deprive the individuals from their information autonomy based upon the principles espoused in K S Puttaswamy. In order to have a fair understanding of the circumstances in which the data of the individuals can be processed without their consent, a detailed analysis of the law laid down in K S Puttaswamy needs to be done.

5.7.2 Importance of Informational Self Determination

In the following analysis we shall stick to analyzing the opinions of the SC judges and the precedents that they have relied upon in order to assess the provisions of the upcoming bill. Particularly in the opinions of Justice Kaul, Justice Narimana and Justice Chandrachud, the dignity related aspects of informational self-determination were discussed extensively.

The SC has been of the opinion that the consent of an individual is the most crucial aspect of informational privacy⁴⁸². Most notable was the observation of justice

⁴⁸⁰The Personal Data Protection Bill, §35, *supra* note 47.

⁴⁸¹Meghna Mandavia, “Personal Data Protection Bill can turn India into ‘Orwellian State’: Justice BN Srikrishna” THE ECONOMIC TIMES, Dec 12, 2019, 11.34 AM IST https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/personal-data-protection-bill-can-turn-india-into-orwellian-state-justice-bn-srikrishna/articleshow/72483355.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

⁴⁸²Kharak Singh v. State of UP, 1963 AIR 1295. “Citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his home, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and education among other matters. None can publish anything concerning the above matters without his consent — whether truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory or critical. If he does so, he would be violating the right to privacy of the person concerned and would be liable in an action for damages”.

Nariman in Aadhar judgement wherein he observed that the right to control the dissemination of information is an inherent aspect of right to privacy and it is the right to data subject to be informed about the purposes for which his personal data is going to be used. He observed that:

“an aspect of privacy [is] the right to control dissemination of personal information. The boundaries that people establish from others in society are not only physical but also informational. There are different kinds of boundaries in respect to different relations. It is but essential that the individual knows as to what the data is being used for and with the ability to correct and amend it”⁴⁸³.

5.8 A Critique of Provisions of the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 Enabling Processing of Personal Data Without Consent.

Right to Privacy is not an absolute right and the reason why every data protection legislation has got to have some exceptions.⁴⁸⁴ The practical needs of a democracy mandate that certain aspects of right to privacy have to be diluted for the greater good. This is the reason why the robust data protection regimes prohibit the processing of data except in the lawful ways. While consent for processing the personal data of individual is one of the most common preconditions for processing, there are globally recognized exceptions wherein the data can be processed even without the consent of the individuals. However, these grounds are quite limited and are restricted to the following grounds. The GDPR provides that the data can be processed without the consent of the individuals for fulfilling their contractual obligations⁴⁸⁵, for protecting the vital interests of the individuals⁴⁸⁶, the legitimate

⁴⁸³KSPuttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 01, 224.

⁴⁸⁴*Id.*

⁴⁸⁵General Data Protection Regulation, Article 6 (EU 2016)

⁴⁸⁶*Id.*

interests of the state⁴⁸⁷ and public interest⁴⁸⁸. The regulation also provides that “*when such a restriction respects the essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms and is a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to safeguard*” meaning thereby that there can be only proportionate restrictions on the enforcement of the right to privacy.

The majority in Puttaswamy relied on the aspect of dignity attached to the informed consent quoted Justice La Forest, “*the use of a person's body without his consent to obtain information about him, invades an area of personal privacy essential to the maintenance of his human dignity*”⁴⁸⁹.” The sole theme of the judgment revolves around the ability of the individual to have an informed and meaningful control over their data. In the following sections we will analyze how do the provisions enshrined within the third chapter of the Bill run contrary to the theme of judgment in KS Puttaswamy and the challenges that these provisions may face in the constitutional courts in the upcoming days.

As per, the bill personal data of the individual may be processed, “*under any law for the time being in force made by the Parliament or any State Legislature*”⁴⁹⁰ which virtually means that the provision authorizes the state to grab the data of the individuals under any law that it decides to make in future. The clause “any law” is very wide and gives the impunity to the state to process the personal data without consent. This clause ignores the theme of the majority opinion in KS Puttaswamy or not is a topic of separate analysis and shall be taken up in the next chapter. However, here we will restrict the discussion to the “minimal importance” accorded to the right to informational self-determination in the legislation.

Justice Kaul had unequivocally highlighted the importance of informational privacy and attached it to the decisional autonomy of the individual while noting that,

⁴⁸⁷ *Id.*

⁴⁸⁸ *Id.*

⁴⁸⁹ LYNDON MAITHER, “THE 325”: THE SUPREME COURT AND OUR CRIMINAL CODE AND ORS.

⁴⁹⁰ The Personal Data Protection Bill, §12(b), *supra* note 47.

“informational privacy...does not deal with a person’s body but deals with a person’s mind, and therefore recognizes that an individual may have control over the dissemination of material that is personal to him. Unauthorised use of such information may, therefore lead to infringement of this right⁴⁹¹. The very fact that the proposed bill creates a window for processing of personal data under “any law” that the state makes cast serious doubts about the efficiency of the data protection regime that is going to come in place in India.

Unlike the European data protection regime that recognizes the aspect of consent as an inherent facet of informational autonomy, the proposed bill seeks to confine the issue of consent only to the private domain. Justice Chandrachud had also noted the European data protection regime where consent forms the basis of personal data processing while noting that, *“The State must ensure that information is not used without the consent of users and that it is used for the purpose and to the extent it was disclosed.”⁴⁹²* The proposition once again highlights that the consent is an essential component for processing the data of the individuals.

One of the most concerning aspects of the current data protection bill are the grounds under which the personal data of an individual may be processed without their consent. On the same lines the bill proposes to give wide range of exemptions from the application of the Act as enshrined under chapter VII of the Act. The exceptions proposed by the Act are quite broad and give widespread powers to the central government to exempt any authority from the authority of the Act. Before analyzing the constitutional validity of these provisions, the proposed provisions for exemptions need a brief analysis. Section 35 of the proposed Bill provides to exempt any agency from the operation of the Act and provides that:

“Where the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient, —

⁴⁹¹KSPuttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 01, 224., 68.

⁴⁹²KSPuttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 01, 224., 637.

(i) in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or (ii) for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, it may, by order, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that all or any of the provisions of this Act shall not apply to any agency of the Government in respect of processing of such personal data, as may be specified in the order subject to such procedure, safeguards and oversight mechanism to be followed by the agency, as may be prescribed.

Explanation.: For the purposes of this section, (i) the term "cognizable offence" means the offence as defined in clause (c) of section 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; (ii) the expression "processing of such personal data" includes sharing by or sharing with such agency of the Government by any data fiduciary, data processor or data principal⁴⁹³".

The proposed section seeks to effectively empower the central government to allow any of its agencies to process the personal data of the individuals without any scant reference to the doctrine of proportionality at all. It is submitted that these widespread exemptions will negate the very purpose of the new data protection regime in the country.

However, the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 lays down an extremely long list of cases wherein the data can be processed without the consent of the individuals. The Section 12(b) provides that personal data can be processed without the consent of the data principal, ".....under any law for the time being in force made by the Parliament or any State Legislature."⁴⁹⁴ This would effectually mean that the central and state

⁴⁹³The Personal Data Protection Bill, §12(b), *supra* note 47.

⁴⁹⁴The Personal Data Protection Bill, §12(b), *supra* note 47.

governments will be at the liberty to process the personal data of the citizens under any law that is in force for the time being. Such wide windows for processing of personal data without the consent of the data principal will nullify the very purpose behind having a data protection legislation. If even after such a maneuver, the personal data of the citizens can be processed without the consent, under the shield of any law enacted by the central and state governments? It is submitted that the legislature should restrict the grounds for processing of personal data without the consent of the individuals to the grounds identified under the GDPR. The provisions in the present form, will not serve the cause of setting up a truly effective data protection regime in India unless the legislature gives adequate recognition to the element of consent for processing of personal data.

5.9 Sand box Clauses

The concept of Regulatory Sand Box is one of the newest features of the proposed Data Protection Bill, 2019. The bill allows the data fiduciaries which have implemented the Privacy by Design policy to create a sandbox for the purposes of encouraging innovation. Commentators have expressed serious doubts about the meaning of term “Sandbox” and the implications of its inclusion within the data protection bill⁴⁹⁵. While, the concept of Sandbox might be a new entrant to the Indian domain of data protection, it is a well-known concept in the arena of financial regulators⁴⁹⁶. The term regulatory sandbox is used to denote a safe haven that would encourage research and innovation to find out the ways in which new methods for complying with the legislative requirements can be generated. Usually, the sandboxes

⁴⁹⁵ Cheng-Yun Tsang, From Industry Sandbox to Supervisory Control Box: Rethinking the Role of Regulators in the Era of FinTech, 2019 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 355, 356-359 (2019).

⁴⁹⁶ Regulatory Sandboxes in Data Protection: Constructive Engagement and Innovative Regulation in Practice CIPL, CENTRE FOR INFORMATION AND POLICY LEADERSHIP, 2019, https://www.informationpolicycentre.com/uploads/5/7/1/0/57104281/cipl_white_paper_on_regulatory_sandboxes_in_data_protection_constructive_engagement_and_innovative_regulation_in_practice_8_march_2019_.pdf.

do have a specific objective to achieve such as in case of data protection they might refer to “*innovations regarding more secure process of data processing*⁴⁹⁷” etc.

However, while the rationale behind the Sandbox clause may be benign, the proposed bill doesn't contain the guidelines that would govern the methods that will guide the implementation of these suggestions. Indian legislature could take a leaf from the approach of jurisdictions like Singapore and Finland⁴⁹⁸. It is submitted that the Proposed Bill doesn't take into considerations, the apprehensions raise by TRAI recommendations about the possible abuse of the data obtained through the sand box⁴⁹⁹. It is submitted that the legislature should take into account these threats and provide for a regulatory framework governing the data sandboxes. The provision in the current form provides that, “*The Authority shall, for the purposes of encouraging innovation in artificial intelligence, machine-learning or any other emerging technology in public interest, create a Sandbox*⁵⁰⁰”.

It is submitted that the provision is silent upon the vital aspects of the data sandboxes such as the mechanisms, access and requirement of setting up of data sandboxes find no mention in the bill. Following are some of the risks that are inherently associated with the data sandboxes.

- Allowing the companies to set up data sandboxes to create anonymous data may be instrumental in clogging the investments in the digital arena.
- The data aggregation and possibility of reversibility of the anonymisation process may open up avenues for profiling and mass surveillance.

It is submitted that the bill lays down detailed guidelines relating to the sandbox do clear the substantiated apprehensions of clogging investments and enabling profiling.

⁴⁹⁷*Id.*

⁴⁹⁸*Supra* note 165.

⁴⁹⁹See, TRAI Recommendations on Privacy, Security and Ownership of the Data in the Telecom Sector, TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA, 52 2018, https://www.trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/RecommendationDataPrivacy16072018_0.pdf

⁵⁰⁰The Personal Data Protection Bill, §40, *supra* note 47.

5.10 Data Protection Authority

The data protection authorities in most of the developed data protection regimes are an indispensable aspect of protection of data privacy and implementation of regulations under the regime⁵⁰¹. An independent data protection authority is the most important aspect of the data protection framework in any jurisdiction and thus it was expected that creation of a truly independent data protection authority would be the most crucial aspect of the data protection legislation. It is an established principle that “*the independence of the national regulatory authorities should be strengthened in order to ensure a more effective application of the regulatory framework and to increase their authority and the predictability of their decisions*”⁵⁰². Recently, the CJEU, in *European Commission v. Austria*⁵⁰³, reiterated the importance of the independence of the data protection authority while observing that the data protection authorities, “*must enjoy an independence allowing them to perform their duties free from external influence.*” The very foundation of a genuinely benign data protection legislation is the creation of a regulatory authority that is independent enough to implement the envisaged provisions. While, independence is a very subjective concept, the following extract from the explanatory report optimally highlights the aspects of independence⁵⁰⁴.

"A number of elements contribute to safeguarding the independence of the supervisory authority in the exercise of its functions. These could include the composition of the authority, the method for appointing its members, the duration of exercise and conditions of cessation of their functions, the allocation of sufficient resources to the authority or the

⁵⁰¹GREENLEAF, G., *ASIAN DATA PRIVACY LAWS: TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE* 212 (1st ed. 2014).

⁵⁰²Supra at 218.

⁵⁰³*Commission v. Austria* (2005) C-147/03.

⁵⁰⁴Additional Protocol to Convention 108, Explanatory Report ¶17 (EU 2018).

adoption of decisions without being subject to external orders or injunctions."

The following observations do describe in a nutshell how a data protection authority must be formed and the ways in which it must be molded to felicitate a healthy data protection regime. The essential factors influencing the of a data protection authority include its composition, the staffing of the authority, the financial structure of the authority and powers of the authority. However, the data protection authority envisaged by the proposed data protection bill have come as a rude shock and they don't assimilate any of these features in the Indian scheme.

5.10.1 Powers, Functions and Independence of Data Protection Authority

The Chapter 6 of the GDPR lays down comprehensive guidelines for the composition, task, competence and independence of the supervisory authority. The regulation provides for a decentralized selection process and specifically empower the members of the authority to act independently⁵⁰⁵ by providing that:

"The member or members of each supervisory authority shall, in the performance of their tasks and exercise of their powers in accordance with this Regulation, remain free from external influence, whether direct or indirect, and shall neither seek nor take instructions from anybody⁵⁰⁶".

The language of the Article forms the backbone of the independence of the DPA in the European Union. Couched in a very wide and unambiguous language, the regulation directs that the supervisory authority would be free from all kinds of external interferences and will not be under an obligation to follow instructions of

⁵⁰⁵Article 52 GDPR

⁵⁰⁶Article 52(2) GDPR

anybody. Moreover, the GDPR lays down detailed provisions that would ensure the financial and infrastructural independence of the authority⁵⁰⁷.

The BN Sri Krishna Committee had envisaged a data protection authority that is an independent regulatory body that would have enough powers and autonomy to promote a healthy data protection regime in the country.⁵⁰⁸ Further the committee had envisaged the following roles for the authority:

- Adequate power to monitor, enforce and investigate privacy breaches
- Awareness generation amongst the citizens about the importance of privacy
- Standard setting through an objective methodology

The legal commentators were of the opinion that the body must be independent in the truest sense and able enough to promote a healthier data protection regime in the country.⁵⁰⁹ As per the recommendations, the composition of the committee ought to have members from all the organs of the state and adequate technical and legal expertise⁵¹⁰. The selection of the board of Data Protection Authority as per the recommendation of the committee had to be made by a selection committee which would be headed by the Chief Justice of India or his nominee. However, the proposed data protection does away with any such requirements and provides that the authority would be appointed by the central government.⁵¹¹ This raises some very serious questions about the independence of the authority. Unlike the other independent authorities in India, whose selections are made by joint committee that involves the members of the opposition parties and judiciary, the board will just prove to be an extension of the executive branch. The proposed bill seeks to give the central

⁵⁰⁷ Article 52(5) GDPR

⁵⁰⁸ White Paper of the Committee of Experts on a Data Protection Framework for India, Part IV Chapter 2 (2017),

https://meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/white_paper_on_data_protection_in_india_171127_final_v2.pdf

⁵⁰⁹ *Id.*

⁵¹⁰ *Id.*

⁵¹¹ The Personal Data Protection Bill, §45, *supra* note 47.

government the power to appoint, dismiss and pay the salary of the members of board which means that the board of the authorities will comprise of nominees of the central government itself. How exactly would these employees of the government be able to decide that the state is complying with the provisions of the Act? The power of central government to recruit and dismiss the members of the authority will reduce it to a ceremonial body and its existence shall always feature as the blackest spot of the data protection bill in India. The importance of having a non-partisan select committee, the nature of office and composition of the authority are the most notable aspects of independence of any regulatory authority.

*“The guarantee of independence is, in fact, primarily assured by the procedure of nomination and removal of the officers of the DPAs. The control over financial resources represents a second relevant element in ensuring the autonomy of supervisory authorities”.*⁵¹²

The provisions of data protection bill have blurred the hope of an independent data protection regime in India and the completely bureaucratic composition of the authority will reduce it to a mere ceremonial body and in stark defiance of the principles of natural justice, the government itself shall be adjudicating against its own potential breaches of the provisions of the data protection legislation. It is submitted that these select committee must consider the seriousness of the independence of the data protection authority and make the necessary changes on the lines of suggestions made by the B N Sri Krishna Committee and the existing judicial precedents from the European Union. Only then shall India be able to create a truly effective data protection regime in the long run. The present provisions that seek to extend the executive set up to the adjudicatory mechanism in the data protection regime will do a huge disservice to the cause of right to data privacy.

⁵¹² FRA, Data Protection in the European Union: The role of National Data Protection Authorities. Strengthening the fundamental rights architecture in the EU II, 8 (Luxembourg Publications Office 2010).

The Supreme Court of India while criticizing the lack of an independent regulatory authority under the Aadhar Act had shed some light on the importance of an autonomous monitoring authority by noting that having a well-structured data protection authority is quintessential to any robust data protection regime. It is only under the vigil of a competent an independent data protection authority that the individuals will be able to seek remedies under the Act.

“Whether it is against UIDAI or a private entity, it is critical that the individual retains the right to seek compensation and justice. This would require a carefully designed structure. An independent and autonomous authority is needed to monitor the compliance of the provisions of any statute, which infringes the privacy of an individual. A fair data protection regime requires establishment of an independent authority to deal with the contraventions of the data protection framework as well as to proactively supervise its compliance⁵¹³.”

The Supreme Court repeatedly stressed upon the importance of “independence” of the data protection authority and highlighted the nature of the office that the data protection authority would hold in a data protection regime. In its considered opinion, the SC observed that the role of the data protection authority would include adjudicating upon the disputes that arise in course of the data protection law. One of the reasons behind the greater emphasis on the term “independence” is the need for an autonomous body to impartially adjudicate the disputes between the state and the citizens as far as the disputes relating to the violations under the proposed law are concerned.

“Independent monitoring authority must be required to prescribe the standards against which compliance with the data protection norms is

⁵¹³KSPuttaswamy v. UOI, (2019) 1 SCC 01.

to be measured. It has to independently adjudicate upon disputes in relation to the contravention of the law. Data protection requires a strong regulatory framework to protect the basic rights of individuals. The architecture of Aadhaar ought to have, but has failed to embody within the law the establishment of an independent monitoring authority (with a hierarchy of regulators), along with the broad principles for data protection. The independent authority needs to be answerable to Parliament”⁵¹⁴.

What the honorable Supreme Court had envisaged was a truly independent regulatory body that would have administrative and judicial powers and a hierarchy of regulators. It can safely be inferred from the global best practices and the understanding of the term “independent authority” of Supreme Court, the body was supposed to be formed on the lines of purely autonomous bodies such as the election commission, with no possibility of interference from the executive and legislative organs of the state. Given the fact that one of the primary roles of the data protection authority is adjudicatory, any interference on the part of the legislative or administrative organs of the state would run counter to the ethos of rule of law⁵¹⁵.

5.10.1.1 Structural and Organizational Design of the Data Protection Authority

The way in which an organization is structured and the mechanisms through which its members are appointed (including the qualification, tenure, expertise etc.), this has a major impact on the ways in which the organization functions. The vital factors like autonomy and efficiency of an organization are inherently hinged to the organizational structure of any statutory body. It is a well-established principle of the public that the independence of the body is inversely proportional to the external influence within the organization. This is to say, lesser the legislative and executive

⁵¹⁴ KSPuttuswamy v. UOI, (2019) 1 SCC 01.

⁵¹⁵ Report of the Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission, Government of India Volume 1 (2013), https://dea.gov.in/sites/default/files/fslrc_report_vol1_1.pdf. (Accessed on 07th March, 2020).

influence in the organization, greater will be its autonomy⁵¹⁶. A very colossal approach towards creation of an independent regulatory body rests on a four-pronged pillar, namely:

- Selection of the top posts of the body by an non-partisan and non-political body.
- Guaranteeing a fixed tenure of the head of the body and very limited grounds for his removal. The process of removal must be partial and subject to judicial review.
- Vesting the power of heading the agency to a multi-membered board.
- Ensuring that the agency is self-funded.

The non-interference of the other organs in the functioning, appointment of the key members of the agency, its ability to fund itself and the security of the tenure of the head of the agency are the key features of any independent and autonomous organization⁵¹⁷. When the agency is able to pay its members and get the funds for investing in policy and research, without being dependent upon the government of the day for the funds, its ability to adhere to the text of statute faithfully, increases manifold⁵¹⁸.

Unfortunately, the proposed office of the Data Protection Authority doesn't adhere to any of these four-pronged pillars. Instead, it has explicitly negated all the requirements and traits of an independent and autonomous body. The first and foremost aspect is the composition of the body and the method of its appointment. As already noted, the composition of the committee that appoints the heads of any regulatory agency has the most important role in shaping the characteristics of the agency. The proposed bill provides that the:

“The Chairperson and the Members of the Authority shall be appointed by the Central Government on the recommendation made by a selection

⁵¹⁶*Id.*

⁵¹⁷ Stephen J., *Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy*, 92 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REV 663, 663-73 (1998).

⁵¹⁸ GILLIAN METZGER, *DESIGNING AGENCY INDEPENDENCE* 219 (1st ed. 2011).

*committee consisting of— (a) the Cabinet Secretary, who shall be Chairperson of the selection committee; (b) the Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry or Department dealing with the Legal Affairs; (c) the Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry or Department dealing with the Electronics and Information Technology*⁵¹⁹”.

The provision in current form makes the selection committee an extension of the central government. With no judicial member present in it, the committee will solely comprise of the civil servants on the payroll of the government of India. This would be extremely detrimental to the “independent” nature of the agency. The very fact the entire body of the selection committee would consist of government servants, makes it imperative that the appointments to the board will be political⁵²⁰.

The exclusion of the Chief Justice of India from the selection panel is an unfortunate departure from the draft bill of 2018 and it casts serious doubts about the independence of the body. The authority is going to have adjudicatory powers and his selection from a panel that is headed by the servants of the government, lands up us in an extremely complex and arbitrary situation altogether. The data protection authority, by the virtue of being an appointee of the central government, can be expected to be anything but an autonomous and independent body⁵²¹. As we had previously discussed, the authority has been made the sole medium through which the individuals are supposed to file seek remedies against the breach of any of the rights guaranteed by the Act. If at all, the legislature had the actual intention of affording a robust data protection regime, the process of appointment of the members and the chairman of the data protection board will do no good to the cause of data protection in India.

⁵¹⁹The Personal Data Protection Bill, §42, *supra* note 47.

⁵²⁰For factors influencing the independence of regulatory agencies, See, Michael A. Livermore, Cost- Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 609, 611-612 (2014).

⁵²¹*Id.*

5.11 Baron Seeking Remedy: Curtailment of the Right of Data Principle

The Bill seeks to vest into the Data Protection Authority (DPA) a wide range of adjudicatory powers and administrative powers. The proposed bill bars the courts from taking the cognizance of any offense under the Act unless a complaint for the any alleged breach of the rights under the Act has been made by the Data protection Authority⁵²². In doing so, the legislature has put a barrier in the form of DPA between the judiciary and the data principal. It must be noted that the clog on institution of a suit against the breach of the rights under the proposed legislation is quite extensive and it covers the aspect of remedies of the breach as well. The proviso to the section 63(1) of the proposed bill reads as, “*Provided that no inquiry under this section shall be initiated except by a complaint made by the Authority.*”⁵²³ The provision, thus accord to the data protection authority an exclusive right to make complaints against the alleged breaches of rights enumerated within the law. It is submitted that any such provision that bars the citizens from enforcing their rights and mandatorily take recourse to a statutory body to file complaints is contrary to the judicial precedents. It ought to be highlighted that the GDPR doesn’t impose any such clog on the right of the data principal to seek remedy in the courts.

It is submitted that the legislature has made an attempt to bring in the Personal Data Protection Bill, what the Supreme Court had expressly struck down in the Aadhar Judgment⁵²⁴. The legislature’s affair with imposition of clog on instituting of suits by the data subjects been vitiated by the judiciary in past and hopefully, the if the said provisions see the light of the day after the review by the select committee, it is extremely unlikely that it shall pass muster to the test of “non-arbitrariness”⁵²⁵. It is further submitted that the proposed bill ignores the possibility of the breaches of the rights under the Act by the authority itself. In doing so, the legislature has

⁵²²The Personal Data Protection Bill, §63(1), *supra* note 47.

⁵²³*Id.*

⁵²⁴*KSPuttuswamy v. UOI*, (2019) 1 SCC 01.

⁵²⁵*Id.*

conveniently accorded to the Data Protection Authority the status of court of record and effectually denied the individuals their right to approach to court against breaches of data privacy. One may appreciate the parallels between the Section 47 of the Aadhar Act, from which the text of Section 63(1) has copied in verbatim⁵²⁶. Interestingly, the Supreme Court had struck down the Section 47 of the Aadhar Act on the grounds that it prevented the individuals from seeking legal recourse against the violation of their rights. The fact that the same provisions were struck down under the Act and yet they have been adopted in the Bill without even a slightest of variation in letter and scope, doesn't reflect well of the intention of the legislature as far as the protection of right to privacy is concerned. The proposed provisions seek to push the entire judicial machinery on the verge of irrelevance and sterility in as much as the data protection is concerned, by restricting the individuals to approach courts against violation of rights under the proposed bill. The foreclosure of the rights of the data subjects to seek remedy against potential breaches to their right to privacy is manifestly arbitrary⁵²⁷ and thus shall eventually be struck down by the honorable Supreme Court. The finder is of the opinion that the select committee should consider the inherent fallacies in the provision and take into consideration the ruling of the Supreme Court with regards to the restriction on institution of suit under the Act.

While, the proposed bill does incorporate mechanisms for the redressal of breaches of data and lays down detailed guidelines regarding the remedies available to the data principal in cases of violation⁵²⁸, it seeks to prohibit the data principals from taking recourse to the efficacious remedies available to them. While defending, the restraint upon suing, imposed by the section 47 of the Aadhar Act, the Central government had contended that the, the provision was brought in order to maintain the purity of the Aadhar scheme⁵²⁹, which was rejected by the Supreme Court but what remains to be

⁵²⁶ The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial And Other Subsidies, Benefits And Services) Act, 2016, 47 NO. 18, Acts of Parliament. (India, 2019)

⁵²⁷ K S Puttaswamy v Union of India (2019) 1 SCC 01, 103.

⁵²⁸ The Personal Data Protection Bill, §25(6), *supra* note 47

⁵²⁹ K S Puttaswamy v Union of India (2019) 1 SCC 01,

seen is the Central government's justification for the inclusion of the same provision in the proposed bill. Whatever argument, the central government comes up with, the far-reaching implications of the wordings of the impugned provision in the proposed bill will fall foul to a well-established jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of India⁵³⁰.

Imposing obligations on the data fiduciaries to notify the possible breach of any personal data being processed by them to the data principal, decreases the possibilities of infringement of right to privacy substantially. When the personal data of an individual is breached, an instant notification of such breach by the processor affords the data principal, a chance to take effective measures to minimize the consequences of the breach⁵³¹. The GDPR, does take into account the implications of notice of breach and thus provides that the data processors must notify the data principals about data breaches within 72 hours from when the breach was detected⁵³². A robust data protection regime would require that the data principal is informed about the breach of data, even a possibility of breach of data through a notice within a given time frame. The notice should adequately mention the nature of the data breach and the likely consequences of such breach.

However, the provisions of the proposed Data Protection Bill, 2019 come nowhere close to these quintessential aspects of a robust data protection regime. Instead, the proposed bill pitches for a practice that lacks objectivity for determining whether the breach of data has to be notified or not. The Section 25(1) of the proposed bill provides that, *“Every data fiduciary shall by notice inform the Authority about the breach of any personal data processed by the data fiduciary where such breach is likely to cause harm to any data principal.”*⁵³³ This would mean that the data fiduciary will be at the liberty to provide the notice about a possible breach of personal data when they are

⁵³⁰Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors vs Union Of India, 1980 AIR 1789, 1981 SCR (1) 206; L. Chandra Kumar vs Union Of India And Others, 1997 (2) SCR 1186

⁵³¹Brandon Faulkner, *Hacking into Data Breach Notification Laws*, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1097, 1101-1104 (2007).

⁵³²General Data Protection Regulation, Article 19 (EU 2016).

⁵³³The Personal Data Protection Bill, §25(1), *supra* note 47.

of the opinion that the breach could likely cause harm to the data principal. The provision is based on the premise that the data fiduciary is best aware of the interests of the data principal and it is up to them to decide whether any breach of data could result into harm to the data principal or not. Moreover, even after a subjective assessment about the likelihood of harm emanating from the data breach, which in case is found to be harmful, the data fiduciary has to give a notice to the data protection authority and not the data principal. It is submitted that while there is nothing wrong with sharing the information about the breach of personal data, the legislature should keep the most important stakeholder, the data principal in loop as well. The provisions in the present form seek to restrict the notification about the breach of data to an one-sided affair by doing away with the necessity of giving notice to the data principal. In a fair majority of the cases, the government itself is the data fiduciary and the data protection authority which is in essence a subsidiary of the central government will be the only ones kept in the loop in case of data breaches. This would imply that, “In case your data is breached by the government and if after a case-to-case basis subjective enquiry, the government comes to a conclusion that the breach could cause harm to you, it will notify the government about such breach.”

By keeping the Data principal out of the loop about their own data breaches and conferring the powers of determining whether a certain kind of breach can be harmful to the rights of the data principal to a non-independent body like Data Protection Authority, the legislature intends to negate and annihilate the principle of “informational self-determination”⁵³⁴. The state can’t be given such a great amount of control over the determination of the nature of the breach of data. The idea of informational self-determination is based upon the premise that the individual should be afforded complete freedom to decide when to give his data for processing, for what purpose and for what time duration to give for processing, to decide what data breach would be beneficial and what data breach could be harmful for their interest. The individual based notion of right to privacy keeps the interests and choices of the

⁵³⁴Latha R. Nair, Data Protection Efforts in India: Blind Leading the Blind, 4 INDIAN J.L. & TECH. 19, 21-29. (2008).

individuals at the center of data protection regime and hence the denial of the right to determine the nature of breach to the data principal themselves, would amount to a departure from the court's ruling in *KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India*⁵³⁵. While denying the data principals, the right to be notified about the data breaches the legislature intend to overlook the very rationale behind the requirement of giving the notice about the breaches of personal data and thus snatches the ownership rights of the data principal over their data.

The lack of an objective assessment of the criteria i.e. harm, will give an incentive to the data fiduciaries to report a far less number of data breaches and thus eventually jeopardize the rights of the data principals. In case, the government wants to bring in a truly effective data protection regime that is "Protective" of the rights of the citizens in the truest sense, it should make it a point to do away with all the provisions of the bill that might put the individual based notion of right to privacy in abeyance⁵³⁶. It is submitted that the legislature should leave it to the data principals to determine whether a particular breach would be harmful or not. And hence, this section 25 of the Personal Data Protection Bill must be amended to pose an obligation upon the data fiduciaries to notify the data principals about every breach and possibility of breach of the personal data. This would reaffirm the commitment to setting a data protection regime with adequate safeguards against the violation of individual based notion of right to privacy.

The bill seeks to mandate the concept of "Privacy by Design"⁵³⁷ in order to ensure the transparency and accountability in processing which is an appreciable fact keeping in view the other provisions of the bill which appear to be felicitating the evolution of a Data Grab Regime instead of a Data Protection Regime. However, these benign provisions seeking adequate infrastructure and policy to be implemented by the data

⁵³⁵ *KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India*, (2017) 10 SCC 01.

⁵³⁶ Preeti Mehta, *Franchising Data Protection and E-Commerce in India*, 3 INT'L J. FRANCHISING L. 23, 23-26 (2005).

⁵³⁷ The Personal Data Protection Bill, §22(1), *supra* note 47.

fiduciaries will do no good to the cause of data protection when the legislation itself gives them a wide window for escaping the application of the provisions⁵³⁸. As far as the private data fiduciaries are concerned, some of the aspects of proposed bill do offer some signs of a half-hearted attempt on the behalf of the legislature to set up a healthy data protection regime but cases wherein the government itself is the data fiduciary, one can observe a systematic effort by the state to control the data of the individuals and deny them any efficacious legal remedy against the potential breaches of data privacy⁵³⁹.

As noted, the bill seeks to vest in the data protection authority, a huge range of discretionary powers that will have a direct impact upon the rights and obligations of the individuals and thus it should have been imperative for the legislature to have adequate accounting mechanism within the organization to ensure a transparent regulatory mechanism. However, the bill in its present form doesn't take into account any of these regulatory requirements. It is submitted that the lack of involvement of judiciary in appointment of the chairman and the members of the board and lack of internal accountability mechanism within the organization will reduce the data protection authority to the second caged parrot of the central government.

As discussed earlier, the legislature has sought to make the data protection authority as a media through which the data principal would seek the remedy in the court of law. While there is not even the slightest of element of independence and autonomy in the data protection authority. Even if we assume as of now that the joint select committee makes substantial changes in the organizational structure of the authority, the proposed bill has severely curtailed the powers of the authority by providing for a widespread interference from the central government⁵⁴⁰. The proposed bill seeks to bring in the interference of the central government at every stage of the data protection

⁵³⁸The Personal Data Protection Bill, §§ 35, 91, *supra* note 47.

⁵³⁹L Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261; Minerva Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789.

⁵⁴⁰The Personal Data Protection Bill, §§ 15, 86, *supra* note 47.

authority⁵⁴¹. Comparing the autonomy of the Supervisory Authority established by the GDPR and the one proposed by the Data Protection Bill, 2019 highlights the fact that there is a great deal of difference in the way the two legislatures have given importance to the need for having an independent authority to adjudicate the disputes concerning the breach of data protection rights.

The death nail in the mirage of the independence and autonomy of the data protection regime comes in the form of miscellaneous provisions of the proposed bill. While we have observed a systematic approach from the central government to vend indirect control over every contour of the data protection authority, the section 86 of the proposed bill sheds all the masks and the intention of the central government to control the personal data comes out wide and clear. The section 81 of the proposed bill lays down the powers of the central government to issue directions to the data protection authority and the authority would be bound by it. Moreover, the provision in clear terms states that the decision of central government would have the final say on the question whether a question is one of policy or not, a question which would determine if the authority is to follow such directions or not.

5.12 Data Localization

The Justice Srikrishna Committee in its report accompanying the draft Personal Data Protection Bill released on July 27 noted that eight of the top 10 most accessed websites in India are owned by U.S. entities⁵⁴². The objective behind highlighting this statistic was to press for the storage of data within the territorial limits of India to help the law enforcement agencies. Data localisation has emerged as one of the most debated aspects of the data protection regime all over the world. The tendency of the sovereign nations has been to restrict the free flow of data globally on the account of

⁵⁴¹The Personal Data Protection Bill, §62, *supra* note 47.

⁵⁴²A Free and Fair Digital Economy Protecting Privacy, Empowering Indians, Committee of Experts under the Chairmanship of Justice B.N. Srikrishna (2018), https://meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Data_Protection_Committee_Report.pdf

genuine security threats. Meanwhile, some of the countries have chosen to see the imposition of restriction of free flow of data as an instrument of furthering the cause of national interest as well⁵⁴³. Data localisation refers to the practice where the states require the internet intermediaries to store the data in the country where the data has its origin⁵⁴⁴. The genesis of the increasing call for data localisation can also be traced in the concerns of the law enforcement agencies. The BN Sri Krishna committee report had studied the drawbacks of absence of data localisation provisions in the Indian legislation and recommended that the critical data collected in India must be stored in India itself⁵⁴⁵. The final Personal data protection bill, retains the provision for data localisation while allowing the cross-border transfer of data with the consent of the user and subject to certain requirements. In these sections, we shall analyse the reasons why the legislature has gone soft on the issue of data localisation and what will be the implications of the data localisation in current form on the rights of the individuals, the internet intermediaries and the law enforcement agencies⁵⁴⁶.

While allowing the transfer of data outside India, the bill categorically mandates that the sensitive personal data will have to be stored in India. The logic behind the assertion of mandatory storage of data within India is "to boost" law enforcement efforts to access data necessary for investigation and prosecution of crimes", however, the policy commentators have previously opined that insistence upon storage in India could be counterproductive and even if it reaps any benefit, that would be minimal⁵⁴⁷.

The argument that the data localisation within the Indian territorial limits will allow the Indian law enforcement authorities to access the data collected by the US companies is based on a false premise that data localisation would eventually decide

⁵⁴³Erica Fraser, Data Localisation and the Balkanisation of the Internet, 13 SCRIPT ed 359 (2016).

⁵⁴⁴*Id.*

⁵⁴⁵*Supra* note 196 At 91.

⁵⁴⁶Soldatov, A., and Borogan, I., Russia's Surveillance State, World Policy Journal (2013), <http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/fall2013/Russia-surveillance>,

⁵⁴⁷Bauer et al., The Costs of Data Localisation: A Friendly Fire on Economic Recovery, ECIPE (2014), <https://ecipe.org/publications/dataloc/>.

who can access the data⁵⁴⁸. The existing law in the United State doesn't allow its companies to disclose the personal data of their users to any foreign law enforcement agency and the law enforcement agencies in India have to solely depend upon the cooperative bilateral agreements like Mutual legal assistance treaty to obtain any information from the US based companies⁵⁴⁹.

It is strange that the legislature hasn't taken into account the fact that these US companies will still be governed by the provisions of the treaty and data localisation is not going to have any impact whatsoever on the ability of Indian enforcement agencies to access the data from these companies. As per the view of the author, the legislature has proceeded with the mandatory data localisation to strengthen its claim of accessing the data within the framework of the treaty. Another neglected flaw of the proposed data localisation model emanates from the fact that a major chunk of online fraud and other forms of cyber-crime has its genesis outside Indian territory⁵⁵⁰.

In such a scenario, the proposition that data localisation will help the law enforcement authorities track and investigate crime takes a blow⁵⁵¹. The only way in which the law enforcement agencies within India could be benefited is through the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act as far as the companies located in the United States are concerned. The Act seeks to end the monopoly of the control of US authorities over the data. However, for any such transfer of data from the US based companies, there needs to be an executive contract between the two countries, which

⁵⁴⁸Sashidhar KJ, Easing the US-India divergence on data localization, ORF DIGITAL FRONTIERS (2019), <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/easing-us-india-divergence-data-localisation-53256/>.

⁵⁴⁹*Id.*

⁵⁵⁰Madhulika Srikumar, Data localisation is no solution, ORF (2018) <https://www.orfonline.org/research/42990-data-localisation-is-no-solution/>.

⁵⁵¹ Dana Polatin-Reuben and Joss Wright. An internet with BRICS characteristics: Data Sovereignty and the Balkanization of the Internet, USENIX (2014), <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b139/318d4b752dbc6c0383775323edc5823d9449.pdf>; In 4th USENIX Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet (FOCI' 14), USENIX Association (2014), <https://www.usenix.org/publications/login/dec14/foc14reports>.

seems highly unlikely in near future. Given the fact that the draft bill reduces the principles of “proportionality” to a mere formality in the absence of procedural safeguard to actualize them, it is highly likely that the data localisation will serve no purpose in as much as the law enforcement agencies powers are concerned⁵⁵².

5.12.1 Understanding Data Localisation

The global data protection regime all over the world has witnessed an increasing trend of restricting the free flow of data across borders for several reasons. The traditional view that the internet knows no territorial boundaries has become more irrelevant than ever before. States have justified their insistence on data localisation for protecting national security, protection of rights of the individual, free and competitive market but commentators across the globe have opined against such practice. Data localisation destroys the border less character of the internet and acts as a barrier in free flow of data and possible balkanisation of the internet. The Personal data protection bill, 2019 mandates that the countries ought to store data in India itself⁵⁵³.

5.12.1.1 Protection of the fundamental rights of the individuals

One of the most beneficial aspects of the data localisation provisions can be traced in their ability to strengthen the right to privacy of the individuals within the constitutional scheme of their own country⁵⁵⁴. Ever since the Snowden and Cambridge analytical leaks, the concerns regarding the adequateness of security of data in foreign jurisdictions have gained ground. The argument sounds quite rational and no country should be expected to jeopardize the interests of its citizens by allowing the transfer of data to a state that doesn't accord sufficient protection to the rights of the data subjects⁵⁵⁵.

⁵⁵²17:1, Joss Wright. Regional variation in Chinese Internet Filtering. Information, Communication & Society 121-141 (2014).

⁵⁵³*Id.*

⁵⁵⁴*Id.*

⁵⁵⁵*supra* note 197.

While, the PDP Bill might be infested with scores of anomalies and the SC might have failed to assess the true nature of right to privacy in the Aadhar judgment, this doesn't underscore the fact that the right to privacy has been accorded the status of a fundamental right within the Indian constitutional scheme and there seems no rational reasons as not to insist upon data localisation for guaranteeing adequate protection to the personal data of the citizens. It must be acknowledged that the enforcement of the constitutional rights requires an element of control by state actors that is severely lacking when the breach is committed by the authorities of a third country and where the effect of that breach is ultimately only experienced on the territory of a third country⁵⁵⁶.

The other justification of the data localisation practices has their genesis in the Snowden paper that highlighted several surveillance related threats that emanated due to placing of data in a foreign country. However, it is highly unlikely that the data localisation, in the present form, will have any impact on the possibility of foreign surveillance in India. The fact that the sensitive data can be transferred outside India with the permission of the central government, makes India's battle against foreign surveillance an extremely weak one⁵⁵⁷. Moreover, it must be noted that the data localization may instead make foreign surveillance easier by effectively sanctioning centralization of data. On the other hand, data localisation is likely to further the cause of domestic surveillance by giving the state a complete access to the data of the citizens at one place⁵⁵⁸. Given the fact that the data protection authority within the proposed bill is devoid of any judicial interference, it is unlikely that the privacy of the individuals will be accorded any protection against an evasion from the state itself.

⁵⁵⁶ Benjamin Wittes, Jonah Force Hill: *The Growth of Data Localization Post-Snowden*, LAWFARE (July 21, 2014, 9:14 pm), <https://www.lawfareblog.com/jonah-force-hill-growth-data-localization-post-snowden-lawfare-research-paper-series>.

⁵⁵⁷ For detailed discussion on threat of foreign surveillance, See, Jonah Force Hill, *The Growth of Data Localization Post-Snowden: Analysis and Recommendations for US Policymakers and Industry leaders*, Lawfare Research Paper Series (2014), <https://lawfare.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/staging/Lawfare-Research-Paper-Series-Vol2No3.pdf>.

⁵⁵⁸ Chander, A. et al., *Breaking the Web: Data Localization vs. the Global Internet*, (2014), <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2407858>.

The data localisation will vest great coercive power in the central government which may in turn be used to extract the personal data of the citizens from the organisations as per the global precedents⁵⁵⁹.

One of the other compelling issues that stems from mandatory data legislation requirement is the threat to freedom of speech and expression. In this era, the internet is an undisputed platform for dissemination of information throughout the globe. Platforms like twitter and Facebook have emerged as the most popular mediums to assert the participation of an individual in the political process exercising constitutional rights⁵⁶⁰. However, the obligation on the part of foreign companies to store the data collected through their platform in India will keep the citizens under an eternal scanner of the existing regime of the country. This will have a colossal impact on the right to privacy of the individuals as the central government will be able to suppress dissent. The countries with similar data localisation principles have shown in recent past the ways in which a surveillance regime can be established in the garb of data localisation.

The Russian Federal Law on data localization can be classified into two broad categories namely, the Data Localization law and the Online Content law, while the online content law specifies that the data will have to be stored within the territorial limits of Russia for six months, there is no such time limit in case of the Data Localization law. This implies that the authorities will be able to retain the personal data of the individuals for unlimited duration on the pretext of affording a greater degree of protection to the right to privacy.⁵⁶¹ The online content law stipulates that the, *“organizers of dissemination of information in Internet’13 must ‘store on the territory of the Russian Federation information about facts related to the receipt, transmission, delivery and (or) processing of voice information, written texts, images, sounds and other electronic messages of users of the Internet and information about*

⁵⁵⁹*Id.*

⁵⁶⁰*supra* note 207.

⁵⁶¹*Id.*

*these users for six months.*⁵⁶²” This would imply that the social media intermediaries and the online platforms would be required to either store the data on the pre-existing local servers within the countries or to establish a data storage center. It would tantamount to storing the sensitive personal data with these servers which might lack adequate safeguards to privacy and thus as a result, shall amount to putting the privacy and the national security, both in acute jeopardy⁵⁶³.

The compliance costs and underlying uncertainty in the legislation will have multifold ramifications on the economy of the country. With an increased volume of compliance list and additional costs of investing in local servers, the businesses all over the country are set to bear the brunt of the extremely excessive and stringent data protection law in Russia⁵⁶⁴. Several studies have outlined that the data localization will necessarily give a blow to the GDP growth rate of the country and thus there shouldn't be any hesitation in asserting that the data localization laws are inherently detrimental to the economy⁵⁶⁵. Apart from the economic factor, one must also take into account the procedural barriers that the data localization principles are going to have on the data processors in the country. Categorizing the data as sensitive and non-sensitive data is one of the most difficult tasks that would substantially increase the compliance procedure for the stakeholders⁵⁶⁶. Moreover, the Russian data localization law applies to the persons on the ground of their citizenship, with different sets of provisions in place for protection of personal data for the non-nationals.

It is submitted the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019, by retaining the requirement for compulsory storage within the territorial limits of India has closely adopted the Russian practice in a bit softened form. It is unfortunate that the legislature has failed

⁵⁶² Grata International Personal Data Protection In Russia, <https://gratanet.com/laravelfilemanager/files/3/Data%20Protection%20in%20Russia%202018%20final.pdf>.

⁵⁶³ *Id.*

⁵⁶⁴ Daniel Garrie and Irene Byhovskiy, Privacy and Data Protection in Russia, 5(2) JOURNAL OF LAW & CYBER WARFARE 235, 253 (2017).

⁵⁶⁵ Kenbei Zhang, *Incomplete Data Protection Law*, 15 German L.J. 1071, 1072-1074 (2014)..

⁵⁶⁶ *Id.*

to appreciate the genuine concerns revolving around the negative economic impacts of data localization. In the following sections, we shall note from a brief discussion about the data protection aspects of China that the, “justifications” of data localization in India is based upon superficial assumptions.

5.12.2 Data Localization in China

While, the European countries already do have an extremely advanced data protection regime in place, the countries like Russia, Brazil, China and South Africa, that have a developing data protection regime may be of great interest for the purposes of analyzing the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019. India along with these 4 countries is a member of a global body known as the BRICS. Over 40% of the world population lives in the BRICS countries and over 25% of the global GDP and thus the data protection regime of the member countries are going to have far-reaching implications on the global data protection initiatives. This will let us have an insight into the difference of approach between the partners of BRICS towards data protection⁵⁶⁷.

Draft Article 2 of the Personal Information and Important Data Outbound Security Assessment Measures, provides that, “*The personal information and important data collected and generated by network operators within the People’s Republic of China during operations shall be stored within the [national] territory. If the business requirements make it necessary to provide data outside of China, a security assessment shall be carried out in accordance with these Measures*”⁵⁶⁸. The provision makes a sweeping assertion that all the “personal” and “important” data which has been collected within the territorial limits of China shall be stored within its territorial limits. The provision, however, leaves a limited window open for the transfer of data outside the country after a security assessment is made by the authorities. While, the

⁵⁶⁷ Smith, D., BRICS Eye Infrastructure Funding Through New Development Bank, THE GUARDIAN, (2013), <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/mar/28/brics-countries-infrastructure-spending-development-bank>.

⁵⁶⁸ Personal Information and Important Data Outbound Security Assessment Measures, Art. 2 (China 2019).

countries like India and Russia require the localization of data that is personal and sensitive, the Chinese data protection framework makes no such stipulation⁵⁶⁹.

The Chinese Cyber security Law provides that, “important data” has to be stored within the territorial limits of the country, while there is a well settled definition of what constitutes of personal and sensitive data (with minor variations) the term important data is an entirely new concept that can encompass within its meaning every possible aspect of the personal life of the citizens.⁵⁷⁰ The comprehensiveness of the data localization requirement makes the case of China a unique one. Interestingly, the previous drafts of the Cyber Security laws contained the term, “Critical Information Infrastructure” instead of the term “important data” to further broaden the scope of data that ought to be localized⁵⁷¹. The extensive requirement of data localization has created fears of state surveillance amongst the foreign companies operating within China. The Article 37 of the law has garnered harsh criticism from the corporate world.⁵⁷² The stringent data localization mandates of the Chinese data protection regime will result in the creation of data centers in China by the companies based there or they will have to rely upon the local data storage facilities, which might even get compromised under the pressure of the government. It is submitted that the concerns of the “State Surveillance” by the corporates do stem from the extensiveness of the data localization norms in China and are well founded.

5.13 Brazil

The comparison between the data protection regimes in Brazil and India will afford a true insight into the difference of approach of two “democracies” towards the commitment to afford protection to the personal data. While, in the previous section,

⁵⁶⁹ Aimee Boram Yang, *China in Global Trade: Proposed Data Protection Law and Encryption Standard Dispute*, 4 ISJLP 897, 901-909 (2018).

⁵⁷⁰ Yuxiao Duan Renmin, *China's Private Law Approach to Personal Data Protection* (2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3484725.

⁵⁷¹ *Id.*

⁵⁷² *Id.*

the discussion was limited to the approach of two of the most authoritarian states with regards to data sovereignty, this section will, in detail, draw a parallel between the data protection laws of India and Brazil, keeping in view the various contours of a truly robust data protection regime. Brazil, just like India is a recent entrant to the league of countries having a comprehensive data protection code. The South American country enacted its first comprehensive data protection legislation in 2018 known as the General Data Protection Law⁵⁷³. However, in order to ensure a smooth transition into the new data protection regime, the legislature decided to postpone the enforceability of the new law to 2020. As a result, the legislature was able to take into the account some of the fallacies in the proposed bills such as the introduction of a data protection authority⁵⁷⁴. Before the enactment of the GDPL, the privacy regime in the country was hinged across a number of specific regulations, including the constitution of Brazil.

The GDPL is quite broad in its approach like a lot of conservative data protection enactments all over the world and is applicable only to the data collected and processed within the territorial limits of the country and the data that has been collected for the purposes of offering goods and services to the individuals in Brazil⁵⁷⁵. One of the most notable aspects in which the Brazilian approach to the data protection is different from that of the Indian approach is the aspect of Informational self-determination. Where India's Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 is riddled with the grounds in which the informational self-determination goes on a toss, Brazil has adopted a very cautious and sensitive approach while striking the right balance between the informational self-determination and public interest⁵⁷⁶.

⁵⁷³ Antonio Tavares Paes, *Privacy and Data Protection in Brazil*, 5 J.L. & CYBERWARFARE 225, 229-233 (2018).

⁵⁷⁴ Amar Toor, *Brazil and Germany make moves to protect Online Privacy, but Experts see a troubling trend toward Balkanization*, 2013, <http://www.theverge.com/2013/11/8/5080554/nsa-backlash-brazil-germany-raises-fears-of-internet-balkanization/>.

⁵⁷⁵ Antonio Tavares Paes, *Privacy and Data Protection in Brazil*, 5 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 225, 226-230 (2017).

⁵⁷⁶ *Id.*

At the outset, it must be mentioned that the legislation expressly mentions the objective behind its enactment and to a great extent, remains committed to it. As per the Article 2 of the GDPL, the Brazilian data protection regime is based on the principles of informational self-determination, consumer protection, respect for privacy, the protection of the dignity of the individuals and contours of human rights. It is submitted that these principles reflect a holistic commitment to data protection. In order to materialize these noble goals, the GDPL adopts an extremely wide definition of “processing” of data and states that processing of personal data would mean, “*any operation carried out with personal data, such as collection, production, receipt, classification, use, access, reproduction, transmission, distribution, processing, filing, storage, deletion, evaluation or control of the information, modification, communication, transfer, dissemination or extraction.*”⁵⁷⁷ The wide definition of processing of personal data makes the scope of the law extremely broad.

Again, following the approach of the GDPR, the GDPL endorses the concept of free flow of data and doesn't fall for the mirage of data sovereignty to insist upon data localization. It doesn't require data localization in any form and it is not mandatory for the data processors to store the data in the territorial limits of Brazil⁵⁷⁸. However, the personal data can't be transferred outside the territory of Brazil only in cases where the requirements laid down in section 33 of the regulation are satisfied. This implies that the personal data can't be transferred to a country that doesn't have the same level of data protection. However, subject to the guarantee by the data controller to afford the same level of protection as guaranteed in the regulation, personal data can be transferred to those countries as well⁵⁷⁹. The regulation additionally lays down

⁵⁷⁷ Article 5(X), GDPL (Brazil)

⁵⁷⁸ Article 33, GDPL (Brazil)

⁵⁷⁹ The guarantee may be provided in the form of in the form of: a) specific contractual clauses for a given transfer; b) standard contractual clauses; c) global corporate rules; d) regularly issued stamps, certificates and codes of conduct.

an extensive list of cases wherein the data can be transferred outside the country in order to reaffirm its commitment to free flow of data⁵⁸⁰.

Unlike, the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019, the GDPL chooses to tackle the key issues surrounding the flow of personal data outside on an objective criterion and lays down the guidelines for determining the parameters that would determine the level of data protection in the third country. As per Article 33 of the regulation, the data protection authority would take into account the following factors to gauge the level of data protection in the third country⁵⁸¹.

1. The general rules governing the data protection in the third country as regards to the cross-border transfer of data in the third country.
2. The nature of data that is sought to be transferred to the third country.
3. The rights of the data principals in the country and the existing compliance measures.
4. Judicial and institutional guarantees for the protection of informational privacy.

It may be noted that the regulation lays down fairly objective criteria for determining the level of protection in the third country before allowing the transfers. This would afford a better protection of personal data of the individuals even in the third countries. When one contrasts the provision with its proposed Indian counterpart, a huge spectrum of the insensitivity of the Indian state towards the protection of personal data comes into the picture. As per the Personal Data Protection Bill, the central government and the Data protection authority which is of course anything but an independent body will decide whether a third country affords an adequate level of protection to the personal data of the citizens.

While comparing India with an extremely developed data protection regime like that of Europe may not be the most rational thing to do however the same comparison with a country that is still in process of enforcing its first data protection bill is the

⁵⁸⁰ Renato Opice Blum & Camila Rioja, *Brazil's GDPR Sanctioned*, 2 Int'l J. Data Protection Officer, Privacy Officer & Privacy Couns. 12 (2018).

⁵⁸¹ *Id.*

best parameter to judge what is wrong with our approach. What is it that has prompted a democracy to enact a pro data principal data protection regime and what is the inspiration of Indian policymakers to deviate the most they could from the track of a truly effective data protective regime? A close look at some of the key aspects of the data protection legislation in both the countries reflects a systematic approach from the Indian parliament to control the subjects of data to the greatest extent and if the need arises, to grab it, without even letting the data principal having a hint about it at all⁵⁸².

It is submitted that the Republic of Brazil has adopted a much more data principal centric data protection law and there appears to be no attempt on the part of the Brazilian parliament to control the data of the individuals while doing lip service to the cause of data protection, unlike India⁵⁸³. The GDPR appears to be far more pragmatic in its approach in assessing the threat to the rights of data principals by the state and the private parties.

Almost every data protection regime all over the world shares a common minimum program that envisages a data protection regime that encompasses the principles of fairness, lawfulness and transparency of processing of data.

Unfortunately, or fortunately, Russia has been a global hotbed in commentaries on data localization. The country is believed to have one of the most stringent data localization requirements throughout the world. The Russian federal government amended the On Personal data law and brought in an express requirement for storage and processing of data within the territorial limits of Russia. Almost half a decade ago, Russia came up with two legislations in its data protection framework that had stringent data localization requirements. The Federal Law No. 242-FZ coupled with the Federal Law No. 97-FZ set forth a lethal data localization regime in place⁵⁸⁴. There

⁵⁸²*Id.*

⁵⁸³*Id.*

⁵⁸⁴ Ilya Khrennikov. Google to visa face Russia rules, Boon to Local Data Centers, BLOOMBERG QUINT (Feb, 2014), <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-25/google-to-visa-face-russia-data-rules-in-boon-to-local-operators.html>.

is a striking similarity between the data localization principles under the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 and the Russian data protection law. While both India and Russia are among the most swiftly emerging economies of the world, they have categorically chosen to ignore the disastrous economic ramifications of data localization principles⁵⁸⁵ based upon finding assumptions that data localization would mean enhanced national security framework and greater protection to the right to privacy of the citizens⁵⁸⁶.

5.14 Conclusion

The Comparative analysis of the Data Protection Regime in India and the European Union, the United States and the United Kingdom along with some of the BRICS countries has highlighted a myriad set of issues that continue to plague the Indian data protection framework. While the existing data protection regime in India is completely inapplicable to the State and its agencies even the proposed data protection regime does not provide a secure firewall against the unwarranted intrusion within the private domain of the citizens. The most pressing difference between the approach of the countries in the analysis and the Indian approach can be summarised in the following points:

- a) While the existing data protection regime in India comes nowhere close to the global best practices on data protection, the proposed Personal Data Protection Bill 2019 does seek to bridge the existing gap by adopting the key data protection principles.
- b) However, in spite of there being apparent evidences of data breaches in Aadhar program, the Indian legislature has crafted a huge window of exemption clauses that would render the state agencies capable of intruding upon the rights of the data principals on a wide range of grounds.

⁵⁸⁵ Daniel Garrie & Irene Byhovsky, Privacy and Data Protection in Russia, 5 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 235, 239-40 (2017).

⁵⁸⁶ *Id.*

- c) A notable departure from the focal feature of the data protection laws of the countries included within the domain of analysis portrays an attempt on the part of the legislature to shield the agencies of the central government from being subjected to the obligations under the act. In contrast to the GDPR and the UK Data Protection Act, 2018 which offer very limited grounds of exemption to the government agencies, the proposed Indian law has very wide exemption clauses.
- d) Another significant departure of the Indian approach towards data protection can be traced in the enforcement mechanism of the rights conferred through the legislation. The provisions of the IT Act, 2000 and the Information Technology Rules, 2011 make the safeguards inapplicable against the state and its instrumentalities. This goes a long way in watering down the effectiveness of the Indian Data protection regime.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

6.1 Introduction

The discussions in the previous chapter has highlighted some of the key issues that undermine the prospects of India's emergence as a safe jurisdiction with regards to data protection. This chapter essentially assimilates the suggestions that may be incorporated in the proposed Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 in order to overcome the existing short comings in the draft bill.

The study has been broadly divided into six chapters that deal with the different aspects of data protection regime in India and abroad. In order to arrive at a fair assessment of the research dissertation, the finder has purportedly classified the chapters in a manner that would pave way for an optimal understanding of the importance of a robust data protection law in the country.

The most important aspect of the research was aimed at critically analyzing the provisions of the proposed data protection bill and thus to come to arrive at the answer to the dissertation of the dissertation. After, a detailed discussion into some of the key aspects of the proposed law, the finder has come to the conclusion that the dissertation of the finder stands answered in positive, an outcome that was more or less apparent from the discussions in all the chapters. It is without doubt, true that the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 fails to address some of the most pressing issues concerning the data protection laws in a free democratic society. In the upcoming sections, the finder shall category highlight the aspects of the proposed law that contribute to the conclusion of arrived by the finder with regards to the dissertation.

The preamble of any legislation is one of the most vital factors influencing its interpretation by the judiciary. Thus, it becomes optimal to have a preamble that is

precise and assertive about its object. The Data Protection Bill's prime objective should be guaranteeing the right to data privacy of the citizens of India and fostering a data protection regime that is sensitive to the remotest of the breaches to the right to privacy. The preamble must also incorporate within its fold an unequivocal commitment from the government against illegal intrusion in the private realm of the individuals with a detailed roadmap of surveillance reform. The preamble should also take into account the pressing need for creating awareness within the country about the contours of right to privacy and thus felicitate a privacy-conscious society. It is proposed that the preamble of the Data Protection Bill, 2019 be amended as:

The preamble that in pith and substance incorporates these objectives will provide a greater width to the rights recognized in the legislation. It is submitted that the aspects like fostering a digital economy and undue emphasis on the economic aspects of data shall do no service to the right to privacy. While, these objectives may be ancillary to a robust data protection regime, the right to privacy must not be pushed to the back seat on the premise of fostering digital economy. The preamble must "*call a spade a spade*" and recognize the pressing need for the surveillance reform in the country and lay down a vision for a regime that is truly protective of the right to privacy in the long run. The preamble must in unequivocal terms endorse the constitutional necessity of protecting and preserving the fundamental right to privacy and thus a need for setting up a truly independent body to enforce it.

6.2 Need for A Broader Scope of Data Protection

The second most important aspect of any data protection legislation, after the preamble, is its scope. This means to say that the extent of application of the legislation determines its effectiveness in meeting its objectives set out in the preamble of the legislation. The proposed bill omits the non-personal data and the anonymised data from the application of the provisions of the law. It is submitted that numerous real-life cases have established the fact that even the non-personal data and the anonymised data can be combined to form the personally identifiable

information. In the age of Big Data analytics, where the data can be collected in the form of meta data which can further be processed as the personally identifiable information, such wide exemption to the non-personal data may prove to be fatal to the prospects of the data protection regime in the country.

While it is true that the data anonymisation may substantially reduce the risk involved in processing of data but the possibility of reversibility of the process cannot be ruled out altogether. Thus, it is proposed that the provisions concerning the non-personal data and sensitive data be amended as follows:

This definition would take into account the potential methods through which the data so anonymised may be brought to the fold of personally identifiable information. A restricted definition for categorizing the data as anonymised data will substantially reduce the volume of data which might be designated as non-personal. It is also suggested that the provision of the bill proposing the sharing of the non-personal data with the central government ought to be omitted altogether. It is submitted that the provisions providing for the “Promotion of Digital Economy” be duly omitted. As previously proposed, the objective of promotion of the digital economy is not in consonance of a robust data protection regime and any emphasis on the aspect may be used by the Central government to seek huge volumes of potentially personally identifiable data on the pretext of promoting a digital economy.

The evidence of such attempts is amply reflected in the Section 91 of the proposed bill. It is suggested that the language of the section 91 is a reflection of a colorable attempt from the Central government to compel the Data Protection Authority to share the, “Non-personal” data for all practical purposes. The provision also asserts in no uncertain terms that the decision of the central government upon the determinative question on sharing of such data would be final⁵⁸⁷. It is submitted that

⁵⁸⁷The Personal Data Protection bill, §91 (2019), *supra* note 47. Section 91 in its present form provides that, (“(1) Nothing in this Act shall prevent the Central Government from framing of any policy for the digital economy, including measures for its growth, security, integrity, prevention of misuse,

when genuine apprehensions are surrounding the irreversibility of the process of anonymisation, such a provision would allow the Central government with all the state machinery at its disposal, an easy run into the right to privacy of the citizens.

It is thereby suggested that the wide powers of the central government regarding the processing of the “anonymised data” be deleted. This would further include the deletion of the reference to the non-personal data throughout the new law, something which appears to be a back-channel enabler of infringement of the right to privacy. It is thought to be pointed out that none of the progressive data protection regimes across the world contains such blanket assertions enabling the State to process any personal data, covered under the guise of non-personal data for the purposes of policymaking and better targeting of the welfare schemes and the retention of the aforementioned provisions in the final bill shall be detrimental to the very concept of a robust data protection regime in the country.

6.3 A Feeble Data Protection Authority

The data protection authority is the cornerstone of any data protection authority all over the world. One may hold the position of data protection authority in a digital society to be analogous to the election commission in a democratic society. What India, as a country which is yet at a nascent stage of its awakening as a privacy conscious nation, needed was an independent agency that would place the interests of the data principals as the most sole objective of its existence. The data protection authority is not just a statutory body that should act upon the whims and fancies of the government of the day, instead the real objective behind having a data protection authority is to have an autonomous agency in place that would afford sufficient

insofar as such policy does not govern personal data. (2) The Central Government may, in consultation with the Authority, direct any data fiduciary or data processor to provide any personal data anonymised or other non-personal data to enable better targeting of delivery of services or formulation of evidence-based policies by the Central Government, in such manner as may be prescribed. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, the expression “non-personal data” means the data other than personal data. (3) The Central Government shall disclose annually the directions, made by it under sub-section (2), in such form as may be prescribed”).

safeguards to the citizens against any attempts from the part of the state to infringe the right to privacy of the citizens.

In what comes as the most unfortunate and disappointing aspect of the proposed data protection bill is the office of the Data Protection Authority. What the bill envisages is not a data protection authority even in the remotest sense. The proposed authority is just an extension of the central government with no element of independence and accountability mechanisms in place. The following are some of the most crucial aspects of the data protection authority that the proposed bill seeks to put in place. As most of the part of the bill, the objective behind the establishment of the data protection authority is quite misplaced. To put things in perspective, the bill actually does make no mention of the objective behind establishment of the authority⁵⁸⁸ and proceeds merely by explaining the nature of the institution. It is submitted that a holistic provision about the existence of the data protection authority will set forth the ground for having a more autonomous body in place.

The provision for the establishment of a data protection authority in this form shall lay the foundation of an independent body that has enough resources, infrastructural and financial capability to pursue its objective in a truly autonomous manner. The provisions stipulating the existence of at least 3 Joint Privacy Commissioners will ensure a greater degree of transparency and accountability within the authority. At the same time, keeping in consideration the mass unawareness towards the right to privacy, a separate coordinate of the Authority for promoting the importance of right to privacy shall be optimal to the establishment of a robust data protection regime in

⁵⁸⁸ The Personal Data Protection bill, § 41, *supra* note 47. Section 41 in its present form provides for the establishment of the data protection authority as, “(1) The Central Government shall, by notification, establish, for the purposes of this Act, an Authority to be called the Data Protection Authority of India. (2) The Authority referred to in sub-section (1) shall be a body corporate by the name aforesaid, having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power, subject to the provisions of this Act, to acquire, hold and dispose of property, both movable and immovable, and to contract and shall, by the said name, sue or be sued. (3) The head office of the Authority shall be at such place as may be prescribed. (4) The Authority may, with the prior approval of the Central Government, establish its offices at other places in India”).

the country. A separate wing of the commission for monitoring state surveillance will also go along way in preventing the state's intrusion within the private domain of individuals.

6.3.1 Composition of the Data Protection Authority

The composition of any agency is another vital factor influencing its functioning and its effectiveness. The internal structuring and the guidelines that establish an accountable framework within the organization have an indispensable role to play in the overall character of any agency. The proposed bill lacks the acumen of establishing such a body and the composition prescribed by it validates the argument that the data protection authority is anything but an independent body.

1. The composition of the data protection authority undermines the need for judicial oversight in the composition of the authority.⁵⁸⁹ The proposed bill provides that out of the six members in the commission, just one member shall be from the legal background.
2. Both the Chairperson and the members of the authority will be appointed by a select committee that would be comprised of just the civil servants⁵⁹⁰. It is absurd even to suggest that anybody that is elected by the servants of the government, who are on its payroll, shall appoint a non-partisan member to the authority which would adjudicate upon the disputes between the government (where it is the data fiduciary) against the citizens.

⁵⁸⁹ 1) The Authority shall consist of a Chairperson and not more than six whole-time Members, of which one shall be a person having qualification and experience in law.

⁵⁹⁰ (2) The Chairperson and the Members of the Authority shall be appointed by the Central Government on the recommendation made by a selection committee consisting of—(a) the Cabinet Secretary, who shall be Chairperson of the selection committee; (b) the Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry or Department dealing with the Legal Affairs; and (c) the Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry or Department dealing with the Electronics and Information Technology.

It is submitted that neither the composition of the board nor the composition of the selection committee appointing the members of the board represent the characteristics of an independent agency. The omission of the Chief Justice of India from the selection panel is one of the most worrying aspects of the bill. It is submitted that the composition of the board, the qualification of the board members and the composition of the selection committee be duly amended as;

It is submitted that the composition of the selection committee, the qualifications of the members and the composition of the Data Protection authority must be based on the approach as provided in the Annexure I. This will ensure an appropriate amalgamation of the judicial and technical expertise within the authority. Moreover, a non-partisan selection committee consisting of people holding constitutional and academic positions shall ensure a greater degree of autonomy and weed out the possibilities of political interferences within the functioning of the authority.

6.3.2 Terms and Conditions of Appointment

The next aspect that impacts the functioning of an agency after its composition is the terms of appointment of its top brass. An agency can't be expected to work independently if the sword of dismissal keeps on hanging over their heads. Unfortunately, the bill seeks to do exactly the same by not laying an objective standard for the process removal of the Chairman of the Data Protection Authority⁵⁹¹.

The bill lays down that, when any member is sought to be removed on the grounds of his continual in the office being detrimental to the public interest, or on the

⁵⁹¹ (1) The Central Government may remove from office, the Chairperson or any Member of the Authority who— (a) has been adjudged as an insolvent; (b) has become physically or mentally incapable of acting as a Chairperson or member; (c) has been convicted of an offence, which in the opinion of the Central Government, involves moral turpitude; (d) has so abused their position as to render their continuation in office detrimental to the public interest; or (e) has acquired such financial or other interest as is likely to affect prejudicially their functions as a Chairperson or a member. (2) No Chairperson or any member of the Authority shall be removed under clause (d) or (e) of subsection (1) unless he has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

grounds that he has acquired financial or any other interest that might impact his functioning, he would be given a chance to be heard. The bill makes no reference as to the authorities before whom such member will be given a chance to make a representation. Gauging the approach of the legislature so far, it may safely be concluded that such hearing would be made before an entirely executive body. It is thus, submitted that in order to ensure the autonomy of the authority, there should be a well-established mechanism for removal of the members. In pursuance of this objective, the provisions providing for the removal of the members of the data protection authority be amended as;

The suggested amendments will give the members a greater degree of autonomy to discharge their duties provided under the proposed Act. This would also fulfil necessities of imparting the character of autonomy to the authority. The last and perhaps the most important aspect of the office of data protection authority from the function perspective is the financial and functional autonomy of the agency. The proposed bill in the present form envisages a data protection authority that would be dependent upon the Central government for appointment of its members, the allocation of resources, salaries of its members. It is hereby suggested that the provisions providing for the salaries of the office holders be amended as follows: These suggestions, if incorporated within the final act will go a long way in establishing a Data Protection Authority that is autonomous and independent in the truest sense. It is submitted that the data protection authority proposed by the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 comes nowhere close to the idea of an independent data protection authority envisaged by the honorable Supreme Court. An independent data protection authority that resembles the election commission in terms of organization and structure will be at the heart of creating an effective data protection regime in India.

6.3.3 Powers of Data Protection Authority

After making these structural and organizational changes within the institution of the Data Protection Authority, the bill should also vest in the authority, enough powers to make its existence more relevant. The bill, as of now seeks to substantially curtail the powers of the Authority and confers it upon the Central government. The bill vests the power in the central government to categorize certain forms of personal data as sensitive data⁵⁹². It may be pointed out that the Data Protection Authority, with a battery of experts having a better understanding of the nuances of data, will be a better placed to categorize certain sections of data as the sensitive data. Thus, it is proposed that Section 15(1) of the Bill be amended as:

The Data Protection Authority, with reasons noted in writing shall, in consultation with the sectoral regulator concerned, notify such categories of personal data as "sensitive personal data",

While, it is important to confer upon the Data Protection Authority adequate powers, it is equally important to have accountability mechanisms in place to secure transparency within the organization. The bill empowers the Authority the powers of, “inspection of any book, document, register or record of any data fiduciary⁵⁹³.” However, the bill, unlike the previous draft, doesn’t mandate the publication of such inspection reports. It is suggested that the following provisions be added to secure a greater degree of transparency and accountability in the functioning of the authority. The inclusion of a mandatory provision will ensure the following;

⁵⁹²(1) The Central Government shall, in consultation with the Authority and the sectoral regulator concerned, notify such categories of personal data as “sensitive personal data”, having regard to— (a) the risk of significant harm that may be caused to the data principal by the processing of such category of personal data; (b) the expectation of confidentiality attached to such category of personal data; (c) whether a significantly discernible class of data principals may suffer significant harm from the processing of such category of personal data; and (d) the adequacy of protection afforded by ordinary provisions applicable to personal data.

⁵⁹³The Personal Data Protection bill, §54(8)(c), *supra* note 47

1. The data fiduciaries will be more familiar with their duties and the approach taken by the authorities while interpreting the provisions of the Act.
2. The data principals will have a better understanding of the modus operandi of the data fiduciaries.
3. The practice will impart greater legitimacy to the functioning of the Data Protection Authority.

The inclusion of these provisions will be beneficial to the data principal, data fiduciaries and the Data Protection Authority at the same time.

6.4 Materializing the Principle of Informed Consent

It has been already observed that the requirement of notice for processing of personal data is not a mere formality. The principle underlying the requirement of notice is based upon a rationale premise that every individual has the right to informational self-determination and the individual as the owner of his data has the right to decide what happens to his data. Notice also incorporates within its fold the notion of informed consent. However, the provisions of the proposed bill ignore this aspect of notice, in non-consensual processing of data. The provision does away with the requirement of notice in cases wherein the data is processed without the consent of the individuals if the notice would prejudice the purpose for which data is sought to be collected.

It is submitted that the provisions providing for the non-consensual processing of data may be completely done away with or substantially amended. Further, the provisions mandating the processing of personal data whether consensual or non-consensual be omitted. The Chapter providing for the non-consensual processing of data should contain the be amended as;

The limitation of processing of data without obtaining the consent of the data principals must be limited only to these emergency cases wherein obtaining the consent of data principal is practically impossible. The legislature should take into

account the fact that the data principal is the true owner of their data and non-consensual processing should be resorted to only in cases of emergencies.

6.4.1 Surveillance Reforms

Every state has a genuine interest to protect its sovereignty and national security. However, the opposing notions of national security and right to privacy have always been a cause of concern for the jurists all over the world. While, the Supreme Court of India recognized the need for carving out exemptions from the Data Protection Law, the smokescreen over the scope of such exemptions has yet not been cleared. On the guidelines of ICCPR and several judgments of the European Human rights Courts, the Supreme Court of India in *Justice Puttaswamy v. Union of India*⁵⁹⁴, adopted the doctrine of proportionality within the Indian constitutional scheme for testing the validity of the acts providing for the infringement of the right to privacy. As already discussed, the doctrine of proportionality is based on a four-pronged test that postulates that for infringement of the right to privacy to be proportionate and therefore constitutionally valid, the act must be in pursuit of a legitimate aim, must be absolutely necessary for achieving that aim, there should not be a less infringing way to achieve the same objective, the infringement must be proportional to the threat of harm.

However, It is submitted that such wide exemptions without any prescribed mechanism dealing with the nuances of surveillance are in blatant disregard to the law laid down in *Puttaswamy v. Union of India*⁵⁹⁵ for the reasons discussed earlier. It is suggested the provisions relating to the exemption clauses be completely overhauled and be replaced with a separate chapter dealing with the reforming the surveillance regime in India be added. The finder would like to propose a comprehensive framework for reforming and regulating the surveillance regime in India.

⁵⁹⁴K.S.Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 01.

⁵⁹⁵K.S.Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 01.

It is submitted that the implementation of these measures will pave the way for informational privacy within the country and thus will revamp the existing surveillance regime in India. The right to informational self-determination warrants complete control of the individuals over their data and the fact that the right to privacy has been recognized as a fundamental right, makes it even more important to accord adequate protection to informational privacy. It is submitted that the suggested provisions do incorporate within their realm the doctrine of proportionality and thus eliminate the possibilities of arbitrary intrusions into the right to privacy of the individuals. It is submitted that the while reform in the surveillance regime is one of the most indispensable aspects of a data protection regime in India which is sensitive to the rights of the data principal, it is equally important to give due weightage to the importance of informed consent.

6.4.2 The need to foster a Privacy Conscious Regime in India

A huge volume of Indian population lives below the poverty line and almost 80 million Indian live in acute poverty. A robust data protection regime in India will remain a distant dream if the state apparatus doesn't take upon itself the arduous task of creating awareness amongst the masses about the importance of informational privacy. However, instead of incentivizing the culture of privacy consciousness, the proposed bill seeks to impose barriers in the course of redressal of infringements of rights guaranteed under the law. The Section 21(2) of the proposed bill states that, *"For complying with the request made under sub-section (1), the data fiduciary may charge such fee as may be specified by regulations⁵⁹⁶."* This would imply that the data principals will have to pay for making requests while exercising their right over their own data, which have expressly been recognized by the proposed Act.

⁵⁹⁶The Personal Data Protection bill, §21(2), *supra* note 47.

6.5 Baron Seeking Remedies for Breach of Rights Guaranteed under the Bill

It is suggested that all the provisions within the proposed bill that seek to create a barrier in the form of Data Protection Authority for enforcement of the rights recognized by the law will be deleted. If at all, the legislature deems it necessary to have a role of data protection authority in the redressal of the dispute.

This would ensure that the adjudicatory powers of the Data Protection Authority do not come in conflict with the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the citizens of India. Moreover, the free legal opinion from the Data Protection Authority shall ensure a greater degree of awareness about the right to privacy among the common Indians.

6.6 Need for Expansion Rights of the Data Fiduciaries

It is submitted that the provisions related to the rights of data principal may be revisited in order to do away with the unnecessary procedural barriers in the enforcement of the rights. The sections dealing with the rights of the citizens be amended as proposed:

It is submitted that the express adoption of the rights of the data principals in the widest amplitude will felicitate better protection of the informational privacy of the individuals.

The aforementioned provision shall ensure that the technicalities of the procedure don't eclipse the rights of informational self-determination. It is further suggested that the aspects of sections 19⁵⁹⁷, 21⁵⁹⁸ and 25⁵⁹⁹ of the bill be suitably amended to make it easier for the data principals to get their rights enforced without procedural hurdles. It is suggested that the proviso to section 20(2) be deleted. The provision seeks to place the onus of proving that the continued processing of their data will not be detrimental to the public interest. It is submitted that this approach runs counter

⁵⁹⁷The Personal Data Protection bill, §19, *supra* note 47.

⁵⁹⁸The Personal Data Protection bill, §21, *supra* note 47.

⁵⁹⁹The Personal Data Protection bill, §25, *supra* note 47.

to the ethos of informational self-determination and thus, it is suggested that the proviso be replaced by a provision that expressly puts the onus of proving that the discontinuation of processing of data would be detrimental to public interest and jeopardize the right to information. The proposed amendments coupled with the inclusion of the expansion of the scope of the rights of the individuals under the Act shall be a precursor to a meaningful data protection legislation.

6.7 The Need for A Transitional Period

India is by far one of the least privacy conscious countries in the world. The Indian awakening into an era of privacy consciousness is yet at an extremely nascent stage. The menace of misinformation and lack of awareness plague the transition of India into a privacy conscious society. The suggested Data Protection Law is all set to introduce revolutionary changes in the way one views their data. As of now, a huge chunk of Indian population who have been at the epicentre of the digital revolution in the country have scarce idea of anything known as Data protection law. It is submitted that the data protection law isn't just a regulatory mechanism, instead it's an instrument that would alter every aspect of the digital society that we live in. Thus, it is optimal to first create a sufficient degree of awareness about the right to privacy and right to informational privacy in particular to mark the beginning of a meaningful data protection regime in the country. A data protection law isn't a tonic that can be injected into the Indian society overnight to transform the prism through which the Indian view the right to privacy.

It must be noted that no number of rights conferred upon the data principals and obligations placed upon the data fiduciaries will materialize the vision of a healthy data protection regime in India. The first step has to be the creation of awareness amongst the citizens about the aspects of informational privacy both amongst the data principals and the data fiduciaries. This is the sole reason that India needs a transition sphere which would be a sort of buffer period that would ensure the transition of India from a privacy indifferent society to a data privacy society. The

previous draft bill (Data Protection Bill 2018) had acknowledged the need of a buffer period that would be required for the transition of the Indian society into a privacy conscious society which would understand the need for the informational privacy. It is submitted that unless there is an awareness amongst the mass about the worth of their privacy, all the substantial provisions recognizing their rights will fall into abeyance.

Moreover, a complete overhaul of the Data Protection regime in a country as vast as India, will prove to be a cause of ruckus. The draft bill had incorporated the need of a transitional phase and had included a detailed framework for the date of establishment of the Data Protection Authority and the sunrise and sunset clauses to ensure a smooth transition to the new regime. However, the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 does not contain any reference whatsoever about the buffer period that would enable the transition. It is suggested that the bill should incorporate a definite timeframe under which the provisions of the Act will come into force. Failing which, the data fiduciaries too might feel a lot of confusion regarding the new provisions which would eventually give rise to serious problems in implementation.

It is also suggested that a clear cutoff date for implementation of the provisions of the proposed Act shall set forth a clear architectural framework for the implementation of the provisions of the law, failing which, it might take years for the law to come into force. Thus, it is suggested that the provision based upon the transition phase be added to the proposed bill. The provision may be on the following lines;

A data protection law must not only recognize the rights of the individuals; it must provide a mechanism conducive to the enforcement of such rights. The bill in present form gives undue emphasis to the interests of data fiduciaries as far as the rights of the data principals are concerned.

The pendulum of convenience has been swinging in favor of the data fiduciaries from the very beginning of the digital revolution and the data protection regime in India should do all that is needed to place the rights of the data principal on the driving seat. The onus to prove compliance of the provisions of the proposed Act must be placed upon the data fiduciaries and the regime should felicitate the involvement of data fiduciaries in becoming more privacy conscious and thus there is a pressing need to incentivize the common Indiansto enforce their rights within the law. While, the parliament is yet to finalize the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019, the finder would, in the light of aforementioned analysis propose the following amendments in the proposed bill in this annexure.

6.8 Conclusion

The Chapter summarizes the outcome of the study of the previous chapters to suggest a robust framework that would lay the foundations of a strong data protection regime in India. The suggestions include amendments to the key provisions of the proposed data protection law so that the globally accepted data protection principles are incorporated within the India data protection regime.

- The Chapter deals with the rationale and jurisprudence behind the data protection laws all over the world. With an impetus on the need for affording adequate protection for protecting the informational privacy, the chapter highlights the contours of an effective data protection framework.
- The Chapter also deals with the various data protection principles that have been developed across the globe while analytically distinguishing the origin of the theme of Data Protection as an aspect of the Right to Privacy.
- The study accorded a thorough insight into the need of striking the perfect balance between the need to achieve the goal of informational self-determination and meeting the needs of an increasingly digitalized world.
- The undertaken study provides the finder with an insight into the key limbs of a robust data protection regime in a democratic society. With special emphasis on the OCED Principles, the finder seeks to formulate an optimum data protection model for the Indian scheme in the upcoming chapters.
- The study has enabled the finder to identify the key aspects of a robust data

protection regime.

- The Comparative analysis of the Data Protection Regime in India and the European Union, the United States and the United Kingdom along with some of the BRICS countries has highlighted a myriad set of issues that continue to plague the Indian data protection framework.
- A specific study regarding the existing data protection laws in the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States has been undertaken to get an insight into the global best practices related to data protection.
- The fact that European Union already has a comprehensive data protection regime in place for over three decades makes it imperative to undertake a detailed study of its data protection framework for pragmatically broadening the ambit of analysis on the subject.
- The assessment of the existing data protection laws in the advanced data protection regimes like the United States, the European Union was aimed at establishing a benchmark that would guide the Indian policymakers with regards to the various contours of an ideal data protection regime, of course with necessary variations to adapt to the Indian society.
- The study of data protection laws in the BRICS countries, was made with an object of drawing a parallel between the approach of authoritarian communist regimes and the liberal democracies in data protection arena.
- The study highlighted the key aspects a robust data protection regime while effectively apprising the challenges in securing informational privacy while promoting international trade.
 - The Chapter on DATA PROTECTION REGIME IN INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM undertakes a detailed study of the existing legislations and judicial precedents in the field of right to privacy and data protection within the Indian scheme.
- The study highlights a myriad set of lacunas within the Indian data protection framework which is ill equipped to tackle the challenges posed to the informational privacy in the wake of intense digitalization. It also brings forth the absence of key data protection principles in the existing legislations in the country.
- The study in the chapter further highlights the pressing need to enact a comprehensive data protection code that would recognize the principle of informational self-determination at its helm.

- While the existing data protection regime in India comes nowhere close to the global best practices on data protection, the proposed Personal Data Protection Bill 2019 does seek to bridge the existing gap by adopting the key data protection principles.
- In spite of there being apparent evidences of data breaches in Aadhar program, the Indian legislature has crafted a huge window of exemption clauses that would render the state agencies capable of intruding upon the rights of the data principals on a wide range of grounds.
- A notable departure from the focal feature of the data protection laws of the countries included within the domain of analysis portrays an attempt on the part of the legislature to shield the agencies of the central government from being subjected to the obligations under the act.
- The provisions of the IT Act, 2000 and the Information Technology Rules, 2011 make the safeguards inapplicable against the state and its instrumentalities. This goes along way in watering down the effectiveness of the Indian Data protection regime.
- The finder has also done a detailed study of the approach of the India Supreme Court towards the right to privacy in order to gauge the approach that the Indian constitutional courts are going to take with regard to the interpretation of the provisions of the upcoming data protection law.
- The exemption clauses in the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 do not adhere to the doctrine of proportionality while warranting the non-application of the provisions of the proposed law to any central agencies on absolutely wide grounds of the sovereignty of India and Public order.
- These exemptions are quite wide in their scope and application and the central government shall be able to exempt any agency from the application of the provisions of the Act for offences like, “*preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to public order.*”⁶⁰⁰

REFERENCES:

STATUTES

- Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 6501–6505
- Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 1986 (P.L. 99-508).
- Fair Credit Reporting Act 15 U.S.C. § 1681
- Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g
- General Data Protection Regulation (EU GDPR), (EU) 2016/679
- Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, P.L. No. 104-191
- Indian Contract Act, 1872, No. 09, Acts of Parliament, 1872. (India)
- Information Technology Act, 2000, No. 21, Acts of Parliament, 2000. (India)
- IT (Amendment) Act, 2008, No. 10, Acts of Parliament, 2009. (India)
- Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019, Bills of Parliament, 2019 (India)
- The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2016. (India)
 - Video Privacy Protection Act, 1988 Pub.L. 100–618

ARTICLES

- Adriana-Maria Sandru; Daniel-Mihail Sandru, *Humanitarian Law and Personal Data Protection*, 2018 PANDECTELE ROMANE 58, 61 (2018).
- Anupam Chander & Molly Land, *United Nations General Assembly Resolution on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age*, 53 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 727 735 (2014).
- Asang Wankhede, *Data Protection in India and the EU: Insights in Recent Trends and Issues in the Protection of Personal Data*, 2 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 70, 73 (2016).
- Asang Wankhede, *Data Protection in India and the EU: Insights in Recent Trends and Issues in the Protection of Personal Data*, 2 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 70, 86 (2016).
- Brent Snook, Joseph Eastwood, Paul Gendreau, Claire Goggin & Richard M. Cullen, *Taking Stock of Criminal Profiling: A Narrative Review and Meta-Analysis*, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAVIOR 437, 455 (2007).
- Brian Gorlick, *Human Rights and Refugees: Enhancing Protection through International*

Human Rights Law, 69 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 117, 126 (2000).

- Cheng-Yun Tsang, *From Industry Sandbox to Supervisory Control Box: Rethinking the Role of Regulators in the Era of FinTech*, 2019 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 355, 360 (2019).
- Erica Fraser, *Data Localisation and the Balkanisation of the Internet*, 13 SCRIPTED 359, 365 (2016) ID.
- Eva Fialova, *Data Portability and Informational Self-Determination*, 8 MASARYK U. J.L. & TECH. 45, 53 (2014).
- Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Jonathan Gray & Mireille Van Eechoud, *Open Data, Privacy, and Fair Information Principles: Towards a Balancing Framework*, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 2073 2097 (2015).
- Gillian Metzger, *Designing Agency Independence*, (2011) JOTWELL: J. THINGS WE LIKE 141, 145 (2011)
- . M. Seervai, *The emergency, future safeguards and the habeas corpus case: A Criticism*, 21 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 103, 111 (2007).
- Hallinan, D., 2019. *Opinions: Data Protection without Data: Could Data Protection Law Apply without Personal Data Being Processed?*, 5(3) EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW REVIEW 293, 299. (2019).
- Joan M. Kiel, *The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Implementation Via Case Law*, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 435, 448 (2004).
- Jonathan Miller, S., *How Did You Know That: Protecting Privacy Interests of Research Participants via Certificates of Confidentiality*, 17 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 90, 100 (2015).
<<https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080%2F1360083042000325274>>
- Joshua Warmund, *Can COPPA Work - An Analysis of the Parental Consent Measures in the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act*, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 189, 210 (2000).
- Joss Wright, *Regional variation in Chinese Internet Filtering*. INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION & SOCIETY 121, 123 (2014).
- Laura F. Edwards, *Rights That Made the World Right*, 102 JUDICATURE 15,

20 (2018)

- Lee A. Bygrave, *Data Protection Pursuant to the Right to Privacy in Human Rights Treaties*, 6 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 247, 246 (1998).
- Lilian Edwards, *Privacy, Security and Data Protection in Smart Cities: A Critical EU Law Perspective*, 2 EUR. DATAPROT. L. REV. 28, 40 (2016)
- Lina Jasmontaite, *European Union: The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) Opinion 4/2015 Towards a New Digital Ethics*, 2 EUR. DATAPROT. L. REV. 93, 112 (2016).
- Lokke Moerel; Ronan Tigner, *Data Protection Implications of Brexit*, 2 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 381, 388 (2016).
- Maria Tzanou, *Data protection as a fundamental right next to privacy? 'Reconstructing' a not so new right*, 3(2) INTERNATIONAL DATA PRIVACY LAW 88, 99 (2013), <<https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipt004>>.
 - Matthias Berberich; Malgorzata Steiner, *Blockchain Technology and the GDPR - How to Reconcile Privacy and Distributed Ledgers*, 2 EUR. DATAPROT. L. REV. 422, 431 (2016).S
- Michael A. Livermore, *Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence*, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 609, 615 (2014).
- Monika Zalnieriute, *An International Constitutional Moment for Data Privacy in the times of Mass-Surveillance*, 23(2) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LAW AND INFORMATION 99, 107 (2015).
- *Rights in Conflict - Reconciling Privacy with the Public's Right to Know*, 63 LAW LIBR. J. 551, 563 (1970).
 - Ruth Gavison, *Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction*, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1, 8 (1992).
- Ryan M. Calo, *Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere)*, 87(3) NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 1030, 1031
- Sougata Talukdar, *Privacy and Its Protection in Informative Technological Compass in India*, 12 NUJS L. REV. 1, 55 (2019).
- Sougata Talukdar, *Privacy and Its Protection in Informative Technological Compass in India*, 12 NUJS L. REV. 1, 11 (2019)
 - Subhajit Basu, *Policy-Making, Technology and Privacy in India*, 6 INDIAN J.L. & TECH. 65, 70 (2010).

- Susan Nevelow Mart, *The Right to Receive Information*, 95 LAW LIBR. J. 175,190 (2003).
- Tschentscher, A., *Privacy and Data Protection by Rules Rather than Principles*. SSRN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL 153 (2017),
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2372088>.
- Vinita Bali, *Data Privacy, Data Piracy: Can India Provide Adequate Protection for Electronically Transferred Data*, 21 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 103, 106 (2007).
- Will Thomas DeVries, *Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age*, BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 283, 311 (2003).
- Wilson, B., *Data Privacy in India: The Information Technology Act.2* SSRNELECTRONIC JOURNAL 82, 88 (2010).

BOOKS

- CATHERINE MACKINNON, TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 322 (1989).
- CHRSTOPHER KUNAR, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW: CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND REGULATION 57 (2003).
- CYRUS FARIVAR, HABEAS DATA: PRIVACY VS. THE RISE OF SURVEILLANCE TECH 353 (2018).
- J BLACKMAN, 'OMNIVEILLANCE, PRIVACY IN PUBLIC, AND THE RIGHT TO YOUR DIGITAL IDENTITY: A TORT FOR RECORDING AND DISSEMINATING AN INDIVIDUAL'S IMAGE OVER THE INTERNET' 321 (2009).
- JOHNBUYERS,ARTIFICIALINTELLIGENCE:THEPRACTICALLEGAL ISSUES 110 (2018)
 - JOHNKLEINIG,THENATUREOFCONSENTINTHEETHICSOFCONSENT- THEORY AND PRACTICE (4th, Alan Wertheimer and Franklin Miller eds, 2009).
- STUART RUSSEL AND PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH 233 (2009).
- V. RICHARD BENJAMINS, POMPEU CASANOVAS,JOOST BREUKER,ALDO GANGEMI, LAW AND THE SEMANTIC WEB: LEGAL ONTOLOGIES, METHODOLOGIES, LEGAL INFORMATION RETRIEVAL, AND APPLICATIONS 35 (2010).
- WALTERS, ROBERT, TRAKMAN, LEON, ZELLER,BRUNODATA PROTECTION

LAW: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ASIA-PACIFIC AND EUROPEAN APPROACHES 514 (2019).

- WILLIAM MCGEREVAN, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION LAW 421 (2016).
- WOODROW BARFIELD, UGO PAGALLO, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 675 (2018).

SAMPLE BOOK

SAMPLE BOOK